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Dissertation supervised by Radu Bordeianu 
 Post-Conciliar ecclesiological reflection in the United States has been largely critical of 
Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity.  The criticism is focused around two concepts used to 
differentiate the lay state from clergy and religious: that the lay vocation takes place principally 
among the life and work of the world, having a “secular character” and that the activity of the 
laity, as a participation in the priesthood of Christ, is the consecration the world itself to God.  
According to this critique, these concepts are problematic because they juxtapose the task of the 
laity in the world with the task of the clergy who are the sole proprietors of the sacred.  This is 
compounded by 20th Century theologies of grace.  Acknowledging a human task of mediation 
(consecration of the world) would be the equivalent to arguing that the world was not already 
filled with the grace of God.  Together these issues set up a series of unacceptable dichotic pairs: 
 
 v 
the separate activity of laity/clergy implies a division between secular/sacred and ultimately of 
God and the world. 
 I assert that Maximus the Confessor’s theological vision is a corrective to the views 
expressed in post-Vatican II literature.  Maximian thought resolves the aporia introduced by 
these dichotomies not because it refutes specific premises, but because it approaches the problem 
of God and the world from a different standpoint altogether.  I argue that within Maximus’ 
theological worldview, the goodness of creation is entrusted to humanity for consecration.  The 
offering of creation to God arises from creation’s own goodness, based within the maximian 
concept of the logoi.  It is this priestly act that unites humanity with creation and constitutes their 
shared deifying communion.  The maximian lens also serves to deepen and enrich Lumen 
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 From 2008 to 2017 I had the honor of serving Catholic students at the University of 
Central Florida as a campus minister.  During that time, I was constantly inspired by the students' 
eagerness to grow in their faith through prayer, study, service, and outreach to one another.  The 
success of the ministry hinged upon the dedication made by the students who had accepted 
positions of service and leadership.  The generous response of these students often led them to 
discover new gifts.  Gifts that they were more than happy to share with their faith community. 
 As one would expect, an overarching concern of these young men and women was 
discerning their own vocation.  There was always a palpable thirst for a firm identity of who they 
were and who they were called to be.  Many of my most cherished experiences from this time 
were moments when students shared their lives with me and allowed me to be a witness to their 
walk with God as they made decisions for life after college. 
 Many times, their aspirations were formed by their experience within the campus 
ministry community.  They had tasted the fulfillment that comes from earnest self-giving.  Some 
translated their experience into work as missionaries in a variety of contexts while others decided 
to pursue full-time ministry or a celibate vocation.  The majority of students would discern to 
lead lives that did not revolve around work in or for the Church.  They would go on to have 
careers in their field of study, entering competitive environments of corporations, academic 
research, and raise families. 
 Conversations with these men and women after they had become alumni centered around 
how to become involved in the parish they were moving to or how to best use their gifts to form 
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a community if they were to find themselves in a place where they were not finding spiritual 
nourishment.  We would speak about how they could continue to foster their gifts in their new 
environment, everything from looking for a role in their new church to sharing their faith through 
personal evangelization.  Despite efforts to highlight God's presence in their daily realities, there 
was a tangible difficulty for them to see how they could serve God in these new circumstances as 
they had during their time on campus. 
 On occasion, a young man or woman would decide to leave their new careers behind to 
pursue a lifestyle with an explicit missionary calling - to positions of service or a lifelong 
vocation.  Whether this was the genuine discernment of a vocational calling or a longing to 
recapture enthusiasm they once had is beyond my ability to say.  What is certain is that there was 
a disconnect between the life lived within the community and their experience of faith as a 
person working in a non-ecclesial profession.  Their stories demonstrate for me how difficult it is 
to communicate the spiritual and theological worth of activities that are not explicitly connected 
to ministerial work in the Church. 
 At the center of this experience is the question of the relevance of the Church to everyday 
life and activity.   
A Pre-Conciliar Dilemma 
My experience reflects a personal discovery of the ambiguities surrounding the life of the 
laity described by Jacques Maritain in his 1965 note to Pope Paul VI on “The Spiritual Mission 
of the Laity”: 
I sometimes ask myself if … under the pressure of circumstances and practical needs, this 
question of the role of the laity in the life of the Mystical Body has not been developed in 
too empirical a manner from too partial a point of view without having been sufficiently 
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thought through for itself and in all its fullness … What we need is a study of the whole 
question, in all its ramifications in which consideration is given not only to that form of 
witnessing and that spiritual mission (apostolic mission) which are peculiar to laymen, 
but also to those modalities peculiar to their interior life, to their spiritual trials, to their 
prayer (liturgical as well as private), and to their progress toward union with God and the 
perfection of charity, which is evidently what must come before all else … we have never 
been able to escape from the perspective of a participation in the apostolate proper to the 
clergy, a perspective which has been broadened more and more (as if it were ultimately 
capable of encompassing the laity in its entirety) all the while retaining from the same 
specific perspective and continuing to see everything from the same original point of 
view.1 
 
While Maritain’s insights are couched in the language of pre-conciliar ecclesiology, they 
remain an accurate representation of the tension that has persistently vexed theologies of the laity 
and are just as relevant as they were over fifty years ago.  Fleshing out the theology behind the 
layperson’s place in the Church and their relationship to the apostolic mission was a task that 
demanded the attention of the theological luminaries that would shape the Second Vatican 
Council.  Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Gerard Philips, and Yves Congar were among the 
prominent periti who offered guidance to the council Fathers on the issue of the laity leading up 
to and throughout the conciliar proceedings. The discussion was colored by the pontificates of 
Pius XI, Pius XII and Paul VI with their expansive vision for lay activity incarnated in groups 
like Catholic Action.  The increase of lay activity in and on behalf of the Church along with 
                                                          
1Jacques Maritain, "The Spiritual Mission of the Laity," Communio 14, no. 2 (1987). 
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renewed interest in ecclesiology made the laity a crucial topic for the coming council.  At issue 
were fundamental questions: What is the nature and theological status of the laity? Could the 
laity be said to have a mission distinct from the apostolate of the clergy?  Or is their Christian 
activity merely an extension of the extant apostolic mission of the hierarchy? 
The prominence of lay issues was a major reason for the jettisoning of the council’s 
original schema for the Church’s constitution.  The outline inherited from the unfinished 
business of the First Vatican Council and was based upon late 19th Century concerns.  Gerard 
Philips who chronicled the development of the Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on the 
Church, Lumen Gentium, notes that the fathers collectively realized a serious need for a 
declaration on the laity.2 Demonstrative of the views that would influence such a declaration was 
the insightful elocution of Cardinal Suenens who declared that in her ecclesiology the Church 
must shift from “Ecclesia ad intra to the ecclesia ad extra.”3  
Over the course of the document’s development the topic of the laity only grew in 
importance.  Whereas the laity was not a heading mentioned in the schema that Vatican II 
inherited from Vatican I, it rose in the early proposals to being one of twelve chapters and 
eventually was judged to be a central issue.  The final document concerned itself with the laity as 
a part of the whole of the Church in chapter two and dedicated all of chapter four to a deeper 
discussion of the role of the laity in the Church and the world.  As we shall see, the task 
undertaken by the conciliar fathers was an attempt to demonstrate “a new understanding for the 
actual life of the overwhelming majority of Christians.”4 But for many the expression of the 
                                                          
2 Gérard Philips, "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church: History of the Constitution," in Commentary on the 
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), 105. 
3 Cardinal Suenens quoted in Philips, "History of the Constitution," 107. 
4 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 121. 
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council demarcates a point of departure. 
 
Argument of the Dissertation 
The ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is an attempt to present the Church’s life 
and mission as a shared task of clergy, religious, and laity alike.  This emphasis can be discerned 
through the statements and structure of Lumen Gentium, Vatican II’s Constitution on the Church.  
The document highlights the laity in particular, attempting for the first time in a conciliar 
document to outline the task and life of the lay faithful.  LG describes the laity in a twofold 
manner.  First, a negative definition by which the laity are distinguished as not being the 
ordained clergy or members of religious orders; second by the description of the lay vocation as 
taking place principally among the life and work of the world.  This “secular character” was 
complemented with a demonstration of how the laity share in the threefold office of Christ as 
priest, prophet, and king.  Of these descriptions the best developed was the priestly action of the 
laity who in their daily lives are called to make offerings through Christ, “consecrating the world 
itself to God.”5  
 Post-conciliar ecclesiological reflection in the United States of America was largely 
critical of this description of the laity.  While the council clearly intended to express a Church 
unified in mission and action, many authors questioned whether the texts of the council 
guaranteed this equality.  The epicenter of this criticism was the continued use of the negative 
definition of the laity as non-clergy.  Compounding the issue, the laity were described almost 
exclusively in an extra-ecclesial fashion. The description offered in LG characterized the lay 
vocation as taking place within the world. The laity are concerned with secular work, juxtaposed 
                                                          
5 Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, ed. Norman P. Tanner, vol. 2, 
Decrees of the Ecumentical Councils, (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964), 32. From this point abbreviated as LG. 
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with the clerical work of the hierarchy who work in the realm of the sacred within and for the 
Church.  The post-conciliar literature was critical of a sacred/secular distinction and cautioned 
against reinstating an ecclesiology that defined clergy as the sole active ministers and reduced 
the laity to passive receptivity. 
 To solve this apparent contradiction between the intention of the conciliar fathers and the 
text born from the fruit of the proceedings many theologians outlined what they perceived to be 
the intended trajectory of conciliar thought.  This trajectory favored further development of the 
laity’s role within the Church as a reaction to the council’s emphasis on secularity.  A turn 
toward intra-ecclesial workings and ministry, the discussion of action in the world was left by the 
wayside.  Some authors prescribed doing away with the concepts of the secular and sacred 
altogether, with the unintended consequence of reducing much of the conversation to internal 
church affairs.  Extra-ecclesial human activity was rarely discussed. 
 In my analysis of the post-conciliar texts, I will argue that we can discern the formulation 
of two distinct but oft associated dichotic pairs.  First, the couplet of laity/clergy, which discerns 
an inequality within the Church’s mission and activity.  The distinction of laity and clergy is 
often downplayed or argued against since it is perceived to perpetuate a laity who remains 
passive as unequal participants in the Church’s life and mission.  In place of this, emphasis is 
placed upon the common dignity derived from Christian baptism.  Intra-ecclesial organization is 
described in terms of relationships within the community rather than being based upon a special 
status of the clergy. This concern for equality often highlights ministerial activity as a shared 
reality among all Christians. 
 A second dichotic pair is causally connected to the first: if clerical action takes place in a 
sacred sphere and the laity act within a secular sphere there must be a strong delineation between 
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the realm of the sacred and the secular.  The delineation between secular and sacred is 
interpreted as a real separation between spheres of activity and ultimately has implications for 
the relationship between the world and God.  Often the second dichotomy is nested within the 
first as the clergy are seen to be actively handing on grace through their ministry while the laity 
are portrayed as passive recipients.  Such a model is seen to perpetuate the understanding that 
there is a two-caste system within the Church with the clergy always being above the laity who 
rely on the clergy for access to the sacred, including God. 
 Underlying this second dichotomy is a critique of the concept of mediation as it is 
expressed in the texts of the council.  If, as the Council affirms, the world has been created by 
God as good, then the consecration of the world to God seems tautological.  This criticism is 
aimed both at the clergy’s role as sacramental ministers as well as the laity’s bespoke task of 
world consecration.  In post-conciliar literature the apparent contradiction forms the basis of the 
argument that language regarding a Christian mission to the world leads to the perception that 
the world itself is separated from God.  Acknowledging a human task of mediation would be the 
equivalent to arguing that the world was not already filled with the grace of God.  These 
criticisms effectively mute any theological possibility of lay consecration of the world to God 
because of fundamental presuppositions about God’s relationship to the world. 
 I assert that Maximus the Confessor’s theological vision is a corrective to the views 
expressed in various post-Vatican II literature.  I will endeavor to showcase the Confessor’s 
theology of creation and human vocation, rather than a point-by-point comparison with 
contemporary theologies.  I believe that maximian thought resolves the aporia introduced by 
these dichotomies not because it refutes specific premises, but because it approaches the problem 
of God and the world from a different standpoint altogether.  I will argue that within Maximus’ 
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theological worldview, the goodness of creation is entrusted to humanity for consecration.  The 
offering of creation to God arises from creation’s own goodness, based within the maximian 
concept of the logoi.  It is this priestly act that unites humanity with creation and constitutes their 
shared deifying communion. 
 There are four key characteristics within Maximus’ conceptual framework that stand in 
service of this line of argumentation: mystical apophaticism, Chalcedonism, freedom, and 
Maximus’ vision for the liturgical unity of humanity and the cosmos.  These concepts are woven 
into the seam of the Confessor’s thought and interact in a way that forms a cohesive unity.  
Maximus’ distinction between God and creation is rooted in the apophatic acknowledgement of 
God as incomprehensibly Other.  The Chalcedonian adverbs used to define the hypostatic union 
are applied to this cosmological distinction and grant clarity to Maximus’ view of how God and 
creation can exist communally yet without division, without change, without separation and 
without confusion.  These qualifiers preserve freedom within communion.  They allow for a free 
exchange between the participants of that communion since they do not admit one dialogic 
partner to be assimilated into the other.  This free exchange reaches its consummation in the 
collective offering of the cosmos back to God.  The whole of Maximus’ cosmological and 
anthropological thought can be viewed in relation to these four pillars. 
 Maximus’ cosmology describes a creation that is inherently good and filled with God’s 
presence.  The Confessor’s view is most clearly stated in his response to Origen’s claim that the 
world is a result of sin perpetrated by spiritual beings.  The exchange allows Maximus to present 
his cosmology in depth.  Neither movement nor creation are a result of any sort of corruption but 
are parts of God’s original plan.  The Confessor emphasizes the goodness of creation and 
explains that creation ex nihilo is nothing less than a free, loving act of God.  Due to the nature of 
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creation, as Maximus presents it, there is a real and inviolable ontological distance between God 
and contingent beings.  This distinction is not problematic for Maximus who, taking cues from 
Gregory of Nyssa, sees it as the setting for perpetual ontological movement toward participation 
in God.  This movement is facilitated by the embedded wills of God in all created things, the 
logoi.  The logoi participate in the one Logos as their origin and as the means of their 
eschatological fulfillment.  God’s will for each individual being, their individuated logos, 
includes an eschatological invitation built into the very nature of that being.  The logoi remain 
permanently embedded within creation.  It is up to the freedom of created beings to respond to 
them and facilitate their return, thus orienting them back toward God.  The concept of the logoi, 
for Maximus, is qualified by the Chalcedonian mode of communion.  As already mentioned, this 
preserves beings in their individuality and avoids assimilation.  Maximus describes a communion 
that is without change, without division, without separation, and without confusion that allows 
for the free movement of created beings back to God as their origin and eschatological 
fulfillment. 
 The whole cosmological vision as encompassed in this maximian doctrine of the logoi is 
indispensable for understanding Maximus’ view of the human person and the central role of 
humanity within creation.  The vocation of all human persons is to offer creation back to God 
through humanity’s deification and the deification of the entire creation, the conversion of the 
logoi.  This is not a task that humanity can carry out alone.  Drawing on the Christological 
tradition of his time, Maximus holds that humanity must participate in the new theandric energy 
made possible by the hypostatic union of divine and human natures in Christ.  The mutual 
communion and participation of the human and the divine allows humanity to cross the 
ontological distance without violating the status of God as apophatically Other.  This union 
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draws together all that is properly human.  Within his schema, Maximus affirms the goodness of 
the human body and human freedom describing their crucial role in the process of deification.  
The communion of logoi is not limited to what is present within humanity.  Through the 
conversion of the logoi embedded in creation by Christ, and in Christ’s humanity, all of creation 
is offered back to God. On account of the framework Maximus develops based upon the logoi, 
Maximus depicts the unity of a single person, the whole of the Church, and all of creation as a 
Eucharistic sacrifice of praise to God. 
 We can characterize the relationship between God and creation as the eucharistic 
exchange of gifts.6 This dialogic reciprocity takes place as the corporate unity of creation and 
humanity, but it can also be understood on the individual level.  It is in this framework that we 
are enabled to present Maximus in a manner that is applicable to the ecclesial vocation of 
individual lay persons.  Logoi are presented as a free gift of God embedded within creation to 
which the human person responds freely.  An affirmative response to the logoi, in other words, a 
free choice to return them as a gift to God is the act constitutive of a “micro-dialogue” between 
God and that individual within the framework of a logoi-laden creation precisely as the means of 
that dialogue. 
 I contend that this theology as a whole brings us to key insights that are applicable to the 
current state of the theology of the laity on a number of grounds.  First, Maximus shares a 
concern for unity within the Church — and beyond the Church, the whole cosmos — as equal 
participants in the praise of God.  Second, the definition of the logoi and the understanding of 
human mediation as a dialogic reciprocity between God and creation demonstrates that for 
                                                          
6 The summation of Maximus’ theology as a Eucharistic Ontology is masterfully presented by Loudovikos in 
Nikolaos Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of Being as 
Dialogical Reciprocity, trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2010). 
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Maximus the difference between God and the world is not one of separation based on mutually 
exclusive realities but, rather, one of a distinction permitting communion without confusion.  
With these insights in hand, I will address the dichotic concerns of the literature responding to 
Vatican II in a way that not only de-problematizes them but reproposes them as distinctions 
constitutive of the divine/human communion. 
 Using Maximus’ framework to answer the post-conciliar criticism has ramifications for 
our interpretation of the conciliar documents.  Returning to the description of the laity offered in 
Lumen Gentium I will argue that viewing the priesthood of the laity through the maximian lens 
expands upon the definition in ways that are helpful for understanding the laity as a concrete 
vocation.  The Confessor’s insights into the participative nature of theandric dialogical 
reciprocity grant the tasks of the laity within the world eternal significance while striking the 
proper theological tension between human and divine action.  I argue that their daily self-
offering holds creation in communion with God as dialogic participants that can be experienced 
now in a proleptic manner but await their final ratification in the eschaton. 
 
Method 
 This project will adopt a synoptic method with the intention of developing a lens based 
on the philosophical/theological system developed by Maximus the Confessor to address 
questions that have arisen from contemporary ecclesiological discussions about the role of the 
laity.  There will be a historical component in regard to both of the topics being presented.  First, 
I will trace the discussion of the secular character from Vatican II to the current state of the 
question. I will note the concerns that arise over the course of this analysis in order to provide 
points for dialogue with Maximus’ thought.  The second historical element will be the retrieval 
 
 12 
of Maximus’ thought, relying on primary texts and prominent maximian scholars to produce 
insights beneficial for theological conversations outside of historical theology. 
 This task is a comparative one insofar as it seeks to juxtapose notions of secularity and 
consecration from the discussion of 20th and 21st century theologies of the laity with those 
developed by Maximus within his seventh century Byzantine milieu.  The goal of this project is a 
synthesis that augments the contemporary discussion with the hope of reconciling the concepts 
of the goodness of creation with the human activity of consecrating the world to God.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
 In the first chapter I will trace the state of the question of the theology of the laity from 
Vatican II to the present.  I will analyze Lumen Gentium, Apostolicum Actuositatem, and 
Gaudium et Spes with the intention of drawing out their understanding of lay activity in the 
world.  I will discuss Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity and the exercise of the lay 
priesthood as the consecration of the world to God.  I will seek to contextualize this description 
by taking account of the different ways the council describes the world and secular activity.  
Properly understanding the way the conciliar documents use the lay priesthood and the world is 
crucial because these issues are often problematized in the post-conciliar literature.  The 
remainder of chapter one will be spent considering responses to the council, in turn.  I will 
analyze the work of Leonard Doohan, Thomas O’Meara, Aurelie Hagstrom, Pope John Paul II, 
Richard Gaillardetz, Paul Lakeland, and Edward Hahnenberg.  In this analysis I will summarize 
the contribution made by each author to the discussion on the laity.  I will pay particular attention 
to how each author interprets the concepts of the world and the exercise of mediation or a lay 
priesthood within the world.  Over the course of this analysis I will demonstrate how each author 
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contributes or responds to the formulation of the dichotic pairs of laity/clergy, secular/sacred, 
and world/God.  These dichotomies become the foundation for the critique of the conciliar 
description of the laity, functionally short-circuiting any understanding of the laity as Christians 
with a priestly role. 
 In chapter two, I will describe Maximus’ cosmology in depth.  Without a firm grasp on 
how the Confessor understands the world, his thought on mediation and the human relationship 
with God is incomprehensible.  At the core of his view is the conviction that the world is good 
while at the same time being other than God.  Maximus clarified this thought in response to 
Origen’s proposal that the world was created as a punishment for the sins of pre-incarnate 
beings.  With Origen as his foil, the Confessor outlines his vision for a world that participates in 
God, is free, good, and brimming with eschatological promise that it will one day share in divine 
activity.  Far from a simple rejoinder to a competing argument, Maximus’ cosmology is based in 
the monastic apophatic tradition and the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon (451 C.E.).  The 
Confessor’s cosmological tapestry coalesces in the notion of the logoi, the divine wills of God 
embedded in creation and indissolubly bound to the good nature of each created being.  It is by 
these logoi and the possibility of their eschatological fulfillment that God seeks to fulfill the 
desire to be embodied within creation. 
 With Maximus’ cosmology in hand, chapter three will focus on the vocation of humanity 
and the human task of mediation.  Behind Maximus’ anthropology is the claim that all humanity 
is drawn up into the communion of God and humanity found in the person of Jesus Christ.  
Maximus demonstrates how Christ fulfills the human vocation in himself and opens the way for 
all of humanity to participate in the same task of offering the whole of creation to God through a 
change in its mode, or tropos.  The Confessor’s concept of deification as the progression from 
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being, to well-being, to ever-well-being is key.  The process is one that promotes unity through 
participation and not assimilation.  This includes the preservation of particularity within 
deification.  I will highlight specifically how the human body and freedom factor into Maximus’ 
vision for deification.  The free communion of persons that includes all of creation is an apt 
description for divinization.  This dynamic takes place corporately within creation and liturgical 
worship.  The same can be said of individual beings.  We will explore the expression of this 
dynamic in its smallest scope through Loudovikos’ synthesis of Maximus as Eucharistic dialogic 
reciprocity. 
 In the fourth chapter, I hope to achieve a creative synthesis between Maximus and 
Vatican II’s theology of the laity.  I will begin by applying Maximus’ worldview to the 
aforementioned dichotomies and using Maximus as a foil for the views of post-conciliar 
literature.  The focus of this discussion will be whether Maximus can provide fitting answers to 
the aporia raised by the dichotomies of laity/clergy, secular/sacred, world/God and how his view 
impacts ecclesiology and the notion of mediation.  Much of this will concern recognizing 
distinctions in place of mutually exclusive division.  One area that we will give substantial 
attention is the concept of hierarchy in the work of Maximus and the influence and interpretation 
of Dionysius the Areopagite.  The second half of the chapter revisits the documents of the 
Second Vatican Council and places them in dialogue with Maximus’ formulation of Christian 
life as a dialogic encounter with God.  It is my belief that the Confessor’s thought enriches the 
Second Vatican Council beyond traversing the bespoke dichotomies.  Viewing the priesthood of 
the laity through a maximian lens leads to a number of conclusions about the manner of 






CHAPTER ONE  
THE THEOLOGY OF THE LAITY IN VATICAN II AND ITS RECEPTION 
 
 This chapter will attempt to retrieve the Second Vatican Council’s theology of the laity 
then trace its reception through the post-conciliar period into the 21st Century.  There are two 
objectives driving this analysis.  First it will establish the state of the question of the theology of 
the laity.  This entails a survey of representative theologies of the laity within which we will 
highlight key issues: their descriptions of the laity and the roles that they assign to the laity.  An 
issue interwoven throughout the discussion of the laity is their relationship to the role of the 
clergy.  The ubiquity of this lay/clergy distinction makes it a central point to follow in the 
development of these theologies. 
 The second objective is to observe how the concepts of world and consecration relate to 
each theological expression of the laity.  The way a theology approaches the world often dictates 
whether it is fitting to include the world in a dynamic of offering or consecration.  As we will see 
below, a theology’s description of the world is frequently tied to themes such as the relationship 
of God and the world, the secular, the sacred, nature, grace, and mediation. After tracing the 
contours of each authors thought our analysis will highlight their view of the world, 
consecration, and mediation. 
 
I. The Laity in the Documents of Vatican II 
 The Second Vatican Council’s teaching on the laity can be found in three key documents: 
Lumen Gentium (LG), Apostolic Actuositatum (AA), and Gaudium et Spes (GS).  AA and GS are 
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built upon the foundation laid by LG within the respective contexts of ministry and interaction 
with the world.  LG serves as the primary locus for our understanding of Vatican II’s teaching on 
the laity.  The Constitution on the Church thoroughly discusses the laity in an ecclesiological 
context and provides the clearest reflection of the laity’s relationship to the world.  Subsequently, 
AA will help us see how the council envisions the laity in ministerial roles while GS will assist us 
in seeing the laity’s concrete relationship to the world as well as describe the council’s attitude 
toward the secular. 
 The council as a whole and these texts specifically occupy a turning point in Catholic 
thought about the laity.  They are the fruit of a century’s long conversation on the role of the laity 
in the Church that began with the rise of lay activity in movements such as Catholic Action.  
Rahner, Congar, Schillebeeckx, and Philips were among the notable periti who had already 
published extensively about the laity before the calling of the council.1 The role of the laity 
within the Church occupied prominent place in the thought of these major influencers of the 
council.  These authors echoed the lay movement’s desire for involvement in the mission of the 
Church and speculated upon a role for the laity that broke with theological assessments of the 
laity as passive.  The conciliar teaching found its nascent formulation in this conversation and the 
prominent place the laity received in the documents granted this newfound understanding 
legitimacy and permanence. 
                                                          
1 For a sampling of the conversation that lead to the shift in language at Vatican II see Yves Congar, Lay People in 
the Church, (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1965).  Karl Rahner, "The Lay Apostolate," Cross Currents 7, no. 3 
(Summer 1957). Karl Rahner, Christian in the Market Place (London: Sheed & Ward, 1966). Edward 
Schillebeeckx, "The Layman in the Church," in Vatican II: The Theological Dimension, ed. Anthony D. Lee 
(Washington: Thomist Press, 1963). Edward Schillebeeckx, The Definition of the Christian Layman (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1970). Hans urs von Balthasar, The Laity and the Life of the Councils, trans. Brian McNeil 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003). Gérard Philips, The Role of the Laity in the Church, (Chicago: Fides 
Publishers Association, 1956). 
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 As we shall see, in its formulation of the role of the laity in the Church, Lumen Gentium 
acknowledges that the clergy and laity have an equal share in the Church’s life and mission.  The 
revolutionary nature of this statement alone can be appreciated if we contrast it with the thought 
of Pope Pius X who, in the 1906 encyclical, Vehementer Nos, expressed an ecclesiological vision 
that would be later contradicted by the council: “…the Church is by essence an unequal society, 
that is, a society comprising two categories of persons, the pastors and the flock… the one duty 
of the multitude is to allow themselves to be led, and, like a docile flock to follow the pastors.”2  
 The sharp departure from the ecclesiological vision expressed within 19th Century 
magisterial statements underscores the need to contextualize Vatican II’s texts.  To this end, our 
analysis of the documents will be supplemented with insights from the relatios that informed the 
writing of the documents.  This will help us understand the mind of the council fathers, 
especially when it comes to the relationship between the laity and clergy as well as their attitude 
toward the world as it is expressed in the totality of creation and “secular” realities. 
 
A. The Structure of Lumen Gentium and the Unity of the Church 
 One of the overarching goals of the council fathers was to create a sense of equality 
among all members of the Church.  This was realized in two ways: the structure of the document 
itself and the description of each position within the Church.  Lumen Gentium describes the 
whole Church together before moving on to discussing specific roles.  Every member of the 
Church holds a common identity in the sacramental witness of the Church: each is a member of 
the “People of God,” the document’s dominant image of the Church which includes all of its 
                                                          




members as the faithful.3 The document is intentionally structured to emphasize an indivisible 
unity among the members of the Church.  It is only once this unity as the “People of God” is 
established that LG moves on to address particular callings within the Church.4 
 The groups that make up the People of God are here meant to offer distinctions within the 
unity of the Church which acts as a whole: “All natural and functional differences are absorbed 
into the same grace of redemption, love and hope, and the exercise of authority is only 
permissible in the service of the universal calling of the new chosen people.”5 The desire of unity 
was also a rejection of an unequal ecclesial society. The fathers wanted to avoid “the danger of a 
separation between rulers and subordinates” by expressing the mission and life of the Church in 
a way that emphasized solidarity in Christ and only allowed distinctions that expressed 
complementarity, bringing about a deeper unity.6  
 The three groups named in LG are the ordained, the laity, and religious.  The order of 
these sections seeks to promote unity and correct preconceptions.  The placement of the sections 
on the ordained and vowed religious can serve as a demonstration.  The hierarchy is only 
discussed after the relationship between Christ and the whole People of God has been thoroughly 
defined.  The first paragraph defines the role of the hierarchy not as governance but as service.7  
This ensures that we understand the hierarchy’s role as servants of the Church and guards against 
clericalism, the understanding that clergy are in themselves the only true members of the Church.  
The section on the consecrated life follows the chapter on the Universal Call to Holiness.  This 
                                                          
3 LG, 9. 
4 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 119. 
5 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 119. 
6 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 119. 
7 LG, 18. 
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demonstrates that this high calling is not reserved for religious life alone. Vowed religious are 
committed to particular expressions of holiness to which the whole People of God is called. 
This structure highlights the communion within distinction that the council fathers 
desired. It is notable that the chapter on the laity does not have a similar complementary theme.  
However, there may still be some logic in the placement of the chapter: if the chapter of the laity 
came before the chapter on the hierarchy and subsequently the chapter on religious it could have 
been interpreted as a move from non-specificity to particular calling.  Placing the laity in line 
with treatments of the hierarchy and religions life ensures that it is understood as an equal but 
distinct calling and role in the Church’s life. 
 
B. The Secular Character of the Laity 
 Chapter four of the constitution is exclusively devoted to the laity.  This is novel for a 
number of reasons.  The council fathers worked to express a unique description of the laity, 
offering a statement about their theological situation that went beyond membership in the 
Church.8 Previously, the laity may have been given mention in ecclesiological descriptions but 
only in relation to the Church as a whole, they were “the faithful.” LG describes all Christians as 
“faithful” within which the laity take up a distinct role. 
 Lumen Gentium 31 contains the clearest description of the laity’s role in the Church.  
First, there is a negative definition that distinguishes the laity from other groups: the laity are all 
the faithful who are neither ordained nor religious.9 This in itself creates a fine distinction.  
Previously, non-ordained members of religious orders would have been part of this definition.  If 
religious had been included in the lay group the definition would be a simple dichotomy: the 
                                                          
8 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 119-20. 
9 LG, 31. 
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laity are simply those who have not received the sacrament of Holy Orders.  The defining 
character of each group is here related to the role that each plays in light of one another and the 
Body of Christ as a whole.  This being the case, the positive definition of the laity begins with 
what is held in common by all members of the Church: through baptism the laity share in the 
threefold office of priest, prophet, and king, a share in the ministry of Christ.  The laity’s share in 
those offices is notable and novel.  The offices of priest, prophet and king had previously 
reserved for the role of the ordained, specifically the bishop.  According to Gerard Philips, 
recognizing that these offices are universal guarantees that “any form of clericalism is rooted out 
from the start.”10 The laity bear these offices in their own expression of the Church’s mission to 
the world. 
 The secular nature of the laity is named as their distinctive character.  The document is 
careful not to create an exclusive realm for lay activity: the whole church has contact with the 
world and is therefore a sense secular.  Members of the clergy may have secular professions but 
their identity is bound to their role as sacred ministers.  Professed religious encounter the secular 
but as a part of their call to testify to the world.  What sets the laity apart is not that they have a 
permanent relationship to the world but that as a norm their identity and mission is to “seek the 
kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of 
God.”11 There are two complementary functions of the laity in their role: they work to bring 
about God’s reign through their own work and give testimony through their life in the 
theological virtues.  These two tasks are woven together so as not to grant priority of one over 
the other.  The secular activity of the laity cannot be reduced to a form of work deprived of 
                                                          
10 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 131. 
11 LG, 31. 
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witness.  Conversely it cannot seek to offer testimony without working for the right order of 
secular affairs. 
 The secular character is not a means for limiting lay activity but reveals the theological 
import of human activity that lies beyond the scope of traditional ecclesial action.  Much of what 
is described in the mission of the laity has to do with activities beyond explicit action in, for, or 
on behalf of the Church.  The vast majority of the People of God consists of lay persons who do 
not identify as ministers, teachers, or professional volunteers at work in the Church.  In their 
description of the secular character, the fathers desired to give “a realistic description of the life 
of the layman (sic) who is called to give testimony to Christ and to radiate his spirit everywhere, 
especially in his home.”12 Hence, the “temporal affairs” and their ordering to the plan of God are 
not limited to occupations but encompass the whole life of the layperson, their family life, 
relaxation, and hardships.13  
 The life of the laity is framed with pneumatological imagery: the implication that the laity 
are the instrument of the Spirit.  The laity are not simply “in the world,” called by God, they are 
“led by the Spirit.” Their collective action within the world works as a leaven.  The leaven image 
can be interpreted pneumatologically.  Yeast, folded into dough makes the dough rise and 
expand by releasing air into it.  The process creates a multitude of tiny air pockets that stretch the 
dough.  In this light, the laity breathe God’s Spirit into the ordinary affairs of life that would be 




                                                          
12 Philips, "History of the Constitution," 130. 
13 LG, 34. 
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C. Laity and Clergy: Distinct Groups with Shared Tasks 
 The inclusions of daily realities in the list of lay activity demonstrates that the lay task 
emphasizes the particularity of their circumstances over the uniqueness of the activity.  They 
hold many of these activities in common with the other groups that make up the Church but 
engage them in their own particularity.  Gaudium et Spes states clearly: “secular duties and 
activities belong properly although not exclusively to laymen.”14 Admitting anything less would 
imply that clergy and religious somehow do not have “daily occupations” or partake in “physical 
and mental relaxation.” In an expansion of the leaven image, the laity are not doing something 
different than the other members of the faithful, they are breathing the Spirit into their specific 
part of the dough in a way that only they can.15  
 While the discussion of mutually exclusive realms of activity for laity and clergy 
dominates the post-conciliar literature, attempts to find a sharp distinction within the text itself 
ultimately fail.  The closest the documents come to this is within the description of Christ’s 
redemptive work in Apostolicum Actuositatem.  Therein, the fathers distinguish between the 
spiritual and temporal orders to underscore their ultimate destiny: to be unified in the singular 
plan of God.16 The distinctions are meant to be held in an overarching unity of activity. This 
unity was the intention of the document’s authors, who battled the temptations to adopt an 
approach that would result in “extreme positions” of totally breaking down the distinction of the 
                                                          
14 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, ed. Norman P. Tanner, vol. 2, Decrees of the Ecumentical Councils, 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965), 40. From this point abbreviated as GS. 
15 LG, 34. 
16 Second Vatican Council, Apostolicam Actuositatem Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity, ed. Norman P. Tanner, 




clergy and the laity or separating them so much that they would become totally disconnected 
from one another.17  
 This being so, the ecclesiology of Vatican II does not bar the laity from being active in 
internal church affairs but encourages their involvement.  Just as LG acknowledges that clergy 
act within the world, so AA describes lay activity within the Church. The laity, to differing 
degrees that depend on practical circumstances, can share in the inner workings of the Church 
including catechesis and the management of Church affairs.18 It is only by pooling the resources 
of the clergy and laity that the mission of the Church is realized. This involvement of the laity in 
the internal life of Church and the activity of the clergy in the secular world do not cancel out 
their distinct identities.  These exceptions weaken claims to mutually exclusive spheres of the 
sacral and secular.  In short, the descriptions of the clergy, laity, and religious are not draconian 
norms to be enforced.  They describe the normal way by which the Church works as a body 
toward the same mission.  The result is a fulness of work and witness accomplished in the Spirit: 
“Thus in their diversity all bear witness to the wonderful unity in the Body of Christ. This very 
diversity of graces, ministries and works gathers the children of God into one, because ‘all these 
things are the work of one and the same Spirit’.”19 
 
D. Lay Priesthood and the World 
 The laity’s contribution to this shared task, the secular character of the laity, is most 
clearly expressed in two prominent themes: the exercise of the priesthood of the laity and their 
relationship with the world.  The laity, having a share in the threefold office of Christ make 
                                                          
17 Ferdinand Klostermann, "Chapter IV. The Laity," in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert 
Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 251. 
18 AA, 18. 
19 LG, 32. 
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manifest Christ’s priesthood in their own way.  Their priestly function is one that gathers their 
work and experiences, offering them as “spiritual worship for the glory of God and the salvation 
of men.”20 This is not an encouragement toward an individualistic mindset of the laity, as though 
their offering remains hidden in the obscurity of private living.  The laity’s role is liturgical: they 
unite these realities to the “offering of the Lord's body, they are most fittingly offered in the 
celebration of the Eucharist. Thus, as those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity 
consecrate the world itself to God.”  
 The definition of the lay priesthood is both pneumatological and christological.  The 
pneumatological permeates the description given in LG 34: the priesthood of the laity is “vivified 
in the Spirit,” “anointed by the Holy Spirit,” the laity “bear fruits of the Spirit,” their activities 
“carried out in the Spirit” all become “spiritual sacrifices.”21 Christ is likewise active in the laity, 
willing to “continue his witness and service” in them, sharing “His life and His mission,” the 
laity are “dedicated to Christ,” their sacrifices made “through Jesus Christ” and reach the 
pinnacle of their expression untied with “the offering of the Lord’s body” at the Eucharistic 
table.22 The Christological and pneumatological imagery does not represent a confluence of 
theological register, an issue that we will return to later in the chapter.  The perichoretic account 
of the lay priesthood is pleromatic.  The theological impetus for lay activity comes from the 
fulness of the divine unity.  This definition does not allow for a conflict between Christic and 
pnuematologic elements but rather expresses their unity. 
 The words that the council uses for these actions are cultic. The laity offer, adore, and 
consecrate.23 The council places the liturgical and the daily activities of the faithful into a 
                                                          
20 LG, 34. 
21 LG, 34. 
22 LG, 34. 
23 LG, 34. 
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profound dialogue with one another.  Sacrasanctum Concilium confirms this from its liturgy-
centric perspective.  The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy demonstrates the centrality of the 
celebration of the Eucharist for lay life.  It is there that they make their own offering “not only 
through the hands of the priest, but also with him, they learn to offer themselves; through Christ 
the mediator.”24 Earlier in the same document, the liturgy, “most of all in the divine sacrifice of 
the Eucharist,” is described as the place “through which the work of redemption is 
accomplished.”25 Keeping in mind the council’s use of the term “faithful” to connote every 
member of the Church, we can conclude that the lay action and offering make up a crucial 
element of the one sacrifice offered by the Church which gathers all into a redemptive act, an 
expression of life, made manifest to others.26  
 The common sharing in the redemptive act is a participation in the priesthood of Christ. 
The laity exercise this priesthood by virtue of their baptism in which they were “plunged into the 
paschal mystery of Christ.”27 Being caught up in the redemptive work of Christ himself and in 
the spirit of adoption that brings about sharing in the life of the Father and Son, the faithful 
become “true adorers whom the Father seeks.”28 The participation in the mystery helps uncover 
the active mode of this adoration which is itself a participation in the Eucharistic sacrifice.  SC 
contextualizes and affirms the teaching of LG that the laity exercise their priesthood as “those 
everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity consecrate the world itself to God.”29  
                                                          
24 Second Vatican Council, Sacrosanctum Concilium Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, ed. Norman P. Tanner, vol. 
2, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963), 48. From here abbreviated as SC. 
25 SC, 2. 
26 SC, 2 
27 SC, 6. 
28 SC, 6. 
29 LG, 34. 
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 The priesthood of the laity demonstrates an exitus/reditus structure.  Their action in the 
world is a procession and the gathering and coming together as an offering is itself a return.  This 
same dynamic is present in the council’s description of the liturgy which “is the summit toward 
which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the font from which all her 
power flows.”30 Lay men and women go out into the world and make Christ and the Church 
present in places that none else are able, bringing the same life and mission that invigorates the 
body to those they encounter.31 They also gather the world up through their daily living, making 
of it an offering constitutive of the Eucharistic sacrifice.32 This outward and inward movement of 
the laity and the secular character that distinguishes lay life imply a mission to the world. What 
does the council say about the world? 
  
E. Vatican II on the World 
LG in particular refers to the primary realm of lay activity using three words: the world, 
the secular, and temporal.  The “temporal” can refer to resources, ostensibly commodities and 
monies necessary for carrying on the Church’s mission.33 The laity are said to order “temporal 
affairs” to God’s plan, which is closely related to social realities, including professions.34 
“Temporal service” is also used to describe charitable works of serving the sick and poor.35  
 Similarly, “secular” is used as a qualification for human activity that is not directly linked 
to religious activity.  The term describes training, business, professions, occupations, and 
activity.  While these activities do not occur within an overtly religious sphere and are 
                                                          
30 SC, 10. 
31 LG, 33. 
32 LG, 34. 
33 LG, 13. 
34 LG, 31. 
35 LG, 41. 
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distinguished from the sacred activity undertaken by the Church they cannot be separated from 
the sacred: “even in secular business there is no human activity which can be withdrawn from 
God's dominion.”36 Both temporal and secular seem to be dealing with human activity - they are 
characterized by human interactions and give rise to human experience that can be subsequently 
offered as a spiritual sacrifice. 
The term “world” (mundi) is used with a diverse range of meaning.  Following is a study 
of these usages from the conciliar documents directly relevant to this project.  We shall consider 
the council’s overall attitude to the world after having catalogued the various ways of addressing 
it. 
 The world as setting.  As a backdrop for human action, the world can be seen as a 
location in which humanity lives and works.  This is often accompanied by setting the Church 
apart from the world.  The world is a sphere in which the Christian faithful live but without 
belonging to.37 It is from the world understood as a setting, a sphere of action, that lay action can 
be described as having a secular character.  The witness of the Church is said to be “before the 
world.”38  
 The bespoke characteristic of “other” projected upon the world by the Church might lead 
us to conclude that the council fathers maintained a negative evaluation of the world as a whole.  
Particularly, passages from LG contain phrases such as “persecutions of the world”39 and names 
“the world-rulers of this darkness.”40 Indeed the same document states that the world is in need 
of revelation that comes from God through the actions of the Church.41 These terms do not apply 
                                                          
36 LG, 36. 
37 GS 2, SC 9, LG 13. 
38 AA, 11. 
39 LG, 8. 
40 LG, 35. 
41 LG, 8. 
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to the world as a sphere of activity or to the natural world as such but to human actors within the 
world.  Those who commit persecution or rule the world in a way that rejects the light cast upon 
the world by God through the Church.  LG does not reject the world but calls the faithful not to 
be attached to it because of its contingent nature.   The Church as a whole and the laity in their 
concrete interactions does not seek out the goods of the world for their own sake nor come to 
terms with the world because the world is “passing away.” 42  
 The world as humanity opposed to the Church.  In a second way of understanding the 
council’s use of the term, the world is not only the setting for human action but is itself the 
subject of the Church’s mission.  There is a desire that the “whole world” might enter into a 
relationship with Christ.43 The world is addressed in a way that draws attention to the occupants 
of the world over the understanding of the world as a place.  The Church works that the “entire 
world may become the People of God...”44 As with the world-rulers mentioned above, “world” is 
used as a euphemism for sinful occupants in need of redemption.45  
 The world as the subject of God’s plan.  The world is addressed in a way that does not 
label it as a background for human activity or as an indirect way of addressing its occupants.  
Many passages bring this usage into clarity.  The People of God are urged to “love God the 
Father as well as the world and men in Him.”46 This shows intentional use of the world as 
distinct from humanity. In like passages, the world is addressed as a subject of God’s plan.47 
This includes mentions of the natural world as such, created by God in his goodness.48 It is in 
                                                          
42 LG, 42. 
43 AA, 2. 
44 LG 17. 
45 LG, 35. 
46 AA, 29. 
47 AA, 7. 
48 LG, 2. 
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this sense of the world that the laity act within it and offer it up for consecration.49 The world is a 
participant in the drama of salvation that shares in the liminal nature characteristic of that drama.  
GS emphasizes the goodness of the world while yearning for its redemption: “that world which 
the Christian sees as created and sustained by its Maker's love, fallen indeed into the bondage of 
sin, yet emancipated now by Christ.”50 There is still something to be accomplished in the process 
of this redemption as the world can still be sanctified and has yet to undergo its final 
transformation.51 
 This highlights the eschatological destiny of the world.  Though the council 
acknowledges the passing nature of the world, the ultimate end of the world is its redemption.  
This is in the sense of the world understood as distinct from its occupants.  The world itself is not 
a temporary setting to be abandoned.  It will be created anew by Christ: “He Himself intends to 
raise up the whole world again in Christ and to make it a new creation, initially on earth and 
completely on the last day.”52 The whole of creation has a lasting place in God’s plan and is to 
be valued.  Its final destiny to be “permeated by the spirit of Christ.”53 This consummation is 
accomplished by God Himself.  The world will undergo “renovation” at the Eschaton.54  
 There is a reciprocal relationship between the goodness of the world, the goodness of 
humanity and humanity’s activity within the world which includes its consecration.  GS joins the 
eschatological destiny of the world to human life and makes the goodness of the world one of the 
reasons for humanity’s dignity: 
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Though made of body and soul, man is one. Through his bodily composition he gathers 
to himself the elements of the material world; thus they reach their crown through him, 
and through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator.  For this reason, man is not 
allowed to despise his bodily life, rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and 
honorable since God has created it and will raise it up on the last day.55  
 
Here the goodness of the world as expressed in Vatican II informs the consecration of the world 
of LG 34.  The world that God has created and redeemed as good finds its culmination not on its 
independent goodness but by the gathering up into human action and its recapitulation as praise 
to the Creator.  Reciprocally, the task itself elevates humanity’s activity which cannot be 
confused with a gnostic world/matter rejection.  On the contrary, GS links human dignity to the 
goodness of creation of which humanity is composed and acts within. 
 The veracity of Vatican II’s positive valuation of the world as good, created, natural order 
is confirmed by key contributors to LG.  We can discern that the above passage takes many cues 
from Congar who brought the goodness of the created order to the forefront of his thought about 
lay action in the world.  For Congar, the world does not simply serve as a backdrop of 
humanity’s salvation but is itself transformed and renewed.56 Against any dualist schema, 
Congar declares that “final salvation will be achieved by a wonderful refloation of our earthly 
vessel rather than by a transfer of survivors to another ship wholly built by God.”57 God is 
already accomplishing this work in the world but remains only “transiently, precariously, 
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fragmentarily, and generally unperceived.”58 Gerard Philips shares the same attitude and in his 
recounting of the formation of the document describes the goodness of creation, permeated by 
grace as the raw material that the laity offer up in their sacrifice.59 Ordinary life is consecrated as 
a participation in this dynamic of divine transformation. 
 
F. Conclusion – Vatican II 
 The major theme of unity steers Vatican II’s ecclesiology.  The structure and content of 
the Constitution on the Church demonstrates a renewal of that unity that is expressed by three 
distinct yet complementary groups.  By virtue of their baptism, all share in the mission of the 
Church.  The recognition of distinction is not intended, therefore, to result in divisions between 
states of life or a picture of the Church consisting of higher or lower “classes.” 
 As sharers in the one mission of the Church to the world, the laity are called by the 
council to embrace a distinctive role within the temporal realities of the world.  This does not 
forbid the laity to be part of internal Church affairs but as a matter of distinction names the 
secular professions as the normal location in which lay life is lived. 
 Lay activity in the world gains profound theological significance when we consider the 
exercise of baptismal priesthood as a participation in eschatological world renewal.  The 
consecration of their daily realities interpenetrates their own journey in which they gather up 
creation and make of it an offering.  The consecration of the world does not here negate the 
goodness of the world but gathers it up into the Eucharistic offering instituted by Christ. 
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II. Post-Conciliar Theologies 
 The development of post-conciliar theologies of the laity can be framed in the register of 
reception.  Views on the laity’s role change based upon how the fourth chapter of LG is 
interpreted.  The view of the magisterium and theological schools aligned with it accepted the 
language of the secular character as the definitive mission for the laity.  This is can be clearly 
seen in the works of Pope John Paul II.  The positive reception holds that theological reflection 
on the lay state should start with the terms set by this document and remain firmly within the 
categories expressed therein. 
 A parallel school of lay theology developed which view the council as a new starting 
point for reflection on the lay state.  This form of reception differs from the first in that the 
teaching of LG is not seen as a limit but the provider of momentum for a new trajectory.  I will 
call this school the “developmental” school of lay theology because it sees the texts of Vatican II 
as a crucial yet provisional point of development.  For this school, Lumen Gentium is a step away 
from the subservient understanding of the laity that had pervaded the Church in the past.  As a 
trajectory, the connotation taken up by the developmental school is that there is something yet to 
be grasped about the lay state. LG paved the way for a journey that could not have been 
completed during the time of the council.  Further exploration was not only possible, it is 
required it if this new trajectory is to arrive at a fruitful destination.  Based upon the 
understanding that LG did not provide the last word on the matter of the laity, developmental 
thinkers engaged the text of LG with an evaluatory lens. Some concepts, such as the equality of 
all the faithful derived from baptism, would be underscored and further developed. Others would 
be criticized or jettisoned altogether. 
 
 33 
 The secular character of the laity became the prominent subject of such criticism.  Even 
though it was the central facet of the document’s role for the laity, those who sought to further 
develop an ecclesiology focused on the laity discarded the language due to its assumption of a 
mutually exclusive dichotomy between the sacred and the secular.  This view was underwritten 
by developments within 20th Century theologies of grace which would reject such a dichotomy.   
 In the following, I will outline the discussion on the laity from the 1980s to the 21st 
century literature on the laity.  The development of thought on the laity is less a discussion and 
more of an expression of two parallel schools that formed as a result of the aforementioned 
modes of reception.  While the magisterial school remains constant in its insistence upon the 
lay/clergy distinction and the upholding of ecclesial structures, the developmental school begins 
by questioning the usefulness of the lay/clergy distinction.  At first the laity/clergy distinction is 
associated with the sacred/secular dichotomy in a passing manner.  Near the turn of the 21st 
century, the developmental school became insistent that the secular/sacred and God/world 
dichotomies were central reasons for rejecting the laity/clergy distinction.  These texts 
demonstrate an incompatibility of the goodness of the world with the concept of 
consecration/mediation which connects the latter to the lay/clergy dichotomy. 
 
A. Leonard Doohan 
 In his 1984 monograph The Lay Centered Church, Leonard Doohan describes an 
ecclesiological vision that frames the very identity of the Church in the key of mission.  He 
regards the conciliar teachings on the laity as a starting point for reflection on the lay vocation.  
Vatican II did not offer a “finished theological evaluation of the layperson’s life and ministry” 
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but brought to the surface a new way of approaching ecclesiology.60 Doohan claims that the 
conciliar documents bear this process out.  He compares the definitions written in 1962 with 
those of 1964, calling the former a “negative and clerical definition of the laity” and the latter an 
“ecclesial vision of the layperson.”61 Seeking to further explore this new understanding, Doohan 
places baptism at the center of his ecclesiological reflection.  From this shared initiation into the 
Christian community Doohan derives a shared mission: every baptized Christian has a mandate 
for ministry.  Doohan’s reflection on the baptismal call is an invitation for the whole Church to 
rediscover the universal call to ministry.  
 At the outset of his work, Doohan embarks on a detailed analysis of different 
ecclesiological approaches.  He evaluates six models that attempt to describe the role of the laity 
which span the development of thought on the laity from before Vatican II to works 
contemporary to his writing.  Doohan’s account of these theologies does not simply catalogue 
each view but includes his own evaluations of their strengths and weaknesses.  A brief 
consideration of these six models will serve as a bridge spanning the twenty years between the 
conciliar documents and the time of Doohan’s writing. 
 First, Doohan reviews the concept of the work of the laity as “Instrumental Ministry.” 
The laity participate in the mission of the Church as the instrument of the clerical hierarchy.  The 
laity acts as instruments of the clergy whether the work concerns internal works of the Church, 
assisting in tasks that are properly the work of the clergy, as well as when they participate in the 
outward facing work of the Church within the world.  The concept of “instrument” is borrowed 
from Aristotelean philosophy.  The laity work but only in participation with and at the behest of 
the clergy.  At the basis of this ecclesiological model is the assumption that the Church’s mission 
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is the mission of the hierarchy and that the most the laity can do is share in this work as an 
instrument.62  
 Doohan recognizes the ability of this ecclesiology to express the unity of the Church and 
describes the interplay between the clergy and laity as a “dynamic interrelationship ... [that] 
brings the liturgical, sacramental, transformational, and sanctifying essence of the Church to the 
world.”63 His criticism of this approach is framed by a quote from Gerard Philips, one of the 
architects of Vatican II’s description of the laity, in which the Belgian priest wonders in the guise 
of a hypothetical protestant whether “in the presence of such authority there remains any liberty 
for the harassed and stifled Catholic.”64  
 The critique of this position gained momentum during and after the council.  Doohan 
relates the reservations of both Schillebeeckx and Congar.  In his own words, Doohan rejects this 
position since it “can easily lead to clericalization and power positions ... and to a lack of 
initiative and personal responsibility among the laity.”65 An instrumental approach was “the best 
approach for its time.” The post-conciliar Church would require something different. 
 Doohan notes that the second ecclesiology he evaluates is based upon a positive view of 
the world. The theology of the “Ecclesial Presence to the World” is itself a “new approach to the 
theology of the laity,” one which was supported by many of the theologians who heavily 
influenced the council, including Congar, Rahner, and Schillebeeckx.  The thrust of this view is 
that the laity “are seen as the bridge between the world Church and the world, the Church’s 
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presence in the world.”66 Doohan praises the rejection of a Christian spirituality that glorifies a 
flight from the world.67 The action of the laity is world-affirming and serves as an expression of 
the laity in their mundane, daily tasks. 
 Despite his praise, Doohan thinks that this view expresses a fundamentally errant 
theological distinction.  By portraying the lay person as “worldly,” proponents of the ecclesial 
presence view assumes the “superficial distinction between ‘priest/sacred’ and ‘lay/temporal’.”68 
Doohan rejects this false sacred/secular dichotomy on the grounds that there are no mutually 
exclusive and distinct spheres for action of the laity and clergy.  
 Doohan includes in this criticism the kernel of his own thesis: “the laity are not a bridge 
between the Church and the world; the laity are Church.”69 Here we can discern Doohan’s deep 
concern that there be no divisions within the body of Christian believers based upon a 
sacred/secular distinction.  Doohan’s desire is for a universal description of the faithful.  He 
rejects the ecclesial presence model that would necessitate a lay/clergy distinction in favor of a 
theology that includes all the baptized. 
 Doohan distinguishes between this ecclesial presence model and a second position that 
can be derived from the conciliar documents: Theology of World Transformation.  Doohan 
suggests that conciliar periti are not the principal authors of this view but “lay people, who, once 
committed to the life-style implied in [the ecclesial presence model], realized that one is not truly 
present to the world without attempting to transform the world.”70 These lay people are “for the 
world.”71 Those who are active within the world see that the world is not how God intended it to 
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be and thus set out to transform it.  In accord with the view that Congar expressed in Lay People 
in the Church, this ecclesiology acknowledges that the world is not only the context of salvation 
but itself needs to be redeemed.  Quoting LG 34, Doohan explains that “in this theology, 
laypersons are agents in the consecration of the universe to God. They are committed to the 
world, use it with detachment, heal it of sin, animate it with Christ’s spirit, transform it into what 
it is capable of being, dominate it, and consecrate the world to God in Christ.”72 The project of 
world consecration brings about both individual and collective action reflected in a concern for 
social justice and political involvement.  
 Despite his positive description of world transformation, Doohan ultimately rejects this 
theology.  He lauds the approach as “strong and satisfying,” affirming something of a secular 
character. This view describes action that is “specific of lay life.”73 The critique that Doohan 
offers does not come from the theological reasoning of this position but is based on practical 
grounds.  He claims that this way of conceiving the world is so different from a common 
understanding of how the life of the laity has been previously described that it would make it too 
difficult for the laity to understand their role.  He worries that there is a risk that they may lose 
faith and become too invested in secular affairs.  Finally, he offers a caution that those involved 
in world-transforming ministry should “keep clearly in mind the distinction between our work 
and God’s” - lest the faith be forgotten and a new form of Pelagianism develop.74  
 The final three models represent post-conciliar developments that reframe the discussion 
of the laity through a variety of emphases: one on community rather than the hierarchy (Ecclesial 
Restructuring), a concentration on the particularity of each individual lay call (the Self-
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Discovery of the Laity), and the abandoning of a specific lay “role” within the Church (Laity as 
Integrally Church).  Each of these views progressively shifts the discussion from Church 
structure to the life of the lay person. 
 The first shift, in Ecclesial Restructuring is based upon the whole Church as the People of 
God and the common call to mission but maintains a focus that is decisively intra-ecclesial.  This 
view focuses on the laity not in the midst of what the council would have called their “secular” 
activities but instead how they contribute to the ministry of the Church.  Doohan notes that this 
view poses a danger in that it “has a touch of narcissism” and would be difficult to develop in a 
way that included those who do not do consciously participate in ministry.75  
 The Self-Discovery of the Laity is far more flexible than Ecclesial Restructuring since it 
describes a wider scope of human activity.  This approach is more a spirituality than a theology, 
carrying with it an invitation for reflection on the myriad of situations lay persons find 
themselves in.  The fuel for this reflection is a laity who have embraced their own particular life 
and mission.  These are often situational, eliciting responses to specific needs.  Doohan makes it 
clear that this approach is one that is on the way to producing deeper understandings of the life of 
the Church but is not yet fully developed.  Similar to his critique of ministries that attempt world 
transformation, Doohan cautions that embracing such particularity may lead to a loss of a sense 
that these actors belong to a structured Church.  Focusing too directly on particular situations 
may lead to a “psychological opting out of structured Church.”76  
 The critique of the Self-Discovery model reveals one of Doohan’s key concerns: he 
wants to protect against the laity being somehow separate from the life of the Church as it was 
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expressed in the Instrumental Ministry model wherein the laity only had a share in the Church’s 
ministry - and to a point the Church’s life - as an extension of hierarchic activity. 
 Doohan’s own position makes the separation impossible.  He rejects the notion that the 
laity have a role within the Church that could somehow be delineated and distinguish them from 
the whole.  The final view that Doohan considers in his overview of ecclesiologies is his own: 
the Laity as Integrally Church. In essence, Doohan proposes a breaking down of any intra-
ecclesial distinction, “convinced that the term laity is now theologically dead.”77 This is because 
for Doohan there is no quest for the lay identity, the laity are Church. 
 Doohan declares lay theology dead for three reasons: first, the term laity, as it was 
originally derived from laos, meaning people has lost its original intent of describing the people 
of God.  Cordoning off a select membership of the Church that has a role to be active in the 
world “emphasizes the distinction between sacred and profane.”78 The result of this distinction 
communicates a separation between these spheres and leads to an image of God that is only 
indirectly accessible. Due to these problems, Doohan concludes that a lay/clergy distinction only 
serves to oppress the laity.  
 Reimaging the Church without this distinction ensures that every member has an equal 
share in the Church’s life and mission.  Doohan’s continued use of the term “laity” to describe 
non-ordained members of the Church serves to underline his point.  He uses the term in a way 
that is all-encompassing.  The mission of the laity is the mission of the Church.  Doohan 
identifies the laity with the Church: “There is no particular vocation for the laity in the Church, 
no need of a quest for lay identity. Being Church in its fullness is the spirituality for the laity.”79  
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 The breaking down of distinction yields a universality of mission: The Church’s mission 
is one.  The mission embraces a total ecclesiology that Doohan presents as a mission in the heart 
of the world: “to be Church means to live as a community in the world for the service of the 
world. It means to live as a member of the Church at the heart of the world, and also as a 
member of the world community at the heart of the Church.”80 At its most basic level for 
Doohan: the Church is a sacrament of unity.  
 Doohan’s project is aimed at one overarching goal: to shore up the Church’s identity as a 
non-divisible unity which results in an equal value of the ministry of the Church’s members.  In a 
sense, Doohan reframes all of Christian activity as ministry.  He distinguishes between work that 
that is done for “ecclesial community’s own internal needs” calling this work both important but 
secondary.81 He is far more concerned with the ministry of the Church to the world.  This is the 
mission of all of the baptized, a ministry without distinction, a mission that is done in Christ’s 
name in and for the world.  Yet every member of the Church participates in the ministry of the 
Church ad intra and ad extra as a matter of “right and responsibility.”82  
 The lay/clergy distinction resists the ecclesial unity that drives Doohan’s thesis so it must 
be done away with.  Any positive formulations for either would be a rejection of a total 
ecclesiology.  Bracketing this division, the theological position Doohan presents, prima facie, 
seems no different than some of the views he evaluates at the outset of his work.  The Church 
presents Christ to the world in the mode of sacramental presence and witness in a way that is 
very similar to both the Ecclesial Presence in the World and the Transformation of the World 
models.  The difference lies in Doohan’s difficulty in expressing the connection between the life 
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of the Church in sacrament and prayer and the Church’s action in the world.  He replaces the 
idea of connection with identity.  The members of the Church serve as the ministers to the world 
by their life as worshippers as well as actors within the world.  When he does speak of dedicated 
action in the world, he cautions repeatedly against two extremes: an assumption that the work 
done by the Church in the world is done by humans alone as well as the danger that actors in the 
world may become too individualistic and forget their place in the larger Church community.83 
 Similarly, there is no detailed discussion about the Church’s liturgical life as such, simply 
that the whole Church has a sharing in it.  Doohan here omits the discussion about the underlying 
concepts that gave rise the clergy/laity distinction in the first place.  Doohan does not reject the 
Church’s sacramental life but proposes that there is an inordinate emphasis on the ordained 
priesthood without a properly developed view of the priesthood of all the baptized.84 This 
underscores the issue that was at the center of Doohan’s focus: equality within the Church and 
the universal sharing in her mission.  The nuances of this and its theological impact would be 
worked out by subsequent authors. 
 
B. Thomas O’Meara 
 In Theology of Ministry, first published in 1983, Thomas O’Meara seeks both to clarify 
the term ministry and to cement its place at the center of the life of the Church. O’Meara revised 
the book in 1999 with an emphasis on the centrality of the parish for contemporary 
ecclesiologies.  The impetus for writing this work and the subsequent revision is the post-
conciliar experience of the Church.  O’Meara seeks to provide a theological explanation of the 
growing number of laity engaged in ministry.  Like Doohan, O’Meara does not view the Second 
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Vatican Council as a definitive statement of ecclesial realities but sees it as a foundation to build 
upon, “a ‘tradition-event.’”85  
 O’Meara’s thesis is that ministry makes up the central “facet of baptized life.”86 Through 
the course of the work, he unpacks a specific definition of ministry in place of ever-increasing 
use of the term, protecting it from becoming “confused, sterile, even duplicitous” by its universal 
adoption and overuse.87 Ministry is specific activity to which each Christian is called but does 
not encompass all of human activity.88 There is a note of particularity in O’Meara’s description: 
the call to ministry happens at certain times in life and is a call that originates in the Spirit.  
 O’Meara is so concerned with defining and applying ministry because it forms the heart 
of his ecclesiological vision.  The Church exists for ministry and the organization of the Church 
is based on the expression of ministry within the contemporary social context.  O’Meara 
describes the Church as a social reality and as such, the Church must “live out the dynamic of 
their people, ... [or] die.”89 Ministries are an expression of social reality for O’Meara. There can 
be no theoretical office without a ministry carried out in praxis.  The naming of an office 
detached from such an expression, O’Meara decries as nominalism.90 Among the manifestations 
of nominalism in the Church the key example for O’Meara is the lay/clergy distinction: “an 
arbitrary designation of some ministries and ordinations as given by divine institution and as 
worthy of sacramental liturgy.”91 Outlining historical developments as well as prominent pre-
conciliar ecclesiologies, O’Meara presents a convincing case that the balance of power expressed 
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in the exclusivity of governance and practice of ministry by the clergy has resulted in a laity who 
have resigned themselves to a passive reception and inaction. 
 In the course of his historical analysis, O’Meara reflects upon a model of ministry 
centered on the hierarchy.  He traces this understanding to the Parisian school which during the 
middle ages adopted the teachings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.92 The thought of a sixth-
century Syrian monk “held a singular position” due to the belief that it was really the writings of 
Denys, converted by Paul in the book of Acts.93 This hierarchical way of thinking is at the root 
of the active clergy and passive laity.  In the neo-platonic schema, the clergy formed a triad that 
had the responsibility of passing on the ability to become divinized through a process of 
purification, illumination, and unification.  These powers were conferred from one rank of 
hierarch to the next until they reached the passive monk, laity, and catechumens.94 This ensured 
that the role of ministerial mediation rested solely within the activity of the clergy.  Noting 
O’Meara’s understanding of Pseudo-Dionysius is pertinent due to the temporal proximity and 
theological influence he had on Maximus’ work. It is also important to note that O’Meara 
represents a specifically Neo-Scholastic interpretation of Dionysius and the concept of hierarchy.  
I believe that this is a misinterpretation of the Areopagite’s work and argue for an opposing view 
in chapter 4. 
 O’Meara traces the influence of this hierarchical mode through Aquinas and a continual 
“ministerial reduction” that focused on the power of the clergy to communicate these realities 
through the sacraments, especially the Eucharist.95 The apex of this understanding, O’Meara 
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marks as “sacerdotalization” or “Christification.” These terms acknowledged the clergy as the 
sole sharer in the ministry of Christ.96 Coupled with the social framework inherited from a feudal 
understanding of the class rank, the clergy became not only those who were entrusted with 
mysteries that sanctify but superiors, ex officio to the laity. 
 O’Meara’s analysis of the historical relationship between clergy and laity as class 
differences and subsequent call to dissolve the distinction is marked by the conclusion that the 
lay-clergy relationship will always result in inequality.  During a synopsis of the historical 
development of the terms clergy and laity, O’Meara notes that “class distinctions come in pairs. 
While the clergy became an elevated, sacral state, the laity became a passive group.”97 He treats 
this disparity as a matter of necessity despite softening the logic by stating that “dualism usually 
means that one pair has an inferior position.”98 O’Meara does not entertain a re-imaging of the 
clergy-lay relationship without this imbalance. 
 The term “lay” has changed from connoting the member of a wider people to 
distinguishing one who is in the lowest place.  “Layperson” is a phenomenologically pejorative 
term: it can only be defined in a negative comparison to the bishop, priest, and deacon.  In place 
of layperson, O’Meara’s ecclesiological register embraces pneumatologically gifted charisms, 
sacramental in their own right.  
 O’Meara’s own definition of ministry develops out of his reception of the definitions of 
Vatican II.  He critiques the council’s use of the term ministry, claiming that it is too imprecise. 
One such shortcoming is a focus on witness.  Witnessing does not fall under his definition of 
ministry, especially the “sign ministry” of those that witness in the course of their ordinary 
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lives.99 O’Meara admits that this witnessing certainly takes its cue from the sort of lay apostolate 
encouraged by Vatican II though it is not specific enough.  He labels the call of LG 31 for the 
laity to bring the Gospel into their own particular, exclusive circumstances a “metaphorical 
vision.”100 
 O’Meara links this vaguery to the passivity of the laity in activities that are internal to the 
Church, especially the liturgical roles surrounding the sacraments and preaching.  He claims a 
strong connection between ministry in one’s own life and active liturgical participation.  
Liturgical roles that minister to the Church community cannot be compartmentalized from their 
outward expression in the world.  O’Meara cites this in a negative fashion, as a hindrance to 
further developing the laity in the Church: “The theologies of the laity in this century failed in 
their attempt to give the laity a place in the community precisely because they joined a liturgical 
role that was passive or routine to a vaguely defined role of witnessing in the world.”101 He 
judges Vatican II’s stance on the laity to be passive on both counts.   
 The church’s mistaken focus on ordinations and offices gives rise to nominalism.  
Instead, ministries come from pneumatological gifts, charisms.  “Christian ministry is the public 
activity of a baptized follower of Jesus Christ flowing from the Spirit’s charism and an 
individual personality on behalf of a Christian community to witness to, serve and realize the 
kingdom of God.”102 As the basis for Christian initiation and the fundamental encounter with the 
Spirit, baptism is the only qualification for the exercise of charismatic gifts in ministry.  The 
common source of these gifts does not make every baptized Christian a minister all of the time.  
Nor does O’Meara’s rejection of the lay-clergy distinction mean that he sees no strata within 
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ministry.  O’Meara provides a ministerial schema that retains certain community leaders at its 
core.  Those who express leadership as a matter of action and exercise of charism correspond to 
the role of bishop and priest.103 His ecclesial structure is not one of sharp distinction as with the 
lay-clergy model but is based upon concentric circles. These encompass all Christians who are 
called during certain times in life to participate in public ministry.  Closest to the center are the 
trained, professional ministers.  Furthest from the center, then, are those who engage only in sign 
ministry.  The metric at work is how much of the life of the Christian is dedicated to ministry.  
This model is beneficial in that it recognizes in every Christian life the capacity to exercise the 
charisms they have received.   
 There is an underlying emphasis on activity over passivity in O’Meara’s work.  We 
encountered this already as O’Meara diagnoses the serious shortcomings of previous ecclesial 
models as restricting the laity to a passive role. The same concern for activity colors his 
discussion of contemplative religious.  Though he affords the contemplative life “its own identity 
and value,” ministry is secondary to this form of life.104 Contemplatives participate in ministry 
but only inasmuch as they take direct ministerial action to visitors, preach, or minister internally 
to one another.  The outwardly passive life of contemplatives raises an issue that O’Meara does 
not address.  Would it be fair to assume cloistered religious would not have liturgical roles by his 
estimation?  That O’Meara sidelines not only lay but religious passivity makes sense when we 
consider the ecclesiological model that he is seeking to upend.  He summarizes his reasons for 
rejecting passivity succinctly: 
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When we look at neo-scholastic textbooks up to Vatican II and their picture of the church, 
we find a neatly drawn Aristotelian ecclesiology. In that theology, the form, the cause, and 
the goal of the church are all the same: the hierarchy of bishops and church administrators. 
People, even presbyters and deacons, are only the material cause, the passive stuff to 
which a super-natural ministry comes. When we recall how passive the material element is 
in Aristotelian philosophy, we appreciate how marginalized in the ecclesiology of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are baptism, charism, and Christian person.105  
 
O’Meara’s intention is to reevaluate this Aristotelean model based upon recent 
developments in the Church and show how this post conciliar ecclesiology can be linked to a 
theology of ministry compatible with the witness of the New Testament.106 He desires an 
engaged, active Church in which a diversity of ministries flow from the charisms given to each 
individual by the Spirit.  As we have seen, his reflections are not simply a matter of defining 
ministry as such, they reach out to every facet of Christian life, liturgy, preaching witness, and 
service.  O’Meara’s theology of ministry has wide sweeping ecclesiological impact. In phrasing 
the Church’s overall success or failure as the success or failure of ministry, O’Meara has 
implicitly defined the whole Church’s life and mission as ministry.  Forms of Christian living 
“have their own value” but O’Meara does not elaborate upon what this value is or how non-
ministerial activity fits into his broader schema. 
 It is apparent that O’Meara seeks to develop the ecclesiological vision of Vatican II in a 
new direction.  This includes a negative assessment of the council’s statements about the secular 
role of the laity.  His rejection of this description is due in part to disagreeing with negative 
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definitions of the laity, discussed above.  How does he evaluate the call for the laity to consecrate 
the world to God?  While O’Meara does not address the content of LG 34 directly, we can 
anticipate his reception of this description by analyzing his thought on mediation and priesthood. 
There is a conscious reduction of sacral language within O’Meara’s work.  He distances himself 
from the structures that glorify priestly action and uses the term priesthood to describe a 
dominating caste far more than to describe a priesthood shared by all believers.  When he 
discusses the universal priesthood he does not address individual actions but the Church in 
aggregate.  He briefly mentions that as a whole, baptized Christians carry out their activities with 
a “‘priestly attitude’ of sacrificial service.”107 The one priesthood of Christ is unique and “there 
remains nothing more, objectively, to be enacted for the human race.”108 The consecration of the 
world at the center of the secular character of the laity is not included in these reflections.  In 
keeping with his rhetorical tone O’Meara sets priestly language in opposition to his definition of 
ministry: “Ministry approaches the reign of God not as high priest or banker but as servant.”109 
O’Meara prefers to speak of Christian action, especially ministry, in the key of service.  The goal 
of this service is an individual turning of every person to a relationship with God so that they 
might become what God intends them to be.110  
O’Meara does not addressing LG 34 and the subject of world transformation, instead he 
writes about ministry to the world.  Ministry happens at the service of the world.  This begs the 
question: how does O’Meara use the term “world?” In the discussion on Vatican II’s view of the 
world we considered three basic approaches to this: the world as a setting or backdrop of a drama 
that principally concerns God and humanity, the world as humanity in opposition to God’s plan, 
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and the world as a subject of God’s plan.  O’Meara clearly sees the world as the setting for the 
Church’s life and mission. 
 The world as a setting adds complexity to the Church’s mission: O’Meara uses “the 
world” to denote a diversity of cultural encounters, across both time and space, which elicits a 
need for a diversity in ministry.  The world encompasses the social realities that the Church must 
respond to and is itself the mission ground of the Church.  We can see the the world as setting 
and not the subject of God’s plan in the way O’Meara formulates the mission of the Church.  
This mission is to propose the Gospel to all of the men and women of the world so that they are 
able to respond “to the presence of the Gospel and the Spirit.”111 
 We can learn about O’Meara’s view of the world by analyzing what he opposes.  He 
denounces the Baroque, pre-Conciliar attitude “that the fallen world could receive only so much 
redemption, and that all not under orders or vows remained in a secular sphere capable not of 
ministry but of a vague witness.”112 For O’Meara, there is no “secular sphere” that is able to 
remain untouched by grace.  O’Meara cites Karl Rahner’s theology of grace, which has 
inaugurated “a world marked by circles of God's gift of eschatological life.”113 The world itself is 
an expression of realized eschatology and contrasts with the idea of a world in need of 
redemption.  The world is not to be addressed as sinful, consigning the kingdom of God to the 
privacy of churches and personal spirituality.  The mission is a public mission to humanity.  It 
serves to heal both intrapersonal guilt for sin and the injustices and tragedies that affect the wider 
community. These injustices flow “not only from natural or social causes but from sin.”114 Evils 
present in the world are not part of the Father’s plan and the Christian mission is to challenge 
                                                          
111 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 146. 
112 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 31. 
113 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 2. 
114 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 147. 
 
 50 
them in the world.  This is an evangelical call to the world that carries as much import as 
ministering to the Church community, “Each church should be as intent upon witness in the 
world as upon its own inner life.”115  
 The world, in O’Meara’s estimation is not the subject of some future divine or human 
action.  The call to ministry is not a call to bring about a yet to be accomplished salvation but an 
expression of an already realized salvation for the world.  The Church is the fundamental 
sacrament of grace that leads the world to this realization.   There is then no need for a slow, 
secretive infiltration of the secular order by Christians to transform the world.116 O’Meara gives 
four reasons to reject an infiltration of the sacral into the secular: the task becomes very 
individualistic, focusing on the soul of the individual at work, “it implied that grace was absent 
from the world,” it would have been a lay infiltration into science and politics, and “it divided 
grace from nature, handing over soul and sacrament to priests but world and history to laity.”117 
Though O’Meara writes in terms of “infiltration” we can easily see parallels between this 
dynamic and the consecration of the world described in LG. 
 Of O’Meara’s reasons for rejecting “world infiltration” as a task for the laity address his 
view of the world, two are of critical import for our discussion.  These are intimately connected, 
addressing the presence of grace in the world and the means by which that grace is made present.  
Each is rooted in a distinction that would be ultimately rejected by the 20th century theologies of 
grace: that there is a possibility of separating God’s grace out from creation.  A need for 
infiltration into the world to bring grace implies that there is a lack of grace.  O’Meara sees the 
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world as encompassed in “circles of grace.” The most potent and apparent of these is the Church 
itself. Beyond the Church, O’Meara encourages openness toward the redeemed world and the 
presence of grace as it is expressed in other religious traditions.  The second point is the working 
out of this separation in the sphere of ministry.  The pre-conciliar sacramental economies that 
O’Meara discussed are prime examples: the clergy are the sole proprietors of graced reality, 
which they introduce into the wholly secularized world.  Pointing toward individual sacraments 
as the vehicles of this grace in place of embracing the whole Church as sacrament would cement 
the role of the ordained as officiants of the sacred to the not-sacred.  O’Meara’s depiction of the 
world as graced is intimately connected with his argument against the lay-clergy distinction.  
O’Meara sees the whole Church as a “basic equality in grace.”118 
 O’Meara’s theology of ministry begins as a theological reflection upon the rising 
phenomenon of ministry in the church and expands to a total ecclesiology119.  From his thought 
we can derive three points pertinent to our discussion that will significantly impact those that 
come after him: first, he has a deep concern for valuing the active ministry of all the baptized.  
O’Meara stresses this point throughout the whole course of his work.  He does so in a way that 
devalues witnessing in anything but the most overt way.  This necessitates the deletion of the 
lay-clergy distinction drawn throughout much of church history.  Second, he does not see world 
consecration or transformation as a fundamental role of the Church in the world.  He de-
emphasizes Vatican II’s universal priesthood language and does not think that an infiltration in 
the world adequately describes ministry.  Finally, he is the first of our thinkers to root his thought 
in the relationship between nature and grace.  O’Meara views the world as graced, holding a 
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positive view of the world.  There is tension in his position since the world is both in need of the 
saving mission of the church and is already encompassed in a circle of grace. 
 
C. The Magisterial School Response 
 The growing number of lay ministers and the critical tenor of the development school are 
two keys to understanding the view of the laity expressed by the magisterium and their 
theological allies.  Since these authors accepted the description of the laity found in the Vatican 
II documents as authoritative and definitive, their own writings are largely apologetic.  Pope 
John Paul II and theologian Aurelie Hagstrom are prevalent voices within this school.  John Paul 
II’s approach is to clarify practices based upon the conciliar view and to offer exhortation for the 
laity in their secular work.  Hagstrom is concerned with demonstrating the consistency of 
magisterial statements about the laity along with identifying why the secular character had been 
largely abandoned by post-conciliar ecclesiologists.   As a defense of conciliar teaching, neither 
John Paul II nor Hagstrom make statements that elaborate on the nature of world consecration or 
the God/world relationship beyond what is already expressed in the conciliar documents.  Their 
work adds rhetorical texture to the magisterial position and sets the stage for the conversation 
surrounding the laity that takes place at the turn of the 20th Century. 
 
Pope John Paul II 
 Promulgated in 1988, Pope John Paul II’s Post-synodal document Christifidelis Laici 
(CL) reiterated the description offered by Vatican II and responded to the increased role of the 
laity in ecclesial ministry.  As a Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, CL was written shortly 
after the Synod on the Laity that occurred in 1987.  Many of the concerns of the synodal fathers 
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are mirrored in the document with one notable exception.  At the head of the propositions, 
representative of the fruits of their meetings, the bishops requested that there be a definitive and 
universal papal declaration on the vocation of the laity.120 This implies that the synodal fathers 
did not view the teaching on the laity represented in the conciliar documents as a definitive 
statement.  John Paul II did not fulfill this request.  Instead, CL is a representation of the 
teachings of LG through the late Pope’s own ecclesiological lens along with cautions regarding 
the confluence of laity and clergy. 
 Aurelie Hagstrom argues that CL fulfills its role as a Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation: 
it is the purpose of the document to urge, exhort, advise, and encourage, not to solve points of 
theology.  It would be inappropriate for the Pope to use the exhortation as an opportunity to 
develop the dogmatic understanding of the laity or to offer some new dogmatic definition.121 
Against the expectations of the Synod fathers, Hagstrom asserts that to fulfill its role CL simply 
had to affirm and expand upon the themes presented in the concluding propositions. 
 Despite the lack of new teaching, CL should not be confused with mere repetition.  John 
Paul II reframes LG’s description of the laity not as a role but as a dynamic.  The laity’s place in 
the world is the condition for the exercise of their secular character.122 The world is not simply a 
framework for lay action but is itself the subject of lay work.  The lay task is to transform since 
the world is “a reality destined to find in Jesus Christ the fullness of its meaning.”123 The laity 
can only fulfill this mission if they are in the world, a point that is clearly emphasized.  
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Receiving baptism does not take Christians from the world or invite them to abandon it.  Citing 
Paul the Apostle, John Paul II encourages the lay faithful to fulfill their vocation “in whatever 
state each was called.”124 Lay life in the world is not an accident of societal circumstance but “a 
theological and ecclesiological reality.”125  
 The dynamic that the laity participates in contributes to the unity and the diversity that is 
needed if the Church is to be a fully functional body.  John Paul II calls the Church an “‘organic’ 
communion … the complementarity of each part must be joined together and every unique 
contribution recognized as done on behalf of the body. (CL 20) This complementarity is enabled 
by the “unmistakable character” that marks each of the states of life lived in the Church which 
must be “seen in relation to the other and placed at each other’s service.” (CL 55) 
 John Paul II’s ecclesiological view emphasizes distinction for complementarity.  A 
confusion of roles and a breaking down of distinctions would be detrimental to his project.  This 
leads the Pope to address lay activity within ministerial roles, a concern that was shared by the 
synodal fathers.  At the center of the cautions and correctives in CL are two points (1) The laity’s 
role within the world is a necessary one.  (2) Confusion over the proper roles, especially the role 
of minister in the Church, threatens the complementarity and effectiveness of each state of life. 
 The Pope distinguishes between the exercise of liturgical, evangelistic, and catechetical 
roles that are proper to all of the baptized and a creeping trend to expand the responsibilities of 
the laity within intra-ecclesial affairs.  The latter may so occupy the laity that they forget their 
mission toward the world.  In place of this, the Pope advocates for Gospel-oriented lives in the 
midst of the world as a witness to the transcendent.126  
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 This is not only a matter of dereliction of duty.  Many concerns shared by John Paul II 
and the synodal fathers revolve around the definition and actions taken by “ministers.” During 
this period, there was a fervent discussion about the extent to which lay persons could be called 
ministers.127 John Paul II adopts a narrow and specifically sacramental definition of minister. 
The term cannot be used to describe someone based upon their activity but is instead a matter of 
sacramental ordination.128 This rules out the identification of any of the laity as ministers.  In 
support of this point, the Pope recalls the difference between the priesthood shared by all the 
faithful and the ministerial priesthood which is “different, not simply in degree but in 
essence.”129 
 This strict definition of minister is based upon the complementary ecclesiology that John 
Paul II has laid out.  Though CL includes passages that could be interpreted as stifling the 
expansion of lay involvement in the Church, many of the correctives made are in service of the 
distinctions expressed in this ecclesiology.  The concern for the overuse of laity in the liturgy, for 
instance, does not offer additional restrictions on lay activity.  On the contrary, the document 
cites the founding of a commission to reevaluate the lay role above and beyond those already 
offered in the exercise of instituted acolytes and readers. 130 
 The passages that are the most corrective are tightly focused on roles and identity.   
Caution against the “clericalization” of the laity and the building up of an “ecclesial structure of 
parallel service” is reactionary in that it upholds the distinction between laity and clergy against a 
praxis seeking to do away with the distinction.  This caution is where the reactionary nature of 
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the document ends.  The brief mention of the trends, noted by the synodal fathers, are 
overshadowed by the application of the lay call to various areas of life.  Within the context of the 
broader theological conversation about the laity, CL is a simple reaffirmation and application of 
the teachings found in LG.  CL does not offer a definitive theological treatise on the laity.  The 
text reiterates the ecclesiology of a clergy/laity distinction which John Paul II frames within the 
conceptual category of a reciprocal complementarity. 
 
Aurelie Hagstrom 
 In her 1994 book, The Concepts of the Vocation and the Mission of the Laity, Aurelie 
Hagstrom offers a theological defense of the magisterium’s ecclesiastical schema.  She outlines 
the preconciliar, conciliar, and post-conciliar conversation regarding the laity’s theological 
definition and mission with the aim of demonstrating the consistency of the magisterial view that 
the laity are to be characterized by the secularity and the task of world consecration.  Hagstrom’s 
critical thrust is that the post-conciliar theological conversation has focused on the work of the 
laity within the Church to a fault.  Her corrective revolves around the thomistic principle agere 
sequitur esse (“doing follows being”), resulting in her claim that the ontological character of the 
laity and their place in the Church should distinguish their action.  This character, received at 
baptism, determines the life and work of the laity.  Hagstrom engages with a comprehensive 
collection of magisterial texts to support her analysis.  Notably, these include the different drafts 
of the Vatican II texts that address the laity, the synodal proceedings of the 1987 Synod on the 
Laity, and a comparison of the 1917 Code of Canon Law with the revised code of 1983. 
 Hagstrom’s historical survey of the preconciliar discussion demonstrates the dramatic 
change that took place within the Church’s ecclesiological consciousness before the council.  
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The result of this development was a new ecclesiology that directly related the laity to the 
mission of the Church, which she contrasted to former theological understanding of the laity as a 
mere appendage of the clergy.131  
 For Hagstrom, the development reaches its pinnacle in Vatican II.  The vocation and 
mission of the laity is expressed clearly in the conciliar documents and this is borne out by the 
consistency of that teaching in canon law as well as the post-conciliar magisterium.  Congruent 
with this stance, she is highly critical of the post conciliar developmental school.  According to 
Hagstrom, there are three problematic tendencies within the current ecclesiological conversation, 
each logically connected to the others.  First is a rejection of anything sacramental or hierarchical 
in favor of the charismatic.  This “pneumatological approach” highlights the call of baptism 
without addressing how that call is complemented by the exercise of holy orders.132 There is a 
dividing line drawn between the charismatic, which is considered good, and the hierarchical 
structure of the Church which is seen to be in conflict with the spirit of Vatican II.  The result is a 
perspective that always casts the hierarchy in an authoritative light, creating an environment that 
stifles ministry. 
 This results in her second concern, that the ecclesiological conversation addresses a 
fractured Church caught in a power struggle among its members.  She criticizes views that see 
the Church as “a battlefield for rights.” 133 The focus of this battle tends to be a fascination with 
intra-ecclesial roles for the laity.  This pits the clergy against the laity, the former always out to 
defend their own interests to the detriment of the latter.  Preoccupation with expanding lay 
activity within the Church leads to the third tendency: a deemphasis of the secular vocation and 
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mission.134  The growth in lay rights within the Church results in the tragically ironic 
abandonment of the mission to the world. 
 Hagstrom sees a common thread between these three tendencies: there is preoccupation 
of what the laity can do over who the laity are. She proposes the thomistic principle of agere 
sequitur esse as a corrective to authors who do not ground the mission of the laity in their 
ecclesiological identity.135 Among the authors Hagstrom addresses are Congar, who has 
reevaluated his approach toward the laity in the time following the council, O’Meara, Robert 
Kinast, and Richard McBrien.  These thinkers have identified the experience of the laity 
following Vatican II as one of ministry and are attempting to reinterpret the lay state in light of 
this experience.136  
 Hagstrom responds to her contemporaries by reiterating the magisterial teaching through 
the lens of her chosen thomistic dictum. She does not bar the laity from participating in the life 
of ecclesial ministry but sets limits based upon her ecclesiological perspective.  Beginning with 
who the laity are means interpreting their role through the secular character as stated in LG.  The 
being of the laity includes the secular dimension which should be allowed to color the intra-
ecclesial activity that the laity carry out.137 This secularity makes what the laity offer in service 
of the Church different than the office carried out by the ordained minister.  This renders the two 
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D. Richard Gaillardetz 
 Richard Gaillardetz is a prominent North American theologian whose work focuses 
chiefly around ecclesiology and magisterial authority.  In his article “Re-Thinking the 
Lay/Clergy Distinction” he expresses reservations about the 1997 Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith’s statement “Certain Questions Regarding Collaboration of the Lay Faithful in 
Ministry of Priests.”138 Gaillardetz seeks to demonstrate that the document is the magisterium’s 
attempt to walk back progress made since the Council and to provide his own way forward.  He 
views “Collaboration” as a reaffirmation of the text of the conciliar documents which do not 
fully express the intent of the council. Like Doohan and O’Meara, Gaillardetz holds that the 
Vatican II documents were the first step in a developmental process.  The conciliar fathers were 
engaged in the herculean task of proposing a new way of understanding the Church’s life and 
mission and could not predict the situations in which the council would be implemented.139  
 Gaillardetz claims that “Collaboration” is incongruent with the ministerial realities 
present within the Church.140 The time since the council has seen an increase in the number of 
laity involved in ministerial roles.  This increase is not simply one of quantity of ministers but an 
expansion of the ministerial roles available to lay men and women.  Gaillardetz considers lay 
opportunities that would have been unthinkable in the time before the council.  For instance, a 
lay woman who has been formally educated for her role of service and now engages her 
community as a full-time minister.  Such examples, as well as the existence of the permanent 
diaconate blur the line of the lay/clergy distinction.141  
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 “Collaboration” approaches the teachings of Vatican II with two crucial presuppositions: 
that the laity are defined by their secular character and that the fullness of ministry resides in the 
clergy.  In response to the secular character, Gaillardetz reasons that it would necessitate the 
existence of a sphere of action that is “purely lay.”142 Regarding ministry, Gaillardetz takes issue 
with the “fullness of ministry” being reserved for the ordained who by nature of that ordination 
receive the sacra potestas required for that ministry.  He unpacks ministry into distinct tasks of 
munera (the sharing in the threefold ministry of Christ by all the baptized), officia (the result of 
the deputation by the Church), and servitium (“in which the Church carries out the work of 
Christ within her and the world”).   Each of these make up an aspect of the fullness of ministry.  
Gaillardetz seeks to demonstrate that both the secular character and the reservation of the 
fullness of ministry to the clergy flow from a common font: a clear delineation between the 
sacred and the temporal.143  
 Conceptualizing the sacred and temporal as distinct spheres of activity has led many to 
misinterpret the conciliar texts and results in a contrastive theology that is only capable of 
identifying the laity in comparison to the ordained.  Gaillardetz does not recognize any positive 
theology of the laity in the documents despite a popular claim that there is one “based on their 
unique vocation to consecrate the world to Christ.”144 For Gaillardetz, this description is merely 
contrastive since it is still based upon “hierarchological premises.”145 Language that reinforces 
the lay/clergy distinction within the conciliar documents betrays the intentions of the council 
fathers, making the conciliar teaching ambiguous and confusing.146 In place of the hierarchical 
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interpretation, Gaillardetz claims that the laity and clergy should always be seen within the larger 
context of the “common matrix” found in LG and its use of christifidelis.147 Gaillardetz 
concludes that the intention of the fathers was not to establish a contrastive definition but to 
move “strongly in the direction of simply identifying laicus as the normal situation of the 
practicing Christian who seeks in their daily life to bring all of history to its fulfillment in 
Christ.”148 He brings this universal definition into contrast with one described by Schillebeeckx 
in which the baptized received their worth “only from the standpoint of the status of the 
clergy.”149 
 Taking a second cue from Schillebeeckx, Gaillardetz looks to the New Testament for an 
essential definition of ministry.  An essential distinction between clergy and laity cannot be 
identified in the biblical text.  Scripture and early church documents paint a picture of a 
charismatic community which included ordained ministers.  The primary biblical role of these 
ministers was community leadership.150 
 For Gailliardetz, identifying clergy as community leaders resolves the tension introduced 
by the language of the council.  This should be the primary way of understanding the unique role 
of the clergy who act in persona Christi capitis.151 In the past, the ordained’s cultic role in the 
celebration of the sacraments, specifically the Eucharist, was the predominant function by which 
the clergy’s role was recognized.  The former model was based on an unacceptable inequality 
between the laity and clergy.  Vatican II had moved beyond this model; Gaillardetz cites the 
strong conciliar language that the common priesthood is not inferior to the ordained 
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priesthood.152 The council’s affirmation that the two priesthoods differ in “essence” should be 
understood as a concession to bishops who desired to protect the role of the ordained.153  
 Gaillardetz purports that the universal and ordained priesthoods are not essentially 
different, but the clergy still have a unique role in which they act in persona Christi capitis.  The 
role of the clergy should not be defined by a cultic sacramental act of consecration but by their 
active role in bringing unity to the community.154 The role of the apostolic office according to 
Gaillardetz’s description is twofold: it is to preserve the apostolic faith in the community and to 
preserve the union among those communities.155  
 The identification of the clergy’s role as community leader respects the diversity of 
ministries in the church while affirming a unique role for the ordained.  It represents for 
Gaillardetz an attempt to integrate the Christological approach to ecclesiology, which stresses 
ordination and hierarchy with a pneumatological approach that sees the church as a collection of 
the baptized who exercise a diverse set of charisms in equality of dignity.156  
 Gaillardetz’s project is fueled by his concern for the equality of ministry.  Unique to his 
approach is his desire to maintain the distinction made between the clergy and the laity.  The 
identification of the unique role of the ordained with an apostolic one that preserves the faith and 
unity of the church does not lead to the same difference in essence named by the council.  In 
effect, Gaillardetz’s ecclesiological view affirms a real difference in the exercise of the role of 
the clergy while preserving an overall unity within the christifidelis. 
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 A second theme is that of the identification of sacred and temporal spheres of action.  
This is an auxiliary argument that Gaillardetz uses to support his case.  Gaillardetz warns against 
assuming a delineation between sacred and temporal realities.  Avoiding this language proves 
difficult because it is present in the council documents.  The defining feature that distinguished 
the clergy from the laity in the conciliar text is the exercise of sacra potestas received at 
ordination.  As we have seen, this is contrasted with the actions of the laity who are concerned 
primarily with the temporal sphere.  For Gaillardetz, this does not set up a distinction but 
mutually exclusive spheres of action.157  
 Gaillardetz reframes the discussion in such a way that there is only one united arena of 
activity.  The Church and not the ordained is the principle of sacramental life, making the sacral 
as much the concern of the laity as the clergy.158 Similarly, the ordained do not forfeit their 
responsibility toward the temporal by receiving the new relationship to the community that 
Gaillardetz describes as their unique role.159 The results of this shift are clear.  Gaillardetz 
deemphasizes an identity of the laity as a distinct group who consecrate the world and cautions 
against a too strong identification of the laity at work in the temporal order.  Conversely, the 
loosening of this distinction has an effect on how Gaillardetz sees sacramental action.  Since any 
empowerment is a result of a relationship formed in the community, he does not see any reason 
why the empowerment must be limited to the recipients of ordination.  This, he notes, would 
require a study on the relationship between sacramental and non-sacramental grace. 160 
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E. Edward Hahnenberg 
 Edward Hahnenberg’s contribution to lay theology comes in the form of two monographs 
with differing emphases, namely his 2003 work Ministries: A Relational Approach followed by 
Awakening Vocation: A Theology of Christian Call in 2010.  These works demonstrate a shift in 
approach toward the laity, the former explains the conversation on the laity with reference to 
ministerial action while the latter has a broader scope which includes elements that are not 
directly related to intentional ministry. 
 In Ministries, Hahnenberg’s central concern is providing an ecclesiologically sound 
description of the emergence of lay ecclesial ministry.161 He argues in line with the development 
school that continued use of the lay-clergy distinction only harms the Church’s understanding of 
ministry.  In place of what he calls the “dividing line” that reserves some things for clergy and 
others for the laity, he argues for a concentric circle model based upon relationship.162  
 The dividing line model is always detrimental to developing a theology of the laity.  
Whether one adopts a distinction between the activity of the ordained priesthood or the secular 
character of the laity as a point of departure does not matter.  A sharp distinction between lay and 
clergy always brings about the same result.  One group performs active ministry, leaving “the 
other largely inactive.”163 The fruit of this approach is a “host of dichotomies” that spring up as 
corollaries: “Christ vs. Spirit, institution vs. communion, ordination vs. baptism.”164 The same 
can be said for beginning with the understanding that laity act in the world.  An approach that 
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takes the secular character as its starting point only “frustrates a comprehensive theology of 
ministry.”165  
 Hahnenberg notes that the Second Vatican council supports both sides of this issue.  The 
secular character of the laity as expressed in LG limits the council’s vision of how the laity can 
act within the Church while Gaudim et Spes’s very title as the “Pastoral Constitution of the 
Church in the Modern World” [emphasis added] does away with dualistic roles.166 Moving 
beyond these dichotomies is important for Hahnenberg.  He writes that the characterization as 
“secular” can lead to an understanding that the voice and work of the laity are separate from the 
Church.167 The conciliar intention was to affirm the goodness of the lay state, the laity’s full 
membership in the Church and the godly work done in the secular world and their family lives.  
Hahnenberg charges that the magisterial statements, however, have interpreted the council in a 
way that hardens the distinction between laity and clergy, backtracking on the softening done by 
the council.168 This includes John Paul II’s CL, which, while stressing the laity’s role in the 
transformation of the world, is more concerned with protecting the special place of the hierarchy 
in the church.169  
 In place of the dividing line, Hahnenberg posits the use of concentric circles.  These 
circles express the relationship that ministers have to their community.170 The Trinity is both 
Hahnenberg’s theological locus for reflection and the lens through which he understands the idea 
of relation.171 Trinitarian reflection gives Hahnenberg the opportunity to reconcile the Christ vs. 
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Spirit dichotomy.  Ministry should not be thought of in terms of a Dionysian hierarchical 
mediation, the result of the exercise of a sacra potestas.172 This Christocentric approach 
deemphasized the role of the Spirit and the charisms accessible to all the baptized.173 The 
charismatic framework recognizes the Holy Spirit at work in the community. The giving of these 
gifts is not seen as an extrinsic or occasional act of God but is the constant action of the Holy 
Spirit which permeates the whole world.174 Just as there is no contradiction implied by speaking 
of the missions of the Word and of the Spirit within Trinitarian theology, the ministry of Christ 
does not contradict charismatic activity.175  
 This relational approach reinterprets ordained ministry.  The ministry of the priest cannot 
be comprehended without the ecclesial community.  For Hahnenberg, the priest does not 
represent Christ in a way that places him “over and above” the community.176 The very concept 
of ordination, the ordering of the priest as minister, is ordered toward the relationship the priest 
has with the community.177  
 Ordination is the recognition of a new relationship and an ecclesial repositioning of the 
priest as the leader of a community.  Relationship dictates the place and activity of every 
member of the Church.  While there might be different levels of involvement and commitment, 
each baptized person falls somewhere on Hahnenberg’s concentric circle schema.  These 
relationships result in a diverse set of roles and types of ministry that he describes in a concentric 
circle of initiations into ministry.178 Hahnenberg still places the clergy at the center of the circle, 
though this corresponds with their role as community leaders from which their special liturgical 
                                                          
172 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 46. 
173 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 64. 
174 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 71. 
175 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 39. 
176 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 55. 
177 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 156-7. 
178 See chart on Hahnenberg, Ministries, 204. 
 
 67 
function is derived.  The different ministries progress from this center until they reach the outside 
circle, depicting the “General Christian Ministry” that results from baptism. 
 The opposite ends of this schema, clergy at the center with a generalized group of the 
“baptized” at the periphery, seem derivative of the dividing line model that Hahnenberg wants to 
avoid.  The two circular layers in between two extremes are novel to his approach.  First there is 
the diaconate and official installation and second there are “Occasional Public Ministries” that 
are initiated by a Commissioning Blessing.179  
 These second and third circles demonstrate the focus of Hahnenberg’s thesis.  By 
allowing for the formal, liturgical recognition of the ministry that arises charismatically in the 
community, he does away with the strict line of delineation of the previous model.  Just as the 
priestly and episcopal ordinations change the relationship of one who could be identified in the 
outermost circle, so the training and installation of a minister should be recognized as a change 
in relationship within liturgy, acknowledged as official ministry. “The ultimate goal is to affirm 
the diversity and distinction among ministerial roles.”180  
Hahnenberg discusses the priesthood of the laity only as a stop along the way to his 
conclusion that all the baptized have a place in ministry.  His analysis includes the theological 
development of the laity as a priesthood with equal share in the priesthood of Christ as explored 
by the liturgical movements of the 20th Century.181 In this period the laity were given an active 
role in the liturgy in place of their passive one.  Hahnenberg sees the roles of the liturgical 
assembly as manifestations of the participants’ place in the community.  This means the non-
ordained have a corresponding active ministerial role outside of the liturgy by virtue of their 
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baptismal priesthood.  Precisely what this role is or how it is to be carried out in praxis is not 
addressed in Ministries.  By omitting this, Hahnenberg does not offer an alternative to the 
description of secular laity in LG.  He notes that the council is right to recognize the goodness of 
family and ordinary life lived by the laity but generally regards the “secular character” as a limit 
on ministry.182  
 In Awakening Vocation, Hahnenberg’s focus shifts to the life of individual Christians and 
their response to God’s calling.  Viewed synoptically with Hahnenberg’s previous work, 
Awakening is a broadening of Hahnenberg’s reflection.  The 2010 work is most concerned with 
Christians who would have been placed on the outermost circle in Ministries.  This is coupled 
with a shift in register:  In place of seeing Christian activity in relation to ministry, Hahnenberg 
discusses the Christian life as a response to God’s call.  The resounding message of Awakening is 
that vocational calls are not limited to religious or clergy.  Every human person is invited to 
respond to God’s call, all have an invitation in the form of vocation.183  
 The first half of the work is a historical study on theologies of vocation.  Hahnenberg 
traces arguments that guide him between two extremes.  He wants to avoid approaching vocation 
as something that is utterly supernatural, something that requires a special revelation.  He also 
wants to guard against the over secularization of vocation understood as faithfulness to one’s job 
or trade.184 These poles developed as the result of two different emphases.  The former 
supernatural-mystical understanding of vocation Hahnenberg links to a dualistic nature-grace 
relationship.185 The secularized view of vocation developed from the Protestant attempt at 
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valorizing the secular.  This second approach became unmoored from its theological origins and 
evolved in a way that one’s calling did not refer back to God as its source.186 Each of the above 
derive from a nature/grace dichotomy.  The first valued grace over nature, the second nature over 
grace.  Hahnenberg’s approach seeks to affirm both “as deeply intertwined realities in the 
vocational dynamic.”187  
 Karl Rahner’s theology of grace provides Hahnenberg with the lens for his vocational 
reflection.  It also grants him the solution to the nature/grace dichotomies and refutes “modern 
Catholic theology of vocation.”188 Grace is understood to be not a reality that is super-added to 
the created world but imbedded within creation itself: “God’s pervasive presence in the 
world.”189 The pervasiveness of grace means that it is not limited to the church, official 
revelation, or mystical illumination.190  
 Hahnenberg understands the vocational call as a unity of nature and grace, of creation 
and redemption.191 God’s self-communication is described as a unique offer to every human 
person in the form of a call, a vocation.192 The offer is made to human persons in their 
particularity and invites a response in freedom.  Free response distinguishes between the offer 
God makes and the fulfillment in every human life.193 The reality of grace is not a fated one but 
takes the form an offer. 
 The presentation of nature and grace as the unified vehicle of God’s self-communication, 
here placed in terms of the individual vocational call, frames sin in a wholistic context.  God’s 
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offer is not something extrinsic from the person so a rejection of this offer is a type of self-
rejection.  The graced call is one that comes from within creation and to a certain extent from 
within the person.  Hahnenberg describes the rejection of God’s call through sin as “a rejection 
of reality, a kind of self-destruction.”194 Conversely, the acceptance of God’s call, a response in 
freedom that signals the reception of God’s self-communication is an entering into friendship 
with God.  God’s offer is a plan that is both written into each human life and provides that life 
with meaning.195  
 Hahnenberg pivots from considerations about the individual calling to the calling of the 
Christian people as a whole.  While he does not couch the discussion in the vocabulary of laity or 
the secular, it is chapter six of Awakening wherein Hahnenberg considers the praxis of the ideals 
he has discussed.  He links two thinkers that give the final chapters of his work their trajectory: 
Johann Baptist Metz and Ignacio Ellacuria.  Metz is a student of Rahner who interprets the 
historical reality of human suffering in a way that does not accept an atemporal distancing.  To 
do so would tempt us to ignore the call of the suffering for justice.  He posits that the voice of the 
suffering is an authoritative voice of Christians since they represent the crucified in our midst.196  
 Ellacuria, similarly concerned with suffering, was killed for his political activity in 1999 
while ministering and teaching in his native El Salvador.197 Theologically, Ellacuria’s project 
was to ground liberation theology in the transcendent.  To this end, he interpreted the cry for help 
of the poor and suffering as the call of God’s action in history.  The response to this call plays out 
as a response to God in history: “salvation history is salvation in history.”198 A student of 
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Rahner, Ellacuria wanted to protect against a dualism that separates God from the world while at 
the same time not reducing the transcendent to the historical.  Hahnenberg relates that Ellacuria’s 
emphasis was protecting against the former more than the latter and in doing so he was after an 
explanation of the God-world relationship that demonstrated God’s action in history while 
accepting human freedom.199 Ellacuria adds the work of Xavier Zubiri to his interpretation of 
Rahner and produces a lens that sees the transcendent God as always present within historical 
reality.  Theology does not remind humanity that they must reconnect to something outside of 
history, but that the transcendent is already intrinsic to the events of history.  In a potent biblical 
example, Ellacuria asks who brought “the people out of Egypt: Yahweh or Moses?”200 The deeds 
done in Exodus are identified as God’s deeds, even the ones that necessitated the exercise of 
human freedom.  Ellacuria saw this as the resolution to the same problem tackled by de Lubac 
and Rahner but for the Salvadoran salvation history represents “grace” and salvation in history 
“nature.”201 The result is a view of the Christian call as one that follows the cry of the suffering 
into history not asking what Jesus would do but doing what Jesus did with all of its socio-
political connotations.202 
 The suffering of the other is a call outward.  Hahnenberg unites this principle to Rahner’s 
invitation to a theology of openness and the theologian’s reflections on the Spiritual Exercises.  
The result is an open-ended assent to the call without grasping the end to which that call would 
lead.203 God’s call does not affix an identity on the baptized from afar but is what constitutes 
their identity from the outset.204 The klesis Hahnenberg describes has two elements: to be 
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ourselves and to accept the challenge of the call.  The challenge is first and foremost love of 
neighbor, the response to the suffering of the world.205  
 
F. Paul Lakeland 
 Paul Lakeland’s The Liberation of the Laity is both a thorough treatment of the 
development of lay theology and the consummation of the development school.  The first half is 
comprised of a comprehensive survey of the history of lay theology through the Second Vatican 
Council to the time of Lakeland’s writing.  Among the theological trends that Lakeland 
highlights are the contest between modernism and scholasticism and the reinterpretation of the 
thomistic account of grace offered by de Lubac in his Surnaturel.  These themes foreshadow 
Lakeland’s own views. The first corresponds to his stance on theological development while the 
second signals his rejection of language that hints at a secular/sacred dichotomy. 
 As a pastoral council rather than a dogmatic council, Lakeland sees the work of Vatican 
II as a continuing effort to bring to completion Paul VI’s desire to let fresh air into the Church.206 
As a whole, he considers the council to be “an unfinished project whose final outcome remains 
uncertain.”207 This has significant bearing on how he approaches the conciliar documents.  
Considering the theological and political tensions which produced them, he does not think that 
the pastoral vision that resulted is well developed.  
Lakeland posits that the ambiguity of the roles outlined by the conciliar documents could 
be interpreted in two ways depending on the reader’s predisposition.  Conservative thinkers 
would see a clear demarcation between clergy who act in the church and laity who act in the 
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world. Liberal-minded interpreters could see the same texts as an invitation to a new 
ecclesiological vision in which the laity and clergy are “co-responsible for the life and ministry 
of the church.”208   According to Lakeland, the former are embracing what Gutierrez calls a 
“distinction of planes” that drives a wedge between what happens in the world and what happens 
in the church, a corollary of the secular/sacred separation while the latter would not identify such 
a distinction.209  
 For Lakeland, the documents of Vatican II present a description of lay action, dominated 
by an examination of the lay apostolate, rather than a theological definition of the laity as 
such.210 This betrays the clergy-centric approach that the council embraced.  Instead of asking 
who the clergy are in relation to the laity, the council asked who the laity are in relation to the 
clergy and how much we can say the laity work in and on behalf of the church.211  
 A notable departure from the theme of lay apostolic work is LG’s description of the lay 
priesthood.  Lakeland emphasizes that the notion of lay priesthood communicated therein has 
nothing to do with lay ministry.  The priesthood of the laity is distinct from the ordained 
priesthood.  The sacramental functions are different: the clergy presiding over the eucharistic 
assembly and the laity being a priesthood held in common and not the result of a vocational 
calling. Putting this difference aside, Lakeland hones in on their common conceptual framework 
which is determinative of their activity: both priesthoods are acts of mediation.  The priest is the 
intermediary between God and the laity in their activity whose task it is to “[ferry] back and forth 
between God and the world.”212  
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 These priesthoods act among and are an expression of the distinctive planes of the secular 
and sacred, between God and the world.  Priestly action, the need for intermediary activity, 
would affirm the difference between the sacred and the secular.  In defining priestly action in this 
way - with the emphasis of the consecrator as a mediator between two separated realities - 
Lakeland has set the stage for his own argument against the concept of mediation in his chapter 
on secularity:  
Talking about ‘the secular’ from a religious standpoint means considering the world, 
dependent on God for its existence and suffused with divine presence through Christ and 
the Spirit, but not in such a way that the presence of God changes or suspends the natural 
laws of the universe.213  
 
He differentiates this understanding of secularity from other approaches that contrast the secular 
with the sacred, inherently excluding God from the secular.  Three dualisms can be linked: the 
sacred/secular, God/world, and church/world.  Accepting one of these dichotomies easily gives 
way to the rest and the creation of truly separate realms of reality.  Lakeland connects the 
breakdown of these dualisms to de Lubac’s explication of the relationship between nature and 
grace.214 As with the debates against the scholastics, the end result is a single reality with nothing 
superimposed by God.  
 Lakeland proposes a vision of the world that acknowledges two fundamental principles.  
Catholic theology is both creationist and incarnational.  Creationist is not here used in the sense 
of an evolution/creation debate but to connote that the world as created by God is good.  For 
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Lakeland this makes the world “the enfleshment of God in earthly reality.”215 Against the 
sacred/secular distinction which threatens this understanding, Lakeland writes that the world is 
not a mere symbol of God’s love, it is God’s love. 
 The second principle, incarnation, is decoupled from its traditional soteriological 
framework.  Lakeland does not think that incarnation is a “ruse to subvert the deplorable effects 
of human freedom gone awry,” it is a demonstration of human freedom.216 Herein lies the center 
of Lakeland’s thesis: the exercise of human freedom, human autonomy is to be lived out within 
the limits of the world.  All human activity, regardless of whether that human is religious or not, 
contributes to a single task: “to make the world a more and more truly human reality.”217  
 This is a radical affirmation of the secular.  God’s actions in revelation serve to affirm 
and promote the goodness of the world as such.  Human activity images God’s activity by 
imitating God’s “no-strings-attached” love for the world.  For Lakeland the love of the secular 
and the exercise of human freedom is characterized by unconditionality.  
 Lakeland formulates secular unconditionality, the total acceptance of secular reality as 
such, from his readings of post-conciliar theologies.  He founded his views upon consensus that 
begins with de Lubac and includes Chenu, Congar, Daniélou, and Rahner. These theologians 
represent a paradigm shift away from the above-mentioned dichotomies.  There is no longer 
nature and grace but a nature that is already graced.  This changes the tone of the Christian 
conversation in many ways: there is no godless reality in need of special divine action, the desire 
for God is already imprinted within the inhabitants of the world in a natural manner, and the 
natural order need not obey any special rules in order to fulfill its intention within the order of 
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grace.  In place of a divine project with a modus operandi that extends from outside of creation, 
salvation history is instead a struggle toward “the humanization of the world.”218  
 This is not a project of perfection for the world but of the transformation of human lives.  
Lakeland describes a secular world, a natural order that is complete, “sufficient if not self-
sufficient.”219 The self-sufficient nature of the secular even applies to the search for the meaning 
of the world.  Lakeland describes the secular world as a mystery.  This is not a mystery that can 
be solved by looking at how the various parts interact, an understanding of the details, but a 
mystery of contemplating the whole.  Though the Christian story proposes the world’s meaning 
founded in its nature as gift even this makes the world about something else.  
 
To say, for example, that secular reality can only really be understood in a transcendent 
frame of reference is inevitably to reduce secularity, to compromise its graced character 
in the name of something supposedly more fundamental.  The history of Christian 
spirituality is replete with examples of this world-hating attitude.220  
 
The challenge for ecclesiologies, particularly a theology of the laity is to affirm this radical 
unconditionality, the self-sufficiency and ultimately self-referential character of the world while 
at the same time allowing for the act of faith.  Lakeland precludes any understanding that would 
interpret the problem from the standpoint of revelation.  Normally treated as a “message from 
another planet” the traditional understanding of revelation as God’s secret message is supplanted 
by the acceptance of God’s constant presence and activity within human history, the apex and 
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perfection of revelation being not the message of Jesus’ life but the encounter with the human 
being Jesus.221 With the exercise of human freedom as the ultimate task of the human person he 
engages in less an ecclesiology and more of an anthropology.  The secular project in which both 
believer and non-believer share is to affirm “the goodness of the human and the natural 
world.”222 Though the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus affirmed the goodness of the world 
the goodness of the world is not dependent on these events.  
 God’s activity is reinterpreted in light of the unconditionality of the secular.  At the most 
basic level, God is understood as the grounding of secular reality.  Salvation and redemption 
become categories of the secular dynamic of struggle and liberation.  These categories are not to 
be applied as an epilogue to the present reality but within the human struggle for freedom from 
structural and personal sin.  Lakeland states clearly the premise that undergirds his other 
theological claims: “God does not have a plan for the world that goes beyond the unconditional 
freedom of the human as God created it.  The secularity of the world is the divine plan.”223 
Christianity has distracted itself with metaphysical and otherworldly concerns.  This unhealthy 
preoccupation leaves Christianity with dualistic obsessions that are not part of the worldview 
characteristic of Jesus or the early church.  Secularity is affirmed by the God described in the 
Jewish theological vision which understands the unfolding of historical events as the sole stage 
of divine activity.224 Lakeland tersely rejects any understanding of God as an entity above or one 
that subsumes creation.  The metaphysical God envisioned by such philosophical and theological 
systems is “the enemy of human freedom” and “delimits human possibility.”225  
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 The role of the church is to support the secular project.  As the pivotal revelational events 
of the life of Jesus and the action of God in history is interpreted as a display of God’s 
commitment to human freedom, so the mission of the church is to work toward the same goal of 
unhindered freedom.  Lakeland circumscribes the mission of the church around the focal point of 
human freedom.  The prophetic role of the church promotes the responsible undertaking of the 
secular project which must always be pursued in light of the human character which is its 
goal.226 This implies that the diversity of action characteristic of human freedom be respected 
and that violation of those freedoms not be tolerated.  The church is subject to these criteria and 
must respect the unconditionality of the secular.  This means that in no way can any religious 
symbol be imposed thus interpreting “the world in terms of some other, more fundamental 
reality.”227 In place of religious symbols and theological categories is a general affirmation as 
mission: “The church is that part of secular reality that is convinced that it is affirmed in the free 
unconditionality of the secular.”228 
 Lakeland’s secular project extends to the worship offered by the church which is directly 
linked to the affirmation of secular reality.  The act of faith is an acknowledgement of God’s gift 
of the world.  Worship is placed in service of the humanization of the world.  The faithful gather 
to be reminded of God’s affirmation of the world and strengthened for the furtherance of the task 
of humanization.  This worship cannot be self-referential and is only valuable if it results in 
engagement with the world.  
 With worship leading out into the secular, the laity are the primary executors of the 
church’s mission.  This cannot be understood in an intra-ecclesial or instrumental sense.  The 
                                                          
226 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 158. 
227 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 166. 
228 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 174. 
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promotion of freedom and world affirmation happens as the free action of adult Christians within 
the world.  The Christian narrative keeps the laity grounded in the goodness of the secular with 
the Church behind them as a support and source of strength for secular action.  This support is 
intended to help the laity make the many difficult decisions that they face daily, enabling them to 
act in a consistently pro-human way.  The mission is carried out by the “countless millions” of 
laypeople who exercise their freedom wholly independent of magisterial oversight.229 This life is 
most clearly manifest in projects of justice, human solidarity, preferring the human over realities 
that threaten to devalue humanity.230  
 Lakeland’s project is a paradigm shift.  Where many post-conciliar attempts at 
developing a theology of the laity found difficulty in providing satisfactory accounts of lay 
action in the world without referring them to intra-ecclesial realities, the unconditionality of the 
secular frames every ecclesial action as a support for the secular.  The secular which was 
consigned to the periphery of the conversation in favor of the discussion of lay apostolic work at 
Vatican II is placed at the center.  The two pillars of Lakeland’s thought are the goodness of the 
world - created good and inherently imbued by God’s grace and the right exercise of human 
freedom.  These form the foundation from which Lakeland’s conclusion of the church as a 
community at the service of the unconditionality of the secular is formed. 
 The radical affirmation of the secular is both a continuation and a correction of the 
conciliar project as it is expressed in the documents of Vatican II.  It is a continuation insofar as 
Lakeland has found creative ways to express the importance and centrality of the secular.  His 
work shares in the affirmation of the world found within the council’s desire to emphasize the 
work of the laity in a world that was created good by God.  Lakeland believes the texts 
                                                          
229 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 246. 
230 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 248. 
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themselves are confused in their reaffirmation of a traditionally held secular/sacred distinction.  
He decries notions of revelation, an emphasis on the spiritual, or the idea that there is anything 
over and above creation as incompatible with unconditional secularity.  In fact, these would be 
the source of a conditional secularity that would only be understood in reference to an outside 
reality, namely the metaphysical God. 
 We can conclude that the correction Lakeland would offer to conciliar teaching on the 
laity would strip it of the inside/outside referent indicative of a secular/sacred distinction.  His 
thought forbids the use of priestly language as he has defined it.  For Lakeland priesthood serves 
only as the courier between the two realms.  Whether we are speaking of the ordained priesthood 
or the common priesthood of all believers, they would equally function as representatives 
ferrying back and forth either God to the world or the world to God. 
 The exercise of such a priesthood would necessitate a conditionality of the world.  For 
Lakeland this heralds a return of the theological position that devalues anything related to the 
secular.  Ostensibly this was a major misstep of Vatican II and the chief reason why the fathers 
were unable to clearly affirm the secular.  Vatican II does not only uphold the teaching that the 
ordained introduce something sacred into the world, something inaccessible without sacramental 
action, the central expression of lay action in the world is framed within the practice of lay 
priesthood.  In direct contrast to Lakeland’s view of unconditionality, the task of laypeople as 
described by Vatican II is the consecration of the world to God.  They are to refer all elements of 
the secular order to God through spiritual sacrifice. The task of the laity outlined in LG is 
incompatible with Lakeland’s view.  The world, sufficient unto itself, is in no need of 
consecrating.  As created good it needs no exterior reference to a larger framework.  There is no 
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further plan for the secular order that requires lay action to bring in the sacred.  As Lakeland 
writes: “The secularity of the world is the divine plan.”231 
 
 
G. Conclusion – Post-Conciliar Lay Theologies 
 In summary, we can recognize several points of tension that arise between the magisterial 
and development schools.  These points are most lucidly stated in the literature that arose as a 
critique to the secular description of lay life.  Though these critiques do not coalesce into a 
homogenous view they share certain characteristics which pose serious issues for the 
ecclesiology as outlined in the Vatican II documents themselves and have particular 
repercussions for the description of the laity as “secular” or for attempting to describe the laity as 
a distinct state within the Church whatsoever. 
 These concerns are rooted in dichotomies that are ostensibly causally connected.  The 
first of these dichotomies is ecclesiological, the second is ontological, addressing God and the 
world.  The ecclesiological dichotomy appears under the guise of many contrastive pairs: 
clergy/laity, institution/charism, an ecclesiology that flows from Christology versus one that 
arises from pneumatology.  Each expresses the same basic dichotomy between what is 
administered or held by the few versus what is held in common by all.  The consensus of the 
development school is that this dichotomy, enshrined within magisterial documents leads to the 
elevation of the former terms over the latter: the clergy over the laity, the institutional over the 
charismatic, the Christological over the pneumatological. 
 Far from disarming the dichotomies, the common thread within these authors is the 
affirmation of the second term in place of the first.  For Hahnenberg this meant placing a new 
                                                          
231 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 173. 
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emphasis on the ignored role of the Spirit and the exercise of the charisms within the Church by 
all the baptized.  Likewise, Doohan recognizes the baptism and the reception of the Holy Spirit, 
as the sacrament of Christian ministry.  In their thought, the Christ/Spirit Lay/Clergy 
dichotomies amalgamate into an active/passive bifurcation in which the clergy minister in an 
active manner to a laity who can only passively receive.  The consensus is that this is not only 
harmful to the trajectory of an ever-increasing role of the laity in the activity of the Church, it is 
contradictory to that same council’s claims to have recognized the laity as equal sharers in the 
Church’s life and mission. 
 The solutions proposed by these authors are varied.   A common outcome of these 
proposals is that the distinction between laity and clergy is weakened if not done away with 
altogether.  There seems to be no task that is distinctly lay.  Positing an exclusive clerical task, 
rooted in the sacra potestas, perpetuates the disparity.  Doohan uses the strongest language here: 
“the term laity is now theologically dead.”232 In its place, Doohan proposes the recognition of a 
universal call to ministry.  Hahnenberg rejects the same categories as a dividing line model to be 
replaced with a Trinitarian based model of mutual relationship.  O’Meara decries any attempt to 
distinguish between lay and clerical ministry as “nominalism.” Gaillardetz, while not calling for 
the complete dissolution of these categories sees the continued use of ecclesiologies that employ 
a “contrastive model” as a contradiction of the trajectory set by Vatican II. 
 We can characterize this common thread as a concern for an ecclesiology of equality.  
This does not mean that each author advocates for an erasure of the distinction between ecclesial 
states as such.  Hahnenberg and Gaillardetz, for instance, both value the unifying ministry of the 
clergy, particularly bishops.  What they are calling for is an equal valuation of all Christian 
                                                          
232 Doohan, "The Lay-Centered Church," 23. 
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activity, sometimes described as vocation, sometimes ministry, that would unmistakably value 
the life and work of all Christians equally. 
 Many of the authors analyzed in this chapter draw a strong correlation between ecclesial 
inequality and separation within the Church and dichotomies that envision the cosmos as a 
distinction between the secular and the sacred, nature and grace, the world and God.  To save us 
from conflating it with the lay/clergy dichotomy with which it is so often associated it is 
important to distinguish between the two.  The lay/clergy and its corollaries are distinctly 
ecclesiological in nature while this second pair is theological, anthropological, and cosmological.   
 The connection between these dichotomies is clearly recognizable in Gaillardetz who 
sees the secular character of the laity as requiring two wholly independent spheres of activity.  
To describe the activity of the laity and clergy in the way that the council does, there must be a 
sphere reserved exclusively to lay activity as well as a sphere that is reserved for the activity of 
the clergy.  The laity, in this schema, are consigned to labor in a secular way in an ambiguous 
“secular” while the clergy handle a strictly defined realm of the sacred.  The description of the 
latter is coupled with the reception of ordination, the exercise of a sacra postestas and the 
participation within the ecclesial hierarchy. 
 The root of this division between secular and sacred is identified as the reliance on a 
Dionysian understanding of mediation.  Hahnenberg and O’Meara name the Areopagite 
specifically, while others decry the notion of mediation in general.  In their description of this 
hierarchy, the active role of those who have the sacra postestas is the sole means for receiving 
the divine.  The world, and the laity who act in this world, would be totally cut off from the 
divine without the mediated presence facilitated by the clergy.  This conversation is easily 
transposed into the key of grace and nature, wherein God’s grace is only available through the 
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ordained ministers of the Church while the laity toil in a natural world, bereft of the help of God 
that is necessary for them to receive salvation. 
 Among the authors of the development school there is a shared understanding that the 
very concept of mediation assumes a deficient world.  The conveyance of some reality be it 
grace, the sacred, or the action of the Church itself into the world implies that the world does not 
already have an equal share in the reality of God.  This is tantamount to saying that the world 
itself is not good.  Lakeland’s recognition of the secular, the world, as sufficient without 
reference to the transcendent is the collapsing of this dichotomy in a logical manner.  We are left 
with a dilemma: either the world is deficient and in need of some further action, which reaffirms 
the dichotomy or creation is good and the concepts of mediation and consecration are ill applied 
to the secular.  I will argue that reflecting upon these issues through a maximian lens will provide 
us with a third way.  The concept of mediation and creation will serve as our point of departure 
for the dialogue between Maximus and these contemporary views.  As we will see, the Confessor 
conceives of mediation in a manner that is consistent with a creation that has not only been 







Saint Maximus the Confessor received his title and notoriety from the public defense of 
dyotheletism and dyoergism: the teaching that in the person of Jesus Christ there are two wills 
and energies or operations, respectively.  At the height of the Monothelite controversy, Maximus 
was silenced by the Byzantine Empire.  In 662, his tongue was cut out of his mouth to keep him 
from speaking, his right hand was cut off to keep him from writing.  The Byzantine monk was 
cast into exile along the eastern side of the Black Sea and would die in that same year.  Maximus 
is revered as a confessor by Orthodox and Catholics alike, his outspoken opposition to the 
emperor was vindicated at the Third Council of Constantinople (680-681). Though Maximus is 
most known for his contribution to the Christological controversy, this event chronicles but the 
final chapter of a life spent in ascetic reflection and spiritual teaching.  The Confessor weaves a 
theological tapestry illustrating how the cosmos, humanity, and the Logos of God are intricately 
connected.  The fruit of maximian thought is a rich theology that affirms both the ontological 
distance between God and creation as well as creation’s participation in God.  The Confessor’s 
thought on the human vocation can be summarized as the eucharistic offering of creation back to 
God.  For Maximus, holding the ontological distance between God and creation and the 
participation of created beings with God in tension acts as a prerequisite for a free communion of 






I. Analysis of Ambiguum 7 
 An extended analysis of Maximus’ Ambigua 7 will serve as a beachhead for our 
exploration of the Confessor’s cosmological vision.  This passage, in which Maximus refutes an 
Origenist interpretation of Gregory of Nazianzus, is perhaps one of the most written about part of 
the Confessor’s work and for good reason.1 
First, it contains a complex yet clear argument that encapsulates the basics of his 
cosmology.  Second, it acts as a key to maximian terminology.  Many of the concepts that 
characterize the Confessor’s thought are employed in his overarching argument against 
Origenism.  We can observe how these concepts interact with one another, demonstrating the 
consistency of Maximus’ thought.  This includes the process of deification as being, well-being, 
eternal well-being,2 the logos and the logoi,3 preservation of the person4 and a nascent defense of 
dyotheletism.5 The crux of the Confessor’s argument reveals his attitude toward creation.  
Maximus defends the created order against charges that it is somehow the result of corruption or 
not originally intended by God. 
 This chapter will use the structure of Maximus’ argument in Ambigua 7 as the scaffolding 
for a thematic exploration of the Confessor’s thought.  We will consider the Origenist position 
and its consequences for creation, before exploring Maximus’ response which will be broken up 
into three sections.  The first section will address the nature of created beings in which the 
                                                          
1 Studies that explore Maximus’ engagement with Origenism or use it as a basis for the systemization of the 
Confessor’s thought include Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor  Studia 
Anselmiana, Philosophica, Theologica, 36 (Rome: Orbis, 1955). Torstein T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric 
Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Sotiris Mitralexis, Ever-
Moving Repose: A Contemporary Reading of Maximus the Confessor's Theory of Time (Cambridge: James Clarke & 
Co., 2018); Joseph Farrell, Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor (South Canon: St. Tikhon’s Seminary, 1989). 
2 Ambigua 7 PG 91:1073C.  All translations of Ambigua text from Maximos (Nicholas) Constas, ed., On Difficulties 
in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua of Maximos the Confessor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
3 Amb 7 PG 91:1077C. 
4 Amb 7 PG 91:1076B. 
5 Amb 7 PG91:1076A. 
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Confessor differentiates created reality from God so as to characterize the former as always in 
motion until it rests in the latter.  The second will provide an account for how Maximus 
understands Gregory’s statement that we are a “portion of God” while maintaining the 
distinction between created being and God which includes the key maximian concept of the 
logoi.  The third is a response to the Origenist notion of a preexistent satiety that replaces it with 
an endless striving toward God that is the eschatological consummation of creation.6 While the 
general structure will follow Maximus’ argument, we will introduce interconnected ideas 
together in order to demonstrate the consistency of the Confessor’s thought. 
 
A. The Countersign of Origenism 
The classic portrait of Maximus’ theological position as a monolith of anti-Origenism is 
beginning to erode.7 In place of this, a nuanced understanding of the Confessor’s work is 
emerging in which Maximus’ engagement with Origenism is multifaceted.8 We can think of 
Maximus’ analysis of Origen in two modes: As the former image suggests, it is apparent that he 
wrote in order to refute the claims of contemporary expressions of Origenism and to preserve 
prominent theological works, Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, from radically Origenist 
interpretations.  This task makes up a majority of the Ambigua.  The second aspect of Maximus’ 
Origenist quest is novel: Maximus was interested in separating the wheat from the chaff - to 
                                                          
6 These sections are delineated in Adam G. Cooper, The Body in St Maximus the Confessor: Holy Flesh, Wholly 
Deified (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 78. He recognizes in them a correspondence to Maximus’ 
description of deification progressing from being (Amb 7 PG 91:1077C-1081C) to well-being (Amb 7 PG 91:1081D-
1085A) and eternal-well-being (Amb 7 PG 91:1085c-1089D). 
7 The most outspoken proponent of this view is Polycarp Sherwood who argued against a claim made by Balthasar 
that Maximus underwent an Origenist crisis early in his life.  Sherwood’s argument was so convincing that Balthasar 
revised this view for the second edition of Kosmische Liturgie, Paul M. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus 
Christ and the Transfiguration of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 67. 
8 Even what is meant by “Origenism” is in need of further nuance.  Blowers points out that there was no united 
school of Origenism in Maximus’ day, Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 67. 
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preserve the ascetic and theological wisdom which grew up alongside erroneous theological 
ideas.  Maximus shows keen discernment by distinguishing between the theological vision of 
creation and anthropology present in Origenist works and the ascetic spiritual tradition that he 
would have incorporated into monastic life. 
 An analysis of Maximus’ works on asceticism show that they are heavily influenced by 
Evagrius Pontikos, a disciple of Origen’s ascetic vision who became prominent in the monastic 
world of the fourth century.  Evagrius’ influence on Maximus’ work is unquestionable.  Many of 
the Confessor’s ascetic works are adaptions and corrections of the Origenist spiritual tradition of 
Evagrius.9 This is true of the Confessor’s largest collection of ascetic teaching, the Liber 
Asceticus as well as the Capita de Caritate, which Maximos Constas notes “is a determined 
rewriting of nearly one hundred passages from Evagrios Pontikos.”10 In this vein, we can say 
that Maximus is an “Origenist” in the sense that he develops this spiritual teaching in his own 
way. 
 Despite this shift, the cosmology of Origenist school is the most prominent foil for 
Maximus’ thought.  The Confessor’s desire to protect the writings of the Fathers from being 
coopted into supporting views contradictory to Chalcedonian Christianity provides the stage 
upon which the drama of maximian cosmology unfolds.  Maximus’ writings are largely 
concerned with the interpretation of difficult passages and it is within these explanations that his 
own thought is exemplified.   This mode of clarifying, distinguishing, and solving aporia is 
brought to bear on Origenist interpretations of Gregory in the Ambigua ad Iohannem.  It is within 
this context that the Confessor undoes the cosmology of radical Origenism and at the same time 
                                                          
9 Demetrios Harper, The Analogy of Love: St Maximus the Confessor and the Foundations of Ethics (Yonkers, New 
York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2019), 237.   
10 Constas, ed., On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua of Maximos the Confessor, VIII. 
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develops his own.  While we can be certain that Maximus’ task was a refutation of the 
Origenism’s worst characteristics, the development of Maximus’ own thought is so tied to 
Origen’s that Pascal Mueller-Jourdan writes “we can recognize the metaphysics of Origenism as 
the prime matter of Maximus’ cosmic liturgy.”11 
 The bespoke difficulty of Ambigua 7 arises from a misinterpretation of an oration from 
Gregory Nazianzus’ On Love of the Poor.  At issue are two specific phrases that lend themselves 
to an interpretation that devalues creation, namely:  “we who are a portion of God that has 
flowed down from above” and “this very weakness that has been yoked to us might be an 
education concerning our dignity.”12 Maximus seeks to defend Gregory from a facile 
interpretation “derived largely from the doctrine of the Greeks.”13 It is noteworthy that Maximus 
does not name Origen or his contemporaries.14 Maximus provides a summary of the view early 
in the passage: There are some who interpret the “portion of God” to mean that humanity was 
once connatural with God.  God only created the world as a response to the flowing down of 
rational beings: the result of movement which lead to the dispersal of rational beings.  Bodies, as 
creation, were not originally intended but were given “as a punishment for their former sins.”15 
The dynamic is one in which there was an original unity of rational beings enjoying God.  These 
                                                          
11 Pascal Mueller-Jordan, "The Foundation of Origenist Metaphysics," in The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the 
Confessor, ed. Paul Allen and Brownen Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 149. 
12 Amb 7 PG 91:1069A. 
13 Amb 7, PG 91:1069A. 
14 Sherwood notes that the only place where Origen’s name is mentioned in Maximus’ work is a condemnation of 
the Alexandrian in Relatio motionis Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 72.  Blowers posits that the specific Origenists 
in question are difficult to identify because they are “recusant Origenist monks” Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 
110. 
15 Amb 7 PG 91:1069A. 
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beings became bored with God, despite the definition of God as the “ultimately desirable” and 
“the Beautiful”16 and proceeded from stasis to movement, causing the creation of the world.17  
 Maximus accuses these interpreters of assuming a triad of fixity-motion-generation.18 To 
better understand Maximus’ response to this misinterpretation of Gregory, it will benefit us to 
explore the Origenist ideas embedded within the narrative.  Though there are no direct citations 
of Origen in this section, that the view stems from the Origenist school stands uncontested.19 
These ideas are readily observed in Origen’s On First Principles which ties creation to moral 
evil.  Origen’s account of creation is a cosmic theodicy.20 Diversity of being and movement are 
counted among the results of a primordial sin precipitated by the devil’s rebellion.  This sin 
results in the creation of the cosmos, ostensibly the spiritual as well as the physical.  Individual 
differences, including disadvantages in states of life, can all be traced to the extent to which the 
person took part in this sin.  Even birth defects and disabilities are counted within the scope of 
this first punishment.  Origen is intent on preserving the unity and goodness of God in the face of 
a cosmos rampant with examples of division and sufferings.  His solution links choice and moral 
evil directly to this downfall and describes them as God’s just punishments but does so in a way 
that requires a choice to be made before the beginning of motion or God’s act of creation. 
 This description of creation makes Maximus’ account seem all the more charitable.  It 
places creation as a result of sins within the same continuum as those angelic beings that became 
                                                          
16 Amb 7, PG 91:1069C. 
17 Amb 7, PG 91:1089C. 
18 Mitralexis, Ever-Moving Repose, 111. 
19 Sherwood does not find any direct quotations or paraphrases of Origen in Amb 7 Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 
89. He proposes that at the time of the writing of these passages, Maximus’ familiarity with Origen’s thought came 
from exposure to secondary sources prevalent during the seventh century with the most likely influences being the 
edicts of Justinian but also Theodore of Scythopolis, Leontius of Byzantium, and Cyril of Scythopolis. See 
Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 71-88. 
20 Origen, First Principles, 1:8:1 cited in Farrell, Free Choice in St. Maximus, 60. 
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demons.  Even the angels are created as a result of complicit rebellion.  This does not simply 
result in a creation that is not originally intended by God but eclipses the goodness of any act 
done by God within creation.  Farrell notes that Origen’s view is problematic in that it taints 
God’s actions ad extra.21 God’s reaching into creation via revelation or a uniting of the divine 
with created reality via the Incarnation would always reflect something other than the original 
divine plan. 
 The Origenist view presents a countersign to Maximus’ view of the cosmos since it has 
its beginnings in the freedom of preexistent rational beings and is the result of disobedience.  As 
the Confessor curtly points out, those who adopt this position would be “indebted to evil.”22 The 
reason for creation, revelation, Incarnation is the disobedience of the many as they, to make use 
of the misapplication of Gregory’s words, “flow down” from above.23 Maximus’ response will 
lead to the eschatological affirmation of creation in the sense that creation will endure in the 
eschaton, not its identification with punishment.  His view can be contrasted directly with 
Origen’s.  Embodiment is not a reproof or the creation or a training ground to correct 
disobedience.  Creation is an irreplaceable part of the divine plan.  For the Confessor, the 
ultimate end of creation facilitates God’s intention who “wills always and in all things to 
accomplish the mystery of His embodiment.”24  
 
B. Creation, Motion, Stasis 
                                                          
21 Farrell, Free Choice in St. Maximus, 60. 
22 Amb 7 PG 91:1069D. 
23 Amb 7, PG 91:1068D. 
24 Amb 7 PG 91:1084D. 
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 Maximus denies the cosmological order of the Origenist argument.  He turns the triadic 
cascade of stasis-motion-creation on its head, formulating his own triad: creation-motion-stasis.25 
Maximus does not offer a competing pre-creation narrative; he makes his argument based upon 
the nature of created things.  In this first section of his response, Maximus deals directly with 
creation and motion and defines them in relation to stasis, their end. 
 Maximus immediately relates creation (genesis) to motion (kinesis): “everything that has 
received its being ex nihilo is in motion (since all things are necessarily carried along toward 
some cause)...”26 Motion does not exist in beings prior to their creation.  He makes it clear that 
creation (genesis) always precedes motion (kinesis).27 Motion is not listless but has an end in its 
goal.  The crux of Maximus’ argument is that movement seeks an end, stasis.  This includes an 
eschatological element: “that which can arrest motion of whatever is moved in relation to it has 
not yet appeared.28 Maximus pits his cosmology directly against the Origenist claim of original 
unity in a henad.  For the henad, there would have been an original unity, a connaturality with 
the natural end or as Maximus terms God “the Beautiful” (to Kalo).  In his own schema, created 
objects move toward God even though God has not yet “appeared.” Maximus’ rhetoric is 
unforgiving.  The Origenist position leads to one of two conclusions: a) an infinite cycle of 
insatiability: if rational beings rejected satisfaction once, they will do so again29 or b) the one 
around which the henad was gathered must not be the end goal because these beings sought out 
an alternative, they were not satisfied by God.30  
                                                          
25 Mitralexis, Ever-Moving Repose, 111. 
26 Amb 7 PG 91:1069B. 
27 Amb 7 PG 91:1072A. 
28 Amb 7 PG 91:1069B. 
29 Amb 7 PG 91:1069C. 
30 Amb 7 PG 91:1069D. 
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 Either possibility links the existence of motion and creation to moral evil.  The 
connection of evil to motion is just as problematic for Maximus as claiming that disobedience is 
the cause for creation.  Again, for Maximus, motion is always seeking its reason for being, its 
end, the Beautiful.  If evil is the cause of motion then it is also the cause of “the most precious of 
all possessions, I mean love.”31 Motion is spurred on by love “through which all things created 
by God are naturally gathered up in God, permanently and without change or deviation.”32 To 
claim that evil is the root cause of love is untenable for Maximus.   The gathering up of every 
created being forms the superstructure for his cosmological thought and we shall see how he 
grounds this dynamic, not as a punishment for obedience, but in accord with God’s original 
intent for creation. 
 Inanimate objects are not devoid of this motion, having their own place within the divine 
plan.  Each created being has motion, created for a proper end that is not included within 
themselves.  Their motion is a striving toward that end.33 God alone is self-caused, existing for 
his own sake, having no end outside of himself.34 This being so, God is not subject to the motion 
of creation but is the source and end of motion.  The impetus behind this movement is 
twofold.  First, there is a natural power by which beings tend toward God as the final end and 
goal.  Second, created beings move toward God as a result of their own activity.35 Maximus does 
not limit this activity to intellectual creatures but highlights that creatures express their activity in 
the exercise of their volition.  It is through free assent that these creatures affirm their movement 
toward God.  Their choice “intensifies and greatly accelerates [their own] motion.”36 This is 
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realized through a dynamic of recognizing the Beautiful and becoming convinced that it is an 
object that should be loved.  The experience of ecstatic love drives the intellectual being ever on 
until it is possessed wholly by the beloved.37  
 The result is an eschatological transformation.  Maximus explains that those intellectual 
beings who strive toward God as their end will undergo a change in which they seek to be 
identified solely in God.  The qualities they manifest are not their own but are the qualities of the 
one who permeates them.38 This should not be confused with absorption or 
annihilation.  Maximus is quick to point out that the intellectual being retains two key 
elements.  First, handing over of the will does not entail the destruction of self-
determination.   What is surrendered is the ability to make choices that are opposed to God.39 
Secondly, Maximus describes the eschatological enjoyment of God in a way that preserves 
personal identity.  Though Maximus does refer to the creature’s preference to be known by the 
qualities of God the intellectual creature’s identity remains distinct.  Maximus borrows an image 
from 1 Cor 13:12: even within God we shall “know even as we are known.”40 Key to 
understanding the preservation of identity of intellectual and other created beings is Maximus’ 
insistence on the infinite difference between the created and uncreated.41 This allows him to 
compare the deified with a star being eclipsed by the greater light of the sun that surround and 
penetrates it without annulling the real difference between them.42  
 
C. Ex Nihilo 
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 The affirmation that all creation – visible and invisible – has been created by God ex 
nihilo is the opening salvo of the Confessor’s response to Origen.  This mode of creation is the 
basis upon which he lays his argument for the genesis-kinesis-stasis schema.43 God freely 
intends to create beings that are necessarily in motion.  This creation does not take place as a 
result of preexistence or downward motion but is brought into existence by God out of nothing.  
Creation ex nihilo can serve as a thoroughfare by which we can reach many aspects of the 
Confessor’s cosmology.  From this doctrine arises three crucial components of Maximus’ 
theological view:  1) the tension of a creation that is ontologically distinct from God and yet can 
become God through participation. 2) Maximus’ apophaticism, the language we can use to 
describe the relationship of created to uncreated realities. 3) how the Confessor’s view defines 
creation as a free act of creation in love. 
 Creation ex nihilo is a twofold rejection of the Origenist stance: God does not create from 
anything preexistent, rational or otherwise, and God creates freely, not out of a contingency 
which arose from disobedience.  The assertion that God would have created either from a 
preexistent substance or due to the result of a pre-temporal fall would be to consign the creative 
act to a matter of necessity.  In the Origenist account, creation is a sort of training ground that is 
necessary to lead beings back to the henad.  It is a response to that situation and no longer an act 
done in total freedom.  Mitralexis explains that maximian cosmology, in agreement with the 
patristic tradition, is not borne out of necessity but due to the act of a personal uncreated 
creator.44 God, due to his transcendence, is always free.  For the Confessor, freedom 
characterizes God, not as part of God’s nature but as a demonstration of God’s existence beyond 
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our conception of Him.45 Maximus rejects that God is any way bound by necessity.  To claim 
limits upon divine freedom would be “utter blasphemy.”46  
 Having been brought about by a free act, creation receives its characteristic 
contingency.  God’s choice, in Mitralexis’ words, “transcends predeterminations and 
necessities.”47 This underscores the utter gratuity of the created order.  God could have created 
something vastly different but chose to create particular beings in this way from among an 
infinitude of possibility.  Bereft of necessity, God could have chosen not to create anything at 
all.  Creation in freedom is nothing more than an exercise of God’s creative will.  God creates 
what he desires, how he desires, when he desires.48 As we shall see when we explore Maximus’ 
anthropology in the next chapter, the nature of creation as free has ramifications for the nature of 
the freedom found in rational beings.  The God who creates without necessity imbues that same 
freedom into rational beings who in turn are invited to exercise their own personal 
freedom.  This is contrary to the Origenist position which makes the creation of the world a 
matter of necessity and distorts freedom into unsatiety that can only be cured through a 
submission to the theological dynamism that will ultimately return it to God.49  
 In his analysis of the fourth section of Maximus’ Centuries on Love, Tollefsen explores 
God’s freedom in relation to creation ex nihilo.  The analysis begins from a point of continuity: 
the doctrine as it was expressed at Nicaea and Constantinople holds influence on Maximus’ 
writing.  Tollefsen demonstrates how Maximus’ view affirms the doctrine but moves beyond the 
                                                          
45 George C. Berthold, "The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus the Confessor," in Maximus Confessor: actes du 
Symposium sur Maxime le Confessor (1982), 53. 
46 D Pyrrh PG 91:293C 
47 Mitralexis, Ever-Moving Repose, 66. 
48 Torstein T. Tollefsen, "Christocentric Cosmology," in The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, ed. Paul 
Allen and Brownen Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 309. 




conciliar teaching and is conversant with the wider Christian tradition on the topic.  The 
Confessor raises and answers many questions in the process.50 Maximus discusses God’s 
“inscrutable wisdom” in creating the cosmos when he did and not before or after.51 This 
statement first assumes that creation itself has a beginning, a position that could not be taken for 
granted in the ancient world.52 For Maximus, creation is not eternal with God because no limited 
thing can exist infinitely.53 This logically begs the question Maximus considers in a selection of 
his De Caritate: why has God chosen to create when he did as opposed to some other time?   
 Engaging this question is not simply an exercise in idle theological speculation.  It gives 
Maximus the opportunity to pass on important distinctions about God’s relationship to creation 
and humanity’s ability to know God.  Crucial to comprehending the discussion is that this 
question has no reference to the time within creation itself.  The question addresses “when” God 
created in reference to the eternity that exists in God and itself may be an attack on the non-
eternity of creation.  Looking closely at the logic in the question as Maximus presents it.  (1) 
God’s eternal goodness includes his identity as creator God (2) God is always good then (3) why 
did God create “recently” or as Tollefsen writes: why didn’t God create “infinitely sooner?”54  
 Maximus finds the question as it stands unanswerable.  Asking why God did not create 
sooner is nonsensical because there is no time before creation.55 The question is useful in that it 
gives the Confessor an opportunity to reflect on the validity of the question.  While it is 
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impossible to have a “when” before creation, asking “why” God created when he did can be 
meaningful if we understand “why” in the proper sense.  Maximus does not answer the question 
as it is posed but reaches into the sense of the question to make his distinction.   God creates in 
accord with the “inscrutable wisdom of the infinite essence” which in and of itself is ungraspable 
by the human intellect.56 Contemplating the divine essence grants an opportunity to wonder at 
God’s creative activity but does not answer the proposition.57  
 This reflection draws an apophatic boundary around what questions Maximus is willing 
to consider.  Questions that pertain to God’s inner life, about God in and of himself remain 
hidden.  The divine essence is impenetrable.  For Maximus, asking the reason behind God’s 
choice to create when he did falls within this category.  These questions are distinct from those 
that can be asked about God using data observed from within creation.  This second type pertains 
to God ad extra, the effects of God’s action within creation.58 Regarding the current example 
from De Caritate 4, humanity can conceive of how God created — the statement that God 
creates ex nihilo is an answer to this very question — or to look for the reasons “why” God 
created embedded within the created reality.  This second way of interpreting the “why” of the 
question differs from the first in that it has for its subject God’s action in creation, present in 
nature or revelation, not inquiring within the divine essence itself.  Maximus’ utilization of 
negative theology is of primary importance for understanding his doctrine of creation.  Before 
exploring the ontological distance between God and creation, which for Maximus is a necessary 
condition for his dynamic cosmology, we need to understand the source and structure of his 
engagement with apophaticism. 
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D. Mysticism / Apophaticism 
 The limits the Confessor is willing to set to his theological inquiry are not a simple matter 
of logical necessity, nor are they unquestioned conformity to what has been handed on to 
him.  Maximus certainly inherits the categories of apophaticism used by both Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Gregory Nazianzus but his conviction that the Divine Essence is utterly beyond the human 
capacity to fathom is primarily grounded within his own mystical experience.  The cosmology of 
Maximus cannot be separated from his lifelong spiritual pursuit of the ascetic life.  The 
Confessor writes as one with intimate experience with the realities he is communicating, not 
dealing in secondhand statements of authority.  Maximus has experienced both the presence and 
absence of God.59 He holds up the ascetic life, the life of virtue as the means of encounter with 
God who is at once present to the one who lives that life and absent to the one who is not.60 He 
writes about a mystical condition of knowledge that proceeds from this way of life in which the 
experience of God is a “simple and direct meaning of the Lord without images.”61 This is the 
door to Maximus’ engagement with the apophatic tradition.  It is a denial of the sensible and 
intellectual and an acceptance of a vision that exceeds the capacity of human intellect.62  
 The mystical experience of an intimate alterity of God underwrites the whole maximian 
corpus but finds potent expression in his reflection on the transfiguration.63 This in itself can be 
seen as an adaptive response to Origenism since the Alexandrian utilizes the transfiguration as a 
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primary locus for his mystical thought as opposed to Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa 
who give pride of place to Moses’ experience at Mount Sinai.64 Maximus sees in the event of the 
transfiguration of Jesus on Mount Tabor a figure of the “two general modes of theology.”65 The 
Confessor outlines these modes using a comparative rhetoric.  The apophatic and cataphatic are 
presented in a complementary manner.  “The first is simple and uncaused, and verily affirms the 
Divine solely through a complete denial, properly honoring divine transcendence by absolute 
silence.  The second is composite, and magnificently describes the Divine by means of positive 
affirmations based on its effects.”66 The threshold of God ad intra and ad extra noted in this 
discussion is further elaborated here but without denigrating the cataphatic.  Each provide 
“symbols appropriate for us.”67 In respect for the impenetrable mystery of God, Maximus calls 
our experience of God’s transcendence a “symbol” just as he does the symbols that address sense 
perception.  It is through these symbols that we believe in what is “beyond the senses” but stop 
short of subjecting these unseen realities to the intellect because doing so would be irreverent.68 
That which is denied through the via negativa is simultaneously affirmed through what is 
available to the senses.  The “likeness of the knowledge of God” is available through these 
positive symbols but only in a rough way, knowing God “from His creations, as their cause.”69  
 This concurrent mystical affirmation/negation continues throughout the remainder of 
Maximus’ exposition.  The Lord, present at the transfiguration manifests this dynamic in 
complementary pairs: created in human form/without undergoing any change, being present as a 
symbol of Himself to lead all of creation to Himself/though He is hidden and totally beyond all 
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manifestation, He provides in a human-loving fashion through visible divine action/what are 
signs of visible infinity.70 
 Maximus exegetes Christ’s appearance at the transfiguration in this manner.  The apostles 
experience both modes of theology in the Lord’s presence.  In His face, made luminous in the 
transfiguration, they experience God who is ineffable and unable to be circumscribed by human 
thought.  He specifies that beholding the face of the Lord, beholding the Godhead, leaves no 
impression around which a concept can be formed.71  
 The garments of Lord shine by the same light present in the face and are a symbol of 
cataphatic theology.  Garments as a created reality, are not the Lord himself but manifest his 
magnificence as it is found within visible creation.72 This corresponds to the effects of God’s 
activity through which we can perceive Him in a positive manner, though not clearly due to the 
immense light of revelation.  These symbols and the theological modes they represent are 
complementary.  The brightness of the garments is inseparable from the luminosity of the Lord’s 
face.  Both make up the fulness of revelation, the apophatic shining within the cataphatic, not 
cancelling it out. The gathering of these modes into a complementary whole gives Maximus’ 
mystical theology a distinctly creation-affirming character.  Creation is not sloughed off as a 
hindrance to the ever-invisible experience of God but is revelatory in its own right in a manner 
proper to its participation in God.73  
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 It is helpful to compare Maximus’ approach to mysticism with that of 
Dionysius.  Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is a pioneer of Christian mystical theology.  There 
is in the work of this anonymous author a unity between the hierarchical, sacramental, liturgical 
and mystical to the extent that his Ecclesial Hierarchy can be seen as a reflection of the Celestial 
Hierarchy.  Emphasis on the unity of these complex realities is inherited by Maximus.  Blowers 
tells us that Maximus’ integration of Dionysius into his own work gives it an ecclesial and 
sacramental orientation.74  
 There are many witnesses to the direct influence that Dionysius has on Maximus’ 
thought.  Chief among them is Maximus’ aim in his Mystagogia to discuss the Divine Synaxis in 
a way that honors the teachings of the “blessed elder” by addressing only the things that he did 
not already cover.75 The high praise offered by Maximus is reflected by the Confessor’s adaption 
of many Dionysian phrases for his own use.  Many of the concepts central to Maximus’ thought 
were coined in works by the Areopagite.  Dionysius is the source of “theandric energy,” 
Maximus’ favorite term for the new activity formed by the unity of divine and human action.76 
The description of the process of deification as the triad being-well being-eternal well being is an 
addition to the dyad of being-well-being, formulated by the Areopagite.77 Even the term logoi, 
key to Maximus’ understanding of the divine/world relationship is adapted from Dionysius.  
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Specifically, Maximus adopts Dionysius’ definition of the logoi as “divine wills.” This way of 
preserving the unity of the one logos expressed in and to the many manifestations of logoi has 
become synonymous with the Confessor’s thought, a concept we will discuss shortly. 
The Confessor embraces the Areopagite’s mystical language as a foundation for his 
ontology.  The ontological distance expressed by apophaticism forbids confusing God with 
creation.  As Balthasar explains: “Dionysius pointed to the indissoluble autonomy of the finite 
world, as a whole and in its individual members in relation to the infinite reality of God.78  
 The Confessor appropriates much Dionysian language and method in his mystical 
theology yet there are crucial differences.  Maximus pulls the categories of apophatic and 
cataphatic modes from Dionysius as well as the theological distinction of God ad intra 
(sometimes known as the theological) from the ad extra (also called the economic) which 
corresponds to Dionysius’ categories of God as cause and God as supernatural cause.79  
 Ysabel de Andia juxtaposes Maximus’ development with the Areopagite’s showing how 
the Confessor reframed his predecessor’s thought in a distinctly Christological key.80 Dionysius’ 
point of departure is an apophatic “ascending of the negations” that approaches the darkness of 
God by freeing the mind of sensible realities and ends “beyond affirmation and negation.”81 
Maximus’ approach is characterized by the kenosis of the second person of the Trinity.  Instead 
of a philosophical ascent, the Confessor’s mystical theology takes its cue from the theological 
descent.  Affirmations are made possible by witnessing this divine activity as revelation.82 This 
unfolds into emphases of imagery that characterize each approach.  Dionysius, in keeping with a 
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negation of the created in search for the uncreated, sees the mystical journey as “a mystique of 
darkness.”83 The Areopagite combines the dark cloud of Exodus 20:21 with the unapproachable 
light of 1 Tim 6:16 in a depiction of the unknowable God.  To this, Maximus adds the imagery of 
the transfiguration, the light of the Lord’s face and garments.84  Unknowing is complemented by 
the mysterious knowledge of the Lord in revelation and activity in creation. 85This result is the 
difference between Dionysius who pursues an ecstatic state that “leaves ‘everything and itself’” 
behind versus the maximian christological synthesis.86 
 For Maximus, cataphatic statements do not remove the veil of mystery from 
God.  Cooper summarizes this paradoxically: “God reveals himself by hiding himself, and in 
hiding himself, makes himself known.”87 Even Holy Scripture cannot be taken as the plain truth 
about God, it participates in this dramatic revealing/concealing.  Maximus uses the image of 
garments, this time showing how they cover the flesh of the Word.  He describes the words of 
Holy Scripture as “garments” - while the Word is clothed and certainly present in them, they also 
cover the Word, concealing the flesh of the Word.88 The same can be said of God’s revelation in 
nature.  What is created in nature and according to the Word is an expression of that same Word 
but the very visible nature of creation means it conceals what is invisible.89 Cataphatic attributes 
and names of God serve to clothe the naked flesh of the Word so that humanity can communicate 
about Him and worship Him.  Maximus warns against rejecting the use of these garments to 
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clothe the Word since without them we would have no way of describing the invisible.  In a 
sense, not concealing the Word with human language makes us “murderers of the Word.”90 Such 
are the Greeks for Maximus, who refuse to acknowledge anything beyond what is visible and 
become worshippers of the visible nature before them.91 The purpose of language, symbols, and 
images is always to point beyond itself.  Just as the garment clothes the flesh, empty garments 
are of no use.  Making affirmations about God always points beyond those affirmations, always 
conceals more than they reveal.  These attributes are not simply of human invention.  Through 
His own self-revelation, culminating in the Incarnation, God has given reason for addressing 
Him in a positive way.  Maximus writes “the Word ... came to us through a body, and likewise 
grew thick in syllables and letters.”92 The thickening of the Word that is the product of Divine 
activity does not change the revelatory dynamic.  What is seen and conceived still belongs to 
God ad extra. We agree with Cooper’s evaluation of the topic that though these affirmations are 
crucial for Maximus, their nature as concealers of the Word means that they do not come 
anywhere close to circumscribing the reality of God.  Whatever can be said of God “is in fact 
more accurately denied him.”93  
 We can see how Maximus uses negations to produce theological affirmation in his 
Centuries on Theology and Economy.  Opening passages of the first “century” find the Confessor 
describing what God is not by comparing Him with created realities such as time, movement, 
and essence.94 The unknowable God, ellusive to human knowledge can only be naturally 
acknowledged by witnessing “the principles in beings.”95 The use of these negations to compare 
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created reality with God is a mode of affirmation itself but not an affirmation of God as such: it 
is the affirmation of an ontological distance between God and creation. 
 
E. Ontological Distance 
 Maximus’ mystically inspired apophaticism leads us to a God who can only be spoken of 
in his manifestations within creation but never fully understood since He Himself is not 
contained within creation.  The maximian distinction between God and creation is not simply a 
linguistic or descriptive one but comes from ontological distance and difference.  The difference 
we find in Maximus has a certain similarity to what von Balthasar links Maximus’ view with 
Dionysius.  Dionysius held that there was an “indissoluble autonomy of the finite world, as a 
whole and in its individual members, in relation to the infinite reality of God.”96 The formulation 
of ontological distance contains the validation of a characteristically Western belief about “space 
and freedom.”97 From the outset we should take care to temper this notion that allows for space 
and freedom with the Orthodox understanding of participation, anticipating discussion of the 
logoi.  Maximus and Dionysius’ shared apophatic vision affirms an ontological distinction and 
difference between God and creation, but they do not do so in a way that bars participation in the 
Divine.  Loudovikos explains that in the Orthodox context apophaticism, descriptive or 
otherwise, does not end with “a sterile gnosiological abstinence.”98 It denotes a spiritual position 
in which the sum of the cosmos is never equal to God but allows for a “dialogical participation in 
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divine actuality.”99 We will return to the description of this dialogic dynamic in the next 
chapter.  It is the affirmation of this difference, the recognition that God is permanently and 
eternally the Other, that simultaneously ensures that the created is never absorbed into the Divine 
while facilitating an ever-deepening participation of the created with God. 
 The ontological distance between God and creation facilitates motion.  Blowers describes 
the distance as functioning as both space and horizon.100 As a space it allows movement toward 
or away from God.  As a horizon it beckons the created toward deification without “ever being 
fully traversed.”101 The difference between God and the creation that God made ex nihilo stands 
as an “epistemic fault line,” which for Maximus is “non-negotiable.”102 We recall that 
prerequisite distinction is made by Maximus at the outset of Ambigua 7 which will go on to 
describe created beings as participating in God.  This distinction and definition of ontological 
distance guarantees that God and creation remain unconfused and is of primary importance 
because of the intimacy that Maximus demonstrates between God and creation.  Recall that 
creation ex nihilo is used by Maximus in Ambigua 7 as a justification for his stance on motion 
since for the Confessor “everything that has received its being is in motion.”103 The Confessor 
describes God as immovable because the Divine occupies a sort of super-position “since it fills 
all things.”104 Ontological distance simultaneously retains space for movement and affirms 
God’s filling of that space.  This both qualifies and introduces tension into Maximus’ exposition 
on motion.  God is both ultimately Other than the creation and yet fills all that exists.  The 
Confessor’s insistence on this difference holds the tension in place without allowing it to resolve 
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into pantheism. The pantheist position has already been rejected by Maximus.  The Origenist 
interpretation of Gregory’s statement that we are “portions of God flowing down from above” 
would not have been problematic for the Confessor had he held a pantheistic view.  Tracing 
Maximus’ argument about the moment of creation revealed that he was unwilling to consider the 
co-eternity of creation with God because it would imply “metaphysical ‘simultaneity.’”105 God 
cannot be univocally identified with his creation.  It is only God’s creative will that can bridge 
the difference, the primordial abyss, that is between him and the creation which he wishes to 
bring into an unconfused union with the divine nature.106  
 Further highlighting this tension is Maximus’ appropriation of the Dionysian concept that 
creation is both ex nihilo and ex Deo.107 In Maximus’ words: “We believe that He Himself, by 
virtue of His infinite transcendence, is ineffable and incomprehensible, and exists beyond all 
creation ... We also believe that this same One is manifested and multiplied in all the things that 
have their origin in Him in a manner appropriate to the being of each, as befits His goodness.”108 
These two statements can only be synoptically affirmed with the understanding of God’s 
ontological difference.  For Maximus, God’s being does not supplant created being.  The two are 
not in dichotic competition for the “space” we are discussing.  If Maximus says that creation is 
ex Deo, he does so in a way that should not be mistaken for a diffusion of God’s being into 
created beings as though the One is now the many.  Instead, as creator and cause of being, God 
cannot be thought of as one being among many.  God abides outside of Maximus’ ontological 
schema altogether.  Characteristic of his theologically apophatic style when speaking of God in 
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reference to ontology, the Confessor says that it is fitting to call the superbeing of God 
“nonbeing.”109 The affirmation of God necessitates the negation of created being writ large.  In a 
passage from his Ecclesial Mystagogy, Maximus writes that it is more proper to acknowledge 
that God “transcends being” but does so in a way that places God “by nature in the same class as 
absolutely nothing of the things that are.”110 Mitralexis cautions us against thinking that 
Maximus is engaging in mere rhetoric here.111 This radical negation, the breaking of ontology by 
attempting to circumscribe God is instead a respectful use of language that cannot hope to be 
made to describe the mode of existence of the Divine which is always outside of creation as its 
source and end.112  
 
F. Movement (Kinesis) 
 The ontological distance that distinguishes creation from the Creator is demonstrative of 
the maximian philosophy of movement.  By nature, created beings move while God Himself is 
immovable.113 Motion is not the result of corruption or moral evil but is presented by Maximus 
as an ontological property of created being.114 Movement is what inherently distinguishes the 
created from God.115 The Confessor says this univocally of all created beings, including 
“inanimate beings and merely objects of sense perception.”116 Recalling Maximus’ reversal of 
the Origenist triad of satiety-motion-generation into generation-motion-satiety, God’s creation ex 
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nihilo precedes motion.  Beings are then originally intended by virtue of their creation for 
motion.117  
 That all creation is ever in motion and that it is a God-intended ontological property of 
being raises some questions: Does motion ever draw creation away from God?  Do created 
beings lose the ontological property of motion once they reach their telos in God? In order to 
address these issues, Dionysius Skliris distinguishes between three sorts of movement (kinesis) 
within the work of the Confessor: metaphysical, diastematic, and perpetual movement.118 The 
metaphysical sense is used as the middle term in Maximus’ response to Origenism.  This 
movement connotes a being in the process of becoming.  It has as a telos its finalization which 
brings about metaphysical completion.  God is both the preconceived end (telos) and objective 
(skopos) of all created things “yet itself exists out of nothing.”119 According to Skliris, what 
differentiates Maximus from the metaphysics of the Greek tradition, particularly Aristotle, is that 
there exists a “great chasm between the movement and the end.”120 This is not to say that natural 
maturation does not move beings toward this goal yet it never does so in a way that causes them 
to attain their telos.  Due to the ontological difference, metaphysical movement can never arrive 
at its final consummation.  That is, it can never reach total fulfillment without receiving 
something from “beyond nature.” Yet this is precisely what has been offered through the 
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hypostatic union.  The uniting of the created with the uncreated facilitates the movement of 
created beings into participation with the Divine.  The incorporation of ontological distance that 
can only be traversed by an incorporation of the created in the hypostatic union represents for 
Skliris the maximian development of a Christian Aristotelianism.121  
 The second, diastematic movement, primarily means spatial movement over distance, is a 
“passage from one place to another.”122 This sort of movement also describes temporal changes 
that are not part of metaphysical becoming such as a change in attributes or 
accident.  Diastematic movement always happens within time, it can accompany metaphysical 
movement but should not be confused with it.  The key difference is that metaphysical 
movement is always movement toward a being’s telos.  Irrational movement, movement that is 
in opposition to the final end of created being is always only diastematic movement.123 
Movement (kinesis) for Maximus can be used to describe both the progress made toward union 
with God in time (both metaphysical and diastematic) but collapses into mere spatial movement 
(diastematic) if beings move in opposition to this end. 
 The Confessor’s final use of movement concerns the eschatological drive of humanity for 
God.  Termed “perpetual” or “eternal” movement, this sort of motion occurs within the human 
psyche as an inner drive for God.124 Since this movement is internal to the human person, it is 
not diastematic, there is no spatial quality to it. The perpetual motion causes bodily movement, 
following this desire for God, but is itself not concerned with space or the physical.  This 
eschatological movement is however metaphysical in that it guides humanity toward the final 
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end: repose in God.125 Eschatological movement does not simply lead to and have its fulfillment 
in the eschaton.  This sort of movement continues even as it is fulfilled.  We can contrast this 
with diastematic and metaphysical movement which cease when fulfilled.126 It is this sort of 
movement that Maximus has in mind when he uses his aporetic term “ever-moving-repose.” This 
term describes God’s movement in which the created is ultimately to participate.127  
 It is important to note that the motion which finds its rest only in God is not limited to 
rational creatures but includes all that is created.  No matter what part of creation, the end, rest in 
God is described in the same terms.  This is why we can say, properly speaking, that the rest that 
has its ultimate goal in God is not only a facet of Maximus’ anthropology, or angelology, but is a 
distinct part of his cosmology.  The argument of Ambigua 7 does not differentiate between 
created beings and rational beings in its foundational descriptions of motions.128 The logic of the 
argument uses the status of rational beings as created beings to conclude that rational beings 
must also be in motion toward some goal.129 It is at this point that the Confessor introduces the 
idea of a will within rational beings, who seek “a voluntary end in well-being.”130 Maximus’ 
argument about motion is then not solely limited to the discussion of rational beings.  The above 
distinctions between metaphysical and diastematic movement proves to be important 
here.  Metaphysical movement has not been limited to rational creatures.  We can conclude that 
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non-rational, the non-intellectual, beings within creation tend toward God which is their own 
telos.  The motion of these non-intellectual beings is not meaningless.  The goal that God intends 
for the whole of creation is rest in Him. The movement toward rest in God is not, however, a 
natural progression in the sense of a fait accompli.  The movement of all creation does not end in 
God out of necessity and may fall short of its potential, into mere diastamatic movement.  Due to 
the ontological difference between the created and uncreated, participation in the hypostatic 
union is the only means by which creation can reach this finalization.   
 The impetus behind all metaphysical movement for Maximus as he describes it in 
Ambigua 7 is desire.  As the Beautiful (Kalon), God, is the proper end to this desire.  This is a 
key point in the Confessor’s argument against Origen since it delineates God as that in which 
movement would cease, resulting in satiety.  “For whatever is not good and desirable in itself, 
and that does not attract all motion to itself, strictly speaking cannot be the Beautiful.” 131 God is 
loved for his own sake and is the only one that can grant the end that can satisfy the longing of 
which all movement is expressive. 
 This being so, Maximus does not claim that this desire is ever satiated.  In what Blowers 
phrases as an “eternal appetitive movement” we see that the perpetual, eschatological movement 
is fueled by an unquenchable desire for God that remains even at the point of participation in 
God.132 The existence of such a desire rejects the notion of Origenist satiety altogether.  If there 
was ever a point at which desire was totally fulfilled there would be a risk that the being would, 
like Origen’s henad, become bored with God.  In place of this is a desire that can only be 
satisfied by God yet never reaches final consummation.  In Maximus’ own words, God is “by 
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nature infinite and infinitely attractive, and who rather increases the appetites of those who enjoy 
Him owing to their participation in that which had no limit.”133 There is an apparent 
contradiction here: even though God is the object that is desired yet never reached, Maximus 
adopts a schema of creation-motion-satiety (rest/fixity).  If the desire is never satisfied, how can 
the Confessor claim that the triad is ever complete?    
 Blowers argues convincingly that Maximus forms his thought around eschatological 
perpetual progress as an adaption of Gregory of Nyssa’s epektasis, that humanity strains toward 
the infinity of God.134 While diastematic movement would cease, in a sense, even the 
metaphysical movement is folded into the infinite dynamic of participation.  The being at rest in 
God would never cease participating in God and due to God’s infinite nature would continue in 
the process of becoming for all eternity.  Gregory of Nyssa’s formulation of perpetual progress 
arises while the Cappadocian is describing those who participate in God through virtue.  This 
invitation to infinite growth is laid out in syllogistic form: “Since, then, those who know what is 
good by nature desire participation in it, and since this good has no limit, the participant’s desire 
itself necessarily has no stopping place but stretches out with the limitless.”135 Blowers finds 
evidence of this view not only in Maximus’ cosmology, as represented in Amb 7, but also in his 
explanations of the virtues, mystical theology and ultimately his view of deification.136  
 Here we can see the cohesion of the Confessor’s thought.  Maximus does not use 
perpetual progress as a rhetorical device or a piece of mere data to refute a view that he does not 
agree with.  Perpetual progress is deeply embedded within his thought.  It is not only consistent 
with but relies as a matter of necessity on the topics discussed above.  Ontological distance, 
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perpetual progress, apophatic theology, and Maximus’ description of motion and the creation of 
the cosmos ex nihilo do not simply interface in a way that they are non-contradictory.  The ideas 
flow together as though they were viewing the same reality with different emphases.  Maximus’ 
initial response to Origenism rests upon each of these topics presented together as a whole and is 
an edifice that does not stand if any one of them is removed.  We have explored these topics in 
this order based upon the Confessor’s own argument in Amb 7.  This order highlights the 
important distinction between creator and the created while affirming the goodness of both 
creation and the movement of creation.  Creation and movement are not the result of corruption 
but were in God’s original plan.  It is at this point in Amb 7 that Maximus discusses God’s 
intention and the means by which God will bring about creation’s participation in the Divine. 
 
II. Logos/Logoi 
 Maximus introduces the Logos and the logoi (λογοι) within his discussion of Gregory’s 
aporetic statement that we are “a portion of God that has flowed down from above.” As a 
continuation of his argument against Origenism, the Confessor contextualizes the logoi within 
the cosmological structure we outlined in the previous section.  The priority of ontological 
distance adds nuance and limits to the sort of participation Maximus is willing to consider, a 
dynamic in which the logoi play a crucial role.  From the outset we should note that the words 
logos and logoi hold manifold yet conceptually harmonious meanings.  Constas explains the 
difficulty of translating logos “which can occur half a dozen times in one sentence with nearly as 
many meanings.”137 Far from leading to confusion, the multivalence of the term shows the 
pleremic character of Maximus’ vision and demonstrates why the term itself is so useful. 
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 The ubiquity of these terms is evident at the outset of this section and connects creation 
ex nihilo to this stage of Maximus’ argument.  With an allusion to the Book of Wisdom, the 
Confessor states that God’s free act of creation is performed with “reason” (logos) and wisdom 
(sophia).138 Already his use of the logoi is multifaceted:  they are ideas within the mind of God 
by which he creates, they allow for a distinction between the one and the many, accounting for 
the “differences of created things” and ensure that individuals are not confused with one another 
and remain unconfused (asugchutos) with God.139 
 God creates in accordance with his logoi which correspond to a macro level (there is a 
logos of angels and a logos of humanity) as well as an individual level, addressing each 
particular being.140 Maximus reminds the reader of God’s transcendence, the ontological 
distance that reminds us that the Divine is not to be identified with creatures but is also the 
paradoxical means by which God can be manifest in all creatures: “this same One is manifested 
and multiplied in all the things that have their origin in Him.” 141 God “recapitulates” all that is 
and holds it in being and it is by virtue of the origin of their being that “they participate in God in 
a manner appropriate and proportionate to each.”142 It is on account of the preexistent logoi, 
universal and particular, that each individual being can be called “a portion of God.”143 
 This being so, the logoi do not provide a fatalistic dictation for creaturely action.  While 
particular beings are created according to their logoi, the creatures’ movements post-creation 
must also be “according to its logos” for it to come to be in God.144 Particular logoi can be 
conceived as the origin and trajectory on which God places beings.  There is a divine intention 
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for the movement of beings that coexists with a freedom that allows the logoi to be impacted by 
the response of individual creatures.  This freedom makes it possible to oppose the logoi. The 
path of opposition does not lead to participation in God.  The Confessor describes a dynamic in 
which created beings resist their logoi and move “irrationally, swept away toward nonbeing.”145 
Participation is brought about by the logoi as cause, guide, and means by which created being is 
brought into unity with God.146 Though the logoi, in a sense, propel creatures, they are never 
moved themselves, remaining fixed within God.147 They precede the beings that are created by 
God “at the appropriate moment in time.”148 The logoi also define the limits of each created 
thing.149 
 Maximus defines one limit, consistent with the discussion of the previous section, to the 
participation in God facilitated by the logoi.  He draws the line of this participation at the limits 
of negative theology, God ad intra.150 In this mode the Logos is utterly distinct from everything 
created “since He is beyond all being.” 151 The Confessor is willing to “set aside” this mode in 
order to contemplate how created beings participate in God in which “the one Logos is many 
logoi and the many are One.”152 In as far as created beings exist according to their logoi (as their 
origin and move in them toward their end in God) they participate in God and it can be said that 
the One sustains them and that in them “the One is many.” 153 
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 Thus far we have encountered Maximus’ formulation of the logoi based upon his use of 
the term in Amb 7.  The Confessor provides a definition for the logoi adapted from Dionysius: 
they are “‘predeterminations’ and ‘divine will.’”154 The identification of logoi with the will or 
“wills” of God that inform all of creation stress God’s unbound freedom and self-investment in 
creation.  This usage describes God’s own involvement within the dynamic of creation, cosmos, 
and return. God embeds divine wills into creation as intended paths and as a means for union and 
participation in his own divinity.  In keeping with the multivalent meaning of logos/logoi, 
Maximus’ definition of the logoi as divine wills presents a firm root for our understanding but in 
itself is not exhaustive of his use of the term. 
 Maximus writes about the logoi so frequently that studying the concept highlights 
different aspects of the teaching depending on context and emphasis.155 Riou calls them the 
“personal destiny of every created thing.” Sherwood emphasizes their existence in God from all 
eternity and their unitive character.  Likewise, Thunberg notes that God’s will is expressed in the 
logoi and that following the logoi brings harmony between particular beings.156 Von Balthasar 
sees logoi as a preexistent “sketch” or “outline,” God’s “plan for the world.” Writing from a 
Balthasarian inspired theo-dramatic perspective, Blowers describes them as the “the Logos’ 
‘script’ in the cosmic drama of his self-revelation.”157 Florovsky emphasizes divine activity, the 
logoi are connections expressed as “actions or “energies” which originate in “divine thoughts 
and desires.”  He also calls them “paradigms.”158 Cottoi traces Maximus’ use of logoi as “inner 
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principles” cosmologically and as “spiritual essences” in the context of the ascetic life.159 Croce 
notes logoi present within the biblical narrative, which give it form and meaning.160 Loudovikos 
writes that the logoi are responsible for “the beginning, middle, and end of things” they guide 
“the entire existential course of a particular entity” in every context, eschatological, ecclesial, 
eucharistic, or otherwise.161 Meyendorff emphasizes the ontological aspect of the logoi that 
simultaneously mark a creature’s participation in God and existence in being: “Separated from 
its logos, a creature is but non-being, me-on.” Participation in God is required for even natural 
movement.162 
 These descriptions of the logoi hang together in a way that bespeak a kaleidoscopic 
view.  It is impossible to contain such a complex term by using a single snapshot.163 The 
continuation of our analysis will consider the logoi as they pertain to three key areas of 
Maximus’ thought: his ontology, Christology, and theology of deification.  To follow Maximus’ 
thought accurately, we should note that even these frames of reference mark out distinctions but 
overlap since they cannot be separated from one another.  Following the overarching theme of 
this chapter, we begin with the ontological/cosmological point of reference. 
 
A. Logoi vs. (Neo) Platonism 
 It is due to their role as facilitating participation in God that the logoi grant the very 
existence of beings in a particular manner and of the universe in general.164 This, coupled with 
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the Confessor’s use of the logoi as a solution to the philosophical problem of the One and the 
many can be mistaken for the Neoplatonic position.  Neoplatonism would interpret the logoi as 
emanations of the One Logos. This emanation would communicate God’s own being through the 
logoi. The logoi are not channels, as it were, of the divine essence into creation.  Believing so 
would be to mistakenly apply the doctrine of the logoi to what lies beyond being, to God ad 
intra.  Maximus forbade precisely this view in Amb 7.  Instead of sharing in God’s essence, 
created beings participate in God through God’s own personal divine activity, which are the 
logoi.165 The logoi exist in God from all eternity as God’s own wills and are inseparable from 
God, whereas Platonic ideals are themselves eternal, distinct from God, and have their own 
motive force.166 Platonic ideas are dissimilar to the logoi since they have autonomy and exert 
necessity over God, an unthinkable limitation of the divine freedom.167 Confusing the logoi with 
Platonic ideas would be just as detrimental to the freedom of created beings.  Mitralexis 
describes a crucial difference between understanding the logoi as created wills versus defining 
them as divine ideas.168  If the logoi were a sort of God-originate form or ideal, they would 
necessarily constrain creaturely freedom.  Expressing the logoi as wills grounds existence in 
freedom rather than necessity.169 Similarly, Bradshaw observes how the logoi are not conceived 
of as “exhaustive predeterminations of the entire course of a creature’s existence.”170 The logoi 
of rational beings can be likened to an “invitation” the response to which is left up to that being’s 
volition. In the distinction between ideas and wills, we encounter a foretaste of the logoi’s role as 
both the guarantor of and means for humanity’s dialogic relationship with God.  
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 The emphasis on freedom proves to be the deciding factor which differentiates Maximus’ 
cosmological vision from his neo-Platonic contemporaries and brings the logoi center 
stage.  Tollefsen expands upon this crucial point and sketches an argument that, while respecting 
the transcendence of the divine essence, connects it to creation in a way that demonstrates the 
diffusion of goodness within creation as a free act of God.  Tollefsen begins with common 
ground: he posits that God’s internal activity is both necessary and sufficient for creation and 
that creation is contingent, having no effect on the divine essence itself.171 For both Christian and 
Neo-Platonist, God could be conceived as one who wills to be “diffusive of good” without 
implying any change in divinity.172 Creation could be mistaken for a side-effect of the existence 
of this diffusion of goodness and it is on this point that the two schools differ.  Tollefsen asserts 
that the difference lies in God’s attention to creation.  God does not simply allow creation to 
happen but is the sole attentive participant in bringing about creation, “something other than 
Himself.”173 
 This argument assumes that we can intimate something about God’s inner life from the 
creative result of divine activity.  We must recognize a distinction between God’s self-
contemplation as one who diffuses good (one who creates) and the active willing of that creation, 
a separate volition of God.  This second point would be unacceptable to the Neoplatonist 
understanding of emanation.174 Creation would not be necessary because of God’s self-
knowledge but would be known as a possibility of that knowledge.  This adds a level of 
contingence that Tollefsen derives from Maximus’ description of the logoi in Amb 7.175 The 
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logoi are depicted as God’s knowledge of creatures but not the actualization of those creatures: 
the very possibility of those creatures to be created and what they might ultimately become.  The 
dominant picture of the maximian God as freely acting divinity in place of logical necessity 
emerges here.  The logoi have a double function of being God’s knowledge of creatures as well 
as the free choice of God to bring them into being with multiple possible outcomes intact. This 
system allows creatures to exercise freedom in respect to God while God remains unchanged by 
the unfolding drama of creation and history.176  
 
B. The Logoi and Ontology 
 What then, is the ontological status of the logoi?  Their intimate connection with created 
beings and rejection of their autonomy from God may lead us to think that they are created like 
the beings they inform.  Thunberg links this question to immanence and transcendence.177 The 
answer he arrives at, in his words, is “a double one.”178 We must hold in tension that the logoi 
precede the entire cosmos and are uncreated wills of God which can only be realized as they 
bring creation into being.  From a different perspective, we might understand them as God’s 
uncreated intention to bring about creation from all eternity, which only becomes manifest 
outside of the divine essence as that creation is brought into being.  Yet the logoi are not passive 
or static, they represent God’s continued presence and activity in created being.179 On account of 
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this, Thunberg states that the logoi are “both transcendent and immanent.” 180This double answer 
helps us to understand a passage in Amb 33 in which the Confessor relates that it is by his logoi 
that the “Word ‘becomes thick.’”181 The dual status of the logoi as transcendent and immanent 
are demonstrated in this passage in which Maximus relates that the Logos is “wholly present in 
the whole universe” and simultaneously “wholly present in individual things.” The conceptual 
categories of transcendence and immanence help us to make sense of how the Logos could be 
present “wholly” to both frames of reference (universally and particularly) while being 
“undiminished.”182 The logoi are the “sole bridge from the inner mystery of divine being” as 
expressions of that being’s will made manifest in creation.183 
 Following Riou, Loudovikos sees Maximus’ logoi as a uniquely maximian solution to 
many of the problems with conventional ontology.  The logoi do not represent, in the words of 
Riou a “general ontology applicable on the cosmic level.” Maximus’ approach is ontological 
inasmuch as it addresses creation as “a sacramental and revealed structure in the created 
world.”184 Loudovikos claims that this differentiates the logoi from other ontologies since it is 
“meta philosophical.”185 Maximus provides a similar schema to created reality but does so on the 
basis of participation in the revealed logoi of God. Conventional, and particularly Neoplatonic, 
ontology assumes the emanation of the essence of an all-encompassing Being from which lesser 
beings are derived.  The inner logic might look similar, but the source is completely 
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different.  Thus, Loudovikos approves the use of “ontology” to describe the Confessor’s thought 
but with the reservation that the source is sacramental and revelatory, not “being” as such.186  
 Within the framework of ontology, we can pick up the thread of the argument from Amb 
7 that “the one Logos is many logoi and the many are One.”187 For Maximus, this is a matter of 
procession from God and return to God.  We can understand the many as One and the One as 
many due to ontological movement: “According to the creative and sustaining procession of the 
One to individual beings ... the One is many.  According to the revertive, inductive, providential 
return of the many to the One ... the many are One.”188 The unity of the many in the One is not 
established as a gross absorption of the many into a one or the compounding of the many onto 
the One.  Maximus describes this unity with the image of a circle.  The return of the logoi are as 
radii which have originated from the center of the circle (which Maximus tells us “pre-contains 
the radii” by virtue of its form) but then return to it through the arc of their movement.189  
 The circle is a favorite image of the Confessor which he uses to describe the Logos/logoi 
dynamic.190 Maximus uses the circle within these three passages in unique ways that demonstrate 
his doctrine of participation.  The Sentences on Theology contain the most laconic example of 
this illustration.191 The Confessor likens the “simple and undivided knowledge” of “all the 
preexisting principles of things” (logoi) to “straight lines which proceed from the center” of “an 
undivided position.”192 Tollefsen highlights the presence of the term “undivided” which features 
prominently in the Christological definition of Chalcedon.193 He argues that the use of the 
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Chalcedonian term is not an accidental allusion but is itself a conscious reminder of the language 
which describes the hypostatic union.  In turn, we should call to mind the complementary term 
“unconfused” which ensures consistency with the Confessor’s orthodox position.  Without this 
balance, the illustration would be susceptible to an interpretation in which the logoi would cease 
to be differentiated when “considered in God.”194  
 The balance of the Chalcedonian “undivided” with “unconfused” ensures that we 
understand the logoi as a unity in plurality, an imprint of Chalcedonian logic on the thought of 
the Confessor.195 The way these terms are used in the works of the Confessor are fundamentally 
the same way in which they were used by Chalcedon to describe the hypostatic union.  The union 
between the human and divine natures in the one person of Jesus Christ is understood to be 
unconfused, without change, undivided, and unseparated.196 The function of these terms is 
contained in the same definition: “at no point was the difference between the natures taken away 
through the union, but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a 
single person and a single subsistent being.”197 What is described here is a particular manner of 
union that allows for preservation. 
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 Tollefsen explains that “undivided” (adiairetos) as used here, and subsequently in the 
above passage from Cap Gnost. 2.4 works to preserve the union of two different sorts of 
being.198 Within an ontological schema of created being, this may be used to describe two beings 
united in a common genus.  In Christ, the uncreated and the created share a union despite not 
sharing a common nature.  As it pertains to the hypostatic union it is impossible to make a 
division between the united human and divine natures.  “Unconfused” (asugchutos) clarifies the 
sort of union.  The mode of union is one in which what makes each nature unique is not 
destroyed.  An unconfused union allows for the particularity of each nature. The result is not a 
mixture but a subsistence of natures within a unity.  The intimacy of what is united does not 
cancel out the individual traits of each nature. 
 Describing the unity of the lines at a single point within Cap gnost 2.4 as “undivided” is 
evocative of the other adverbs that qualify the union and preservation of natures.  The balance 
Tollefsen calls for is a warranted demonstration of the Confessor’s application of the 
Chalcedonian categories to ontology.  The same undifferentiated unity that can be found in the 
hypostatic union is reflected in the logoi as they are seen in God - in both their pre-existence and 
as they come to their final meeting in God.  Maximus expects a continued consistency: in 
bringing together the human and divine in Christ, God did so in an unconfused, undivided 
way.  As created beings participate in God through their logoi, they will likewise do so in an 
undivided and unconfused way. 
 These conclusions can be carried into our discussion another instance of the circle image 
already mentioned in Amb 7.199 This image of radii contains a double movement that 
characterizes their beginning and being gathered again.  These movements correspond to a) “the 
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creating and sustaining procession of the One to individual beings” and b) “the revertive, 
inductive, and providential return of the many to the One.”200 Tollefsen clarifies the second 
movement citing the Neoplatonic origin of the idea: We should not understand this movement in 
a way that bespeaks an absorption into the divine essence or a metaphysical return toward a 
higher principle.201 Instead, the movements are processions of the logoi toward actualization in 
particular being and a turning back of those individuated beings toward their origin.202 A 
Neoplatonic understanding of this dynamic would end with “communion” of the participating 
beings with their cause.203  
 In anticipation of Maximus’ anthropology, it must be acknowledged that the movement 
of conversion is a free one.  The logoi act as a paradigm, a formal cause for particular beings in 
this regard.204 By virtue of their logoi, created beings are naturally attracted toward God.  This 
nature does not imply necessity.  Maximus is careful to retain the possibility that beings, 
especially rational, intellectual beings, have freedom to move in accord with their logoi or to 
move in opposition to them. It is only if they move in accord with their logoi that they will be 
gathered to God.205 This being said, Maximus does not set up a dichotomy between the natural 
movement of creatures, their rational/intellectual actions, and the graced eschatological gathering 
by God.  Any movement according to the logoi, Maximus would call “natural” since it 
corresponds to the pre-existent will for that being that comes from the Creator. 
 Natural movement according to the logoi is the movement described by conversion.  It 
would be a mistake to assume that this movement is only necessary because of sin, that creation 
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was already moving in opposition to the logoi and thus needs to turn back toward God.  In 
Maximus’ apology for Gregory’s statement that “we are portions of God flowed down from 
above,” the Confessor offers clarification from the double movement we have described 
above.206 The statement “portion of God” refers to the procession in which created reality 
participates in God, naturally, not simply as their origin but in a continued way.  This is because 
God, through the logoi, acts as an efficient and sustaining cause both of the individual and of all 
creation.207  
 The statement that we have “flowed down from above” correlates to the process of 
conversion and denotes the need to return to acting in accordance with the logoi after having 
strayed from them.  Tollefsen describes this downward movement as the cause of “sinful 
separations and enmity in the cosmos.”208 It is in the drawing of all of creation back to God 
through conversion that these divisions are overcome and the effects of sin are conquered.  The 
unity of the logoi in the one Logos is the result of the breaking down of this enmity.  If we limit 
conversion to the resolution of this enmity would it not admit that conversion is a result of 
sin?  Does the movement of conversion assume a previous movement in opposition to the logoi? 
 As we described above, for Maximus, movement is within the inherent nature of created 
being.  To be created means to have movement.  This is due to God’s own willing of the logoi as 
principles of this movement.  By juxtaposing the “flowing down from above” with movement 
according to the logoi, Maximus is describing this movement in a historical, dramatic 
fashion.  The return to movement according to the logoi that characterizes conversion is not a 
reaction to the flowing down from above but was always God’s original intention for created 
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beings.  For Tollefsen procession/conversion establish “historical limits of the world.”209 If we 
understand the “flowing down” in a historical and not a logical way we can see it as a movement 
that happens in opposition to conversion rather than being the cause for the need of 
conversion.  Procession/conversion is itself a historical process that is interrupted by the 
“flowing down” of sin.  Understanding the process in a historical way, as an unfolding in time, is 
a Christian adaption of the Neoplatonic dynamic that gives the process a definitive beginning and 
consummation.210 As such, procession/conversion creates a space, a distention that acts as a 
stage upon which beings act in accord with or in opposition to their logoi.211  
 This historical process is different than a second double movement described by 
Maximus: expansion/contraction. Tollefsen differentiates between these movements which 
denote ontological distinctions and unity and the movement of creatures according to their 
logoi.212 While the former movement pair included volition in history, expansion/contraction is a 
matter of logical distinction in which the two movements happen in simultaneity.213 Expansion 
describes the process of distinction.  This happens at every level of individuation: from genus, to 
species, all the way down to the delineation of being, derived from Porphyry, to the particular 
being as an individual.214 Here we see the plurality of creatures emerge in a logical manner.  The 
distinctions are not themselves cause for division or separation but individuation in accord with 
the logoi.  This is complementary to the first part of the procession/conversion movement in that 
God does not simply sustain the cosmos in unity, his knowledge of and intention for created 
beings extends to their individual logoi. 
                                                          
209 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 78. 
210 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 78. 
211 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 79. 
212 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 78. 
213 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 79. 
214 Amb 7 PG 91:1077B-C.  See Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 82. for details on the “Porphyrian tree.” 
 
 130 
 Just as conversion is not an undoing of procession, so contraction does not erase the 
distinctions made in expansion.  Contraction is the gathering of individuals of a species into 
successively larger groups “until it is gathered up into the most generic genus, and there its 
contraction comes to an end...”215 The gathering is not of disparate elements but of like into like 
from the smallest category to the largest, general category of all created being.  This movement 
establishes a communion between all of creation that is built upon progressively larger 
expressions of that communion.216 The double movement of expansion/contraction demonstrates 
the divine intention to create a unity in plurality that is irreducible.217  
 The consummation of these two double-movements demonstrates the centrality of God 
intended unity-in plurality within the Confessor’s thought.  Expansion/contraction results in an 
expansive communion of communities that overcomes difference, a communion that 
incorporates all created being while uniting them all to the uncreated by virtue of their 
participation in the logoi.  Communion that overcomes difference while sustaining plurality is 
also the result of procession/conversion.  Moving according to their logoi, beings that undergo 
conversion are gathered up according to those same logoi in the manner described in 
contraction.  Yet this pair of double-movements does not collapse into one.  First, there is the 
historical versus ontological frame of reference described above but secondly and perhaps more 
preeminently, is the eucharistic allusion Maximus makes in his description of conversion.218 The 
verb for gathering in the Confessor’s description of conversion is “anaphora.”219 As the same 
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word used to describe the mode of communion brought about by the Eucharist, conversion as 
anaphora evokes the participation of all creation in a liturgical communion with God. 
 We can correlate this interpretation of conversion with Maximus’ use of the same image 
of a circle to describe the unity in diversity that is brought about by the Church as the Body of 
Christ.220 Those incorporated into this body share in a mode of communion in which God 
“encloses all things in himself ... [limiting] their extents with a circle.”221 Beings circumscribed 
in this circle, an image of the Church, they retain their identity but are drawn into relationship 
with “one, simple, and single cause and power”222 from which they cannot be distinguished on 
account of their relationship with the one who outshines them.223 Here we encounter the 
Chalcedonian “unconfused” (asugchutos) once more.  Maximus uses “unconfused” to describe 
how natural relationships between beings and the one who unites them are overshadowed 
without having their identities destroyed through assimilation.224  
 Despite the Chalcedonian qualifiers, the language of maximian ontology sounds similar 
to the neoplatonic and stoic descriptions of creation.  A singular way in which we can 
differentiate Maximus’ Christian cosmology from these philosophical positions is to recall that 
the Logos is identified as a person, the Son of the Father.  This complements ontological 
language with the understanding that it is founded upon personal relationship.  It is Christ who 
gathers and holds the logoi together “as his own.”225 Christ as Logos is the same Christ the Lord 
sought in the spiritual and moral path of perfection.226 The logoi have a personal character as the 
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will of Christ for individual created beings.  As the means by which particular beings are brought 
into being, sustained, and brought to inseparable union with God, the logoi are individuated 
manifestations of the one Logos to each being.227 As such, they are manifestations of Christ’s 
love and intention for created beings. 
 Two key ways in which Christ relates to creation are in his providence and judgment.  As 
expressions of the divine will, we can speak of providence as judgment as two overarching logoi 
by which God knows his creation and makes his will known.  Maximus defines these logoi in 
different ways throughout the Ambigua.  In Amb 67, he presents them in a way that appeals to a 
moral sense.  Providence is understood as God’s assistance in moving according to their logoi to 
“be what they are.”228 Judgment is a punitive correction that reorients created beings toward their 
logoi when these principles are “damaged and perverted.”229 In this moral definition, providence 
and judgment effectively guide beings toward their logoi as a channel, offering boundaries to 
their action while being boundless in themselves.230  
 Alternatively, Maximus offers an ontological understanding of providence and judgment 
within an ontological framework. The Confessor distinguishes between this expression of the 
logoi and the moral, “convertive” one which is active in “returning whatever has gone astray to 
its proper course.”231 Within his ontological framework, Maximus defines providence as “the 
power that holds the universe together, keeping it aligned with the inner principles according 
(logos) to which it was originally created.”232 Judgment likewise is not “punishment on sinners” 
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but the “differentiated distribution of beings.”233 Judgment is properly God’s delineation of 
creatures, how they are arranged, and how he brought them into being.234 Maximus makes clear 
that these two conceptions of providence and judgment are not describing two separate 
realities.235 Our free response to the logoi denotes whether we perceive them as punitive.  This 
experience is a subjective one.  A response that rejects the logoi would experience providence 
and judgment as a correction since God directs “the course of things that are beyond our control 
in a manner contrary to what is within our control” if we have done evil.236  
 Both Thunberg and Loudovikos affirm the moral sense while emphasizing the 
ontological aspects of providence and judgment.237 For Thunberg, these logoi are another 
guarantor of the diversity of beings able to be united in God, a design that God has for his 
creation from the beginning.  These logoi forbid violence to the “individualized multiplicity” we 
find in creation.238 In God’s original intention for creation and its eschatological fulfillment, 
which is deification, God upholds his will and does not revoke the effects of providence and 
judgment.  God contemplates individual beings as distinct from one another.  Judgment is used 
to describe the God intended differentiation between particular being.  Providence guides the 
relationships of the particular beings and is the “principle of unification,” facilitating union 
without confusion.239  
 Loudovikos notes that providence and judgment inform God’s free act of creation.  If 
they were not connected in this way, they would work as though they were uncreated 
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principles.240 Thus, God contemplates and creates in accord with his willed providence and 
judgment.  The delineation of creatures, their particularity, is not superadded onto an already 
unified creation but are the result of God’s own choice.  Similarly, Maximus describes the 
transformation of created beings according to providence and judgment in a way that expects 
their growth and movement.  We can conclude, therefore that these logoi do not only 
corresponding to “substance” but also to “potency and activity” since God’s preexistent 
contemplation of created beings includes potency and activity.241 Providence and judgment are 
related to Maximus’ concepts of movement, freedom, particularity, and communion since 
without differentiation and the drive for union the schema has no room for movement and no 
consummative goal. 
 For Loudovikos providence encompasses the capacity of a being to grow toward the 
fulfillment of its natural potential.242 This includes its growth in relation to its own essence, its 
potential, as well as activity.  Judgment is a protection of this growth.  It can be conceived as 
punishment for deviations from the logoi.  This explains why things do not progress in growth 
but rather disintegrate when they move in opposition to their natures.  That God’s logoi, God’s 
will for creation is circumscribed with the overarching logoi of providence and judgment tells us 
that for Maximus God conceives of the worlds not as a static reality of perfection but as a 
multiplicity of possibilities moving toward that perfection.  The Confessor describes these logoi 
as penetrating “both our present and future life, as if they were different generations...” 243 In this, 
providence and judgment have about them an eschatological character.  God leads created beings 
by these logoi in a way that acknowledges that they are not presently perfected but can be in the 
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future.  Once again, we find that for Maximus, motion, change, and dialogue are God intended 
realities manifest in creation. 
 What are the possibilities inherent in movement according to the logos?  Is it a simple 
binary of either obedience to the logoi or rejection of them altogether?  Yes and no.  Movement 
in a way that is opposed to the logoi always results in self-destruction.  In Maximus’ schema, 
movement away from the logoi is a movement toward non-being.244 Movement in opposition to 
the logoi is consummate with an attempt to change the logoi. The free actions of beings in 
relation to the logoi does not change the logoi in and of themselves.  Attempting to change the 
logoi is destructive to the logoi and in turn destructive for that being, the “flowing down” of sin 
that Gregory describes.245 This does harm to the original way in which God intended for created 
beings to use their natural powers.246  
 
C. Tropos 
 Maximus writes that there was an original, natural mode, tropos (τροπος), which God had 
given.  The Confessor describes tropos as the place of innovation within created beings.  Nature, 
which corresponds to the logoi of a being is not changed but a change in mode of that being 
leaves the nature intact.247 Changes made to created beings that are not in opposition to their 
logoi are changes in tropos.  Mitralexis catalogues varied meanings of the Greek term that are 
illuminative: derived from the verb trepo, tropos can mean “to turn, to turn in a certain direction, 
to alter, to change ... it presupposes action/activity and an actualized relation.”248 
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Maximus explains that through sin, movement in opposition to the logoi, humanity has 
rejected this original God given mode.  In its place, God has granted another mode “more 
marvelous and befitting of God than the first, and as different from the former as what is above 
nature is different from what is according to nature.249 This new mode is established in the 
hypostatic union, the new theandric mode by which humanity can act in accord with the 
logoi.  For now, it is sufficient to note that the logoi, God’s original plan is unchanging, it 
undergoes “no innovation.”250 The mode, tropos, by which the logos is lived out is able to be 
changed.  
 Maximus uses the term tropos to qualify how logoi are realized in a variety of ways: 
theological, logical, ethical, physical, and even hypostatic.251 The term is often attached to logos 
as a “logos/tropos” dyad that communicates the possible ways by which logoi may be 
realized.  Larchet notes that the preeminent function of this dyad in Maximus’ work is to account 
“for the fact that the reality of any natural order can attain to a new, supernatural mode of 
existence, while remaining the same in its essence.”252 As with many aspects of the Confessor’s 
thought, the concept of tropos reaches the pinnacle of its purpose when used to describe the 
process of deification.  On one hand, tropos can be understood as the resulting state of a created 
being that has encountered divine grace.253 On the other it can be used to describe what is 
variable in the working out of logoi through the course of history. 
 The distinction between logos and tropos allows for varied responses among created 
beings to their logoi.  Moving in accordance to one’s individuated logos does not mean a sort of 
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fated, uniform action but a free response.  This is consistent with Maximus’ view that God 
contemplates created beings as moving.  As they move, rational beings would likewise be 
contemplated as willing on their own account.  The matter of volition that is not opposed to the 
logoi are changes in tropos.  Free action is then not simply a matter of a conformative response 
to one’s particular logos.  This dynamic reveals a wide berth for free response according to the 
logoi. 
 A simple demonstration of this point comes from considering the exercise of human 
freedom in the creation of art.   A person composing a work in an artistic manner is not simply 
moving along a predetermined path of their logoi.  They are exercising an ability to act in a way 
that creates.  Maximus acknowledges two sorts of creative activity.  The first is the natural 
process of making beings “identical in form and substance and absolutely identical to them.” 254 
Maximus’ laconic explanation of this activity is difficult to decipher but it seems to indicate 
reproduction in species.  The second activity is done to something that different than the actor in 
identity and nature.  This occurs when “a person actively engages something extrinsic and 
substantially different, and from it produces something foreign” doing so “from some other 
source of already existing matter.”255 This second sort of activity, Maximus writes, “is a 
scientific characteristic of the arts.”256 Since this creation is by no means a sharing in God’s 
creating ex nihilo, an explanation consistent with Maximus’ ontological schema is that the logos 
of that item remains intact while the creative action indicates a change in tropos.257 
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 To these we may add a third type of possible activity, a negative one that does not move 
in accordance with the logoi but against it.  This movement is in direct opposition to providence 
since it ignores the logos of providence.  This is a sort of art of sin which Maximus describes as a 
historical reality.  Passed on from one generation to the next, humanity has made “progress in 
evil.”258 Thunberg interprets this as a misuse of humanity’s “inventive power.”259 The competing 
cause to that of the logoi are “fleshly passions,” following these only leads to “mortal 
despair.”260 Just as this power to create can work as a means for the freedom to form the tropos 
of one’s logoi, the application of that same activity to the logoi themselves further develops the 
art of sin, which is destruction of the logoi. 
 While the binary choice of using humanity’s freedom to move according to the logoi 
remains, we see that the choices themselves are not binary in nature.  Once the inventive power 
of freedom is applied to the right subject, the tropos (mode) rather than the logos (principle or 
essence) of a created thing, a multitude of possibilities can be embraced.  Thunberg calls the 
possibility of movements in accordance with the logoi, moving in “harmony with the logos.”261 
Creation then is a medium on which rational beings may act, changing the tropos and not the 
logos in a manner that is not predetermined by the logos itself but for which the logos allows the 
possibility of.  Again, possibilities that do violence to the logoi are not contained within these 
logoi themselves.  Choices that oppose the logoi sets the being on the path toward nothingness, 
the opposite of the movement of conversion, the path of deification.  Movement according to the 
logoi is in agreement with the original divine intent that facilitates the final eschatological 
communion and consummation that is participation in God. 
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D. Eschatological Consummation of Creation 
 The God who creates offers to all of creation consummate communion with Himself 
through the logoi.262 Maximus’ cosmological vision is inseparable from the eschatological hope 
of deification.  This hope derives from the maximian affirmation that all creation is good, it is the 
result of the free act which is God’s creation of the cosmos for the express purpose of 
participation in God. 
 Maximus boldly proclaims that “the Logos of God (who is God) wills always and in all 
things to accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.”263 This is the divine plan from the 
beginning, “God will be all things in everything, encompassing all things and making them 
subsist in Himself” and it is because of this plan that created beings can be called “portions of 
God.”264 As we have seen, Maximus describes a plan for the participation and not the 
annihilation of created beings in God.  This preservation of their created identities is upheld by, 
and brought about, in Christ, the center and source of the logoi.  It is due to Christ’s mediation 
that we can affirm that creation comes to be entirely in God without “ontological 
assimilation.” 265  
 The unification of creation in God is both a future and present reality.  It is accomplished 
by Christ as origin and goal of the logoi.  The proleptic manifestation of the eschaton is made 
present in the paschal mystery.  As with the discussion of the Logos as the center of the circle, so 
here Maximus emphasizes that the Logos is not a bare ontological principle but breaks down 
divisions within the course of history in his person.  Christ’s Incarnation and subsequent raising, 
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the unification with and deification of human nature, brings together all things in Himself.  “He 
obscured in Himself the property of division that had cut [creation] in two.”266 Maximus 
describes Christ as the one who gathers all of these things up into himself267 according to the 
logoi, translated by Constas as the “most primal and most universal principle” in a way that 
preserves them “absolutely indivisibly and beyond all fracture.”268  
 The Incarnation serves as Maximus’ eschatological map from which he derives the fate 
of all creation.269 The Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ’s own body is an affirmation of all 
human bodies.270 In Amb 42, Maximus observers that Christ as both architect and “pioneer” of 
salvation does not manifest a perfected state beyond the body.  Perfection then does not mean the 
sloughing off of creation or the “casting aside of the body.” 271 The precedent set by Christ leads 
Maximus to expect that the body itself is a recipient of salvation and unification in God.272  
 The incorporation of human bodies into the unity that is Christ does not function as a 
limit to that communion but signals an expansive vision.  The hypostatic union of the Logos with 
the human nature is not a self-encapsulated reality but spills over into the rest of creation.  Christ 
overcomes division and reveals the logoi of humanity as capable of bearing the image of Christ, 
“intact and completely unadulterated.”273 The image of the Body of Christ includes this complete 
humanity as well as “the extremes of the whole creation” which he incorporates “as His own 
parts.”274 Though Maximus stops short of calling all of creation, eschatologically realized, the 
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Body of Christ, he writes that everything is recapitulated in Christ in “a manner appropriate to 
God.”275 Participation in God does not undo the ontological difference discussed above and it is 
necessary for us to continue to affirm this difference.  Without this difference, Maximus would 
not be writing of participation but absorption.  Instead, what has been created out of nothing, 
what is different than God has been created for communion with God: “It is for the sake of 
[deification] that all things that are have been constituted and are maintained in being, and that 
things that are not are produced and come into being.”276  
 To better understand what Maximus means by participation, we return to his reversal of 
the Origenist triad.  The Confessor’s own creation-motion-stasis has as its final term a stage that 
must not be confused with satiety.  As we have discussed above, Maximus has brought two 
seemingly contradictory ideas into contact with one another.  First, there is the nature of created 
things which is always in motion, even as they come to be in God, propelled by Gregory of 
Nyssa’s concept of perpetual progress.  Second, there is the use of the term “stasis” that connotes 
the cessation of all movement.  Both of these are necessary for Maximus’ schema of 
participation to be understood correctly.  On one hand, the perpetual progress means that 
creatures never reach the state of satiety.  As opposed to the Origenist henad, they can never be 
filled up and grow bored of God.  On the other hand, their stasis in God means that they never 
deviate from this final state.277  
 Maximus again uses God’s activity as the basis for his understanding of creation’s 
participation in God, this time drawing on Trinitarian theology rather than Christology.  In 
describing God as “ever-moving repose” Maximus does not think of God in terms of creaturely 
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movement but is instead describing the processions of the Trinity.  Just as in his descriptions of 
God’s “being” as “beyond being” and non-being, so here the Confessor would call God’s own 
motion “beyond motion.”278 The Trinity includes the fullness of both motion and 
fixity.  Participation in God means that the created motion is replaced by the dynamic that exists 
in God.  That is to say that the participation of created things in God leads to a sharing in the 
ever-moving repose that exists in the Trinity.279 Thus, creaturely motion is not annulled but 
receives a new, divine impetus.  This transposition of creaturely activity into divine activity does 
not annul the creature. The logoi, the underlying reason and nature of creatures is never 
changed.  The mode, tropos is eschatologically changed, now moving in a divine mode.  This 
ensures that the whole of creation is preserved in deification.  From the highest category of 
creation as “all that is” to the particular member of any given species, deification does not 
assimilate being but leads it into the divine communion.280  
 For Maximus, creation does not need any “addition or subtraction” in order to be called 
good.281 Though creation is never complete in and of itself the way that God is, it is not due to 
any deficiency or evil inherent to creation.  Incompleteness is a sign that creation was made for 
communion with God. Mitralexis summarizes this point clearly: “The motion of the created 
towards its beginning and end, its source and purpose (a motion that can be clearly discerned by 
those who can contemplate the logoi of beings) amplifies the fact that creation is ‘good’ as it 
tends to the attainment of completeness.”282 Natural motion is logically good since this motion is 
according to the logoi while the goal is always beyond the reach of nature itself.  This 
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insufficiency does not negate creation’s goodness but points it beyond itself toward the Other by 
and for whom it is made. 
 Here we can see the totality of Maximus’ response to Origenism as an affirmation of 
creation.  Each triadic moment of creation-motion-stasis ratifies the others.  In creation (genesis), 
God freely creates according to his wills (logoi) from nothing beings who by nature (their logoi) 
move toward communion with the divine.  Motion according to the logoi reveals simultaneously 
the origin of created being in the goodness of God’s wills for being as a whole and in particular 
as well as the end of deification for which that being was created.  This movement is in 
accordance with the overarching logoi of providence, which reveals the divine destiny of created 
being, and judgment which upholds the divinely conceived differentiation of beings.  The 
incorporation of created being in stasis, the ever-moving repose of God in the Trinity is the final 
state of motion and communion.  This state does not collapse into a mode that annuls either of 
the previous two parts of the triad.  The genesis of creatures is not violated as the otherness of 
these beings is preserved.  Without this otherness, we would not be speaking of communion but 
rather absorption in God.  Secondly, the motion toward God, motion according to the logoi 
continues despite the description of the state of “stasis.” God, from all eternity has contemplated 
creatures as “beings in motion.”  This motion does not cease but is elevated into a new mode 
(tropos) in God, one that shares in the divine communion.  The ever-moving repose is the 
consummation of the communion between God and the cosmos.  For Maximus, the whole of the 





MAXIMUS ON DEIFICATION 
A. Theandric Activity as the Goal of the Incarnation / Resurrection 
 Maximus’ view of mediation is inextricably entangled with his Christology and 
anthropology, both of which are heavily influenced by his ascetic focus.  These elements come to 
form a theology of deification that is both eschatological in the sense of coming to fruition in the 
fulness of time and that it is realized before the eschaton in a proleptic manner.  This drama of 
deification does not stand apart from the cosmological schema explored in the last chapter but is 
the template, linchpin, and keystone for the cosmological redemption within the one Logos, the 
person of Christ.  Christ fulfills the original vocation of humanity in a way that enables the whole 
of humanity to participate in the task of mediation.  Maximus’ understanding of the Christic act 
of mediation via the logoi affirms the goodness of creation even as it is mediated (converted) 
back to God.  The invitation for humanity to participate in these mysteries through deification 
makes the fulfillment of the original human vocation possible. This is expressed as a eucharistic 
reciprocity between God and humanity with the whole cosmos as its medium. 
 In this chapter we will unpack Maximus’ theology of deification as the foundation of this 
communicative reciprocity.  The Incarnation and Paschal Mystery of Christ the Logos provide 
both the model and goal of this transformation.  Maximus’ Neo-Chalcedonianism synthesizes 
unique categories for understanding the hypostatic union which results in a new theandric 
activity.  This activity provides both the impetus and telos for the deification of humanity.  We 
will explore Maximus’ description of the process of deification and how he understands this 
process in relation to humanity’s mediatorial role.  This role is made possible through 
humanity’s unique status as a microcosm of creation, which informs Maximus’ view of the 
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human body as well as his influential thought about the freedom of Christ and deified humanity.  
Humanity’s communion with the theandric activity established by Christ allows for the 
eucharistic reciprocity between the creator and the created to manifest collectively in the 
Church’s liturgy and can be understood in an individual way as an interpersonal communion of 
individual persons with the Logos.  Understood as a dialogue between persons, Maximus’ 
schema highlights the importance of human freedom, describing its active role in the return of 
the logoi to the Logos.   
 The point of departure for this discussion is Christ as the central Logos from which all of 
creation proceeds and to whom God wills of all creation to return to according to their individual 
logoi.  The role of Christ as Logos is not that of an impersonal natural principle or force but as 
the Second Person of the Trinity by the free act of God, unites all things in himself.  The epitome 
of Christ’s unifying action is the mystery of the hypostatic union according to which “all the ages 
and what is contained in all the ages have taken in Christ the beginning of being and its end.” 1 
Though the whole of creation was already guided toward God through participation in the logoi, 
the hypostatic union introduces a new “eschatological matrix” in Christ and his body, the 
Church.2 This movement surpasses natural teleology.  We should recall that nature is good in 
itself and does not in and of itself resist deification.  The created world, instilled with the 
potentiality to participate in God from its genesis through the logoi, provides the “raw materials 
for deification.”3 Christ’s Incarnation and Resurrection provide the paradigm for deification not 
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solely for humanity but for the whole of the cosmos which will be healed of division and come to 
rest in Christ.4  
 The deification of creation is restorative and transformative. By its participation in the 
uncreated, the cosmos is granted a mode (tropos) which exceeds its natural telos.  This is only 
possible through the mysteries of the Incarnation and Resurrection.5 The mysteries of 
Incarnation and Resurrection are themselves inextricably linked in Maximus’ thought. Their 
universal impact provides the starting point for Maximus’ understanding of both God in himself 
and God’s economic manifestation in the cosmos.6 The cosmological reflections of the previous 
chapter are reliant upon these mysteries since they are the means by which the cosmos ultimately 
participates in the divine.  
 Keeping Maximus’ mystical theology in view will help us understand the communion of 
natures found in the hypostatic union.  Nichols calls the Word incarnate a “living synthesis of all 
apophasis and cataphasis.”7 This would imply that in the Incarnation we can name both an 
affirmation and a negation. In adopting human nature without destroying it, the Logos unites 
himself to what he is not.  Inasmuch as the Word is united to human nature without eradicating 
it, human nature is affirmed.  Since human nature is incorporated into a new, super-eminent, 
mode of being, we can understand that it is a negation of human nature since that nature alone is 
insufficient.8 As with mysticism, the resolution is something beyond the original nature.  In 
Christ, natural beings are made to be above nature consonant with the mystical perspective of 
being beyond nature.  The categories of mystical theology are important here because the new 
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mode should in no way be understood as a simple additive of the divine to the human nor as a 
mixture of the two. To avoid misrepresenting the hypostatic union and its fruit requires the 
apophatic approach along with precise language.  Here we revisit the adverbs of Chalcedon this 
time addressing the mystery for which they were formulated: the communion between the human 
and divine in Christ is unconfused (ἀσυγχύτως), undivided (ἀδιαρέτως), without change 
(ἀτρέπτως) and without separation (ἀχωρίστως).  The communion of the human and divine 
natures produces a new sort of activity that is connoted by the descriptive term “theandric.” 9 
 Maximus appropriates the term “theandric energy” (θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν)10, from 
Pseudo-Dionysious who uses the phrase to describe a unity of human and divine action rather 
than a singular composite energy.11 Thunberg writes that the term “theandric” becomes 
Maximus’ preferred expression of the union of humanity and divinity in Christ.12 Understanding 
Maximus’ interpretation of this term is central to piecing together the Confessor’s understanding 
of deification. 
 Dionysius coins the term while explaining how Jesus could be “placed in the same order 
in being with all men.”13 In the Incarnation, Christ is no less “overflowing with transcendence” 
but assumes this new way of being out of love for humanity.14 Jesus does not act at times in a 
divine manner and at others in a human manner.  The Incarnation has produced a new way of 
action, a new energy: “by the fact of being God-made-man he accomplished something new in 
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our midst-the activity of the God-man.”15 One underlying issue with Dionysius’ formulation is 
that it could be interpreted in a way that agrees with both monophysite and diaphysite views. 
 Despite this ambiguity, the term was repeatedly adopted by Neo-Chalcedonians.  Severus 
Asmounein used it to describe a single activity in Christ while John of Scythopolis understood it 
in a manner that allowed for both the mixing of the human and divine in a single activity with the 
added complication that the natures could also act independently of one another.16 Maximus’ 
own formulation views this new energy as taking hold in a new mode, tropos, that respected the 
two distinct natures in Christ.  A change in tropos, as we have discussed above, leaves the nature 
– the logos of a particular being – intact.  In the case of Christ, it is a common mode that is the 
point of communion of the human and divine natures.  This is a union that does not introduce 
confusion, division, separation, or change to those natures.  The Chalcedonian adverbs protect 
against understanding the hypostatic union as a chimeric composite nature.17  
 Maximus elaborates upon Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought in Amb 5 which addresses the 
Areopagite’s description of Jesus as both “the cause of men” and “truly man.”18 We should note 
that this and the other first five chapters of Ambigua ad Thomam were written while Maximus 
was emerging upon the stage of the Christological debates surrounding the energies in Christ.19 
While Maximus still does not make the sort of strict categorical distinctions between theological 
subjects, Amb 5 can be clearly recognized as a topical work on Christology.  Compared to Amb 7 
in which the Confessor presented a wide sweeping description of cosmology, Christology, and 
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deification, Amb 5 remains focused upon the hypostatic union with appropriate development and 
nuance. 
 The Confessor fleshes out his own understanding of the hypostatic union before 
introducing the Dionysian term.  In Christ, human and divine natures enter into a unity that is a 
“conjunction,” a “true union,” that is “neither of [the natures] exclusively.”20 In effecting this 
union, the person of Christ no longer acts in a way that is only divine or only human: “in no way 
acting through one of the natures in separation from the other.” 21 Instead, the activity is itself 
revelatory of this union: the human and divine are seen working together and in a 
complementary manner they “[confirm] the presence of the one through the other.”22 The union 
between these natures qualifies the activity of each.  Christ “experienced suffering in a divine 
way ... worked miracles in a human way...”23  
 Maximus stresses the unity of action going as far as to say that “divine and human energy 
coincided in a single identity.” 24 This term “identity” can be tricky since out of context it may be 
mistakenly interpreted as pointing toward a single identity in action but not in person.  Thunberg 
and von Balthasar prefer a qualified phrasing, adding that the natures act in a single identity “in 
mutual preservation.”25 This addition is consonant with the Confessor’s thought and is implicit 
within the context of Amb 5 which places a heavy emphasis on preserving the principle of the 
natures being held in communion.26  
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 The Confessor introduces his own clarifications on the interaction of these natures and 
allows the Chalcedonian adverbs to do the heavy lifting within his argument.  In doing so, 
Maximus creates a synthesis between Dionysian and Chalcedonian orthodoxy.  The result is a 
union that “does not impair distinction” between the natures while at the same time does not 
diminish the essential principles that participate in the union.27 The hypostatic union is not an 
adding together of the human and divine in a way that provides a product, the middle of two 
extremes.28 What is “new” is the mystery of the “ineffable mode (ἀπόῤῥητος τροπος) of natural 
coherence (συμφυιας).”29 The shared activity takes place at the level of “mode” (τροπος).  As 
with the mode of deification, properly understanding the distinction between the underlying 
principle that determines nature (λογος) and the mode (τροπος) of activity is pivotal.  The mode 
of activity helps us understand that it is not the natures that are changed but the manner by which 
they now operate.  The divine acts humanly and the human acts divinely.  Collectively they share 
in theandric activity.  In defining theandric activity as a τροπος, Maximus seeks to clarify the 
Dionysian term with the Chalcedonian affirmation that the human and divine remain unconfused 
(ἀσυγχύτως) and undivided (ἀδιαρέτως) in Christ.  This is the mode of activity that is proper for 
“‘God made man,’ to Him who became perfectly incarnate.”30  
 Following Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus avoids using the term “one” for this new energy.  
This would necessarily introduce by itself a new nature.  What is singular for Maximus is the 
mystery of the activity, which is a communal activity.  This is not a common unity of two 
extremes but the working together of two natures in communal activity.  Both retain their natural 
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energies but these energies no longer work without being in concert with the other energy: 
“therefore it is not permitted to say that there is simply ‘one,’ or a ‘natural,’ energy common both 
to Christ’s divinity and His flesh.”31  
 A second reason Maximus is unwilling to call the name theandric energy “one” is that he 
wants to use “theandric” in a way that connotes dynamism.  It is not a thing in and of itself but is 
a “mode of exchange” between the human and divine natures present in Christ.32 This is because 
the union preserves the human and divine natures in a way that is without change (μεταβολῆς) or 
confusion (συμφύρσεως).33 Though Maximus uses a different word for change than the 
ἀτρέπτως of Chalcedon, the meaning is the same. There is a perichoretic quality to this 
communion, the divine and human natures are “interchangeable” with one another yet are 
inseparable from the person of Christ. 
 The Confessor utilizes a vivid image to demonstrate this communion.  He asks us to 
ponder a sword, heated in fire.34 The two natures are preserved while taking up the properties of 
the other.  First, the sword becomes hot as the fire is hot.  Swords heated to the point that they 
change in color can set other objects on fire as though the sword were itself aflame.  Likewise, it 
is difficult to distinguish between the burning of the flame and the cutting of the sword.  In a 
sense, the flame has taken on the sword’s property of sharpness. 
A few clarifications will help us further understand the sort of union Maximus is seeking 
to describe.  Though a modern scientific framework may tell us that there is indeed a change 
going on within the composition of the sword, we can see that this is not what Maximus is 
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attempting to communicate.  If it were a change in the sword that Maximus was after, he could 
have contextualized the heating as part of the shaping of the sword in a kiln by a blacksmith.   In 
Maximus’ example, there is no change.  Secondly, what may seem to be a limitation of the image 
actually reveals the true character of the union.  If a sword is tempered at a high temperature 
such that it changes color it would begin to cool once it is removed from the heat.  At this point, 
the metal, once cooled may have been changed by its encounter with the fire but would have also 
lost the characteristics of the fire. 
 Maximus describes an ongoing, dynamic union between flame and blade.  He is not after 
a result that emerges as the fruit of the combination of two elements with different natures.  The 
point at which the flame is sharp and the sword can burn is the moment of union.  Just as the 
image of a sword heated by fire communicates an active union, so the theandric energy is not a 
“result” of something but an active communion of natures.  The human and divine retain their 
own nature while taking up the properties of the other.  Though unlike the sword which takes on 
the properties of heat, there is no possibility of separation between the two - the hypostatic union 
is an eternally active communion.  The image of the flame evokes this dynamism.  The 
hypostatic union is an indissoluble union, ongoing and ever dynamic.35 The new theandric 
energy is not a composition of two natures because the natures are ever participating in shared 
communion.  If one of the natures were to be subsumed by the other (the sword melted by the 
fire, to draw out the example) there would be no union because one of the natures had been 
destroyed.  The communion of the human and divine is one that is active, communicative of 
properties, ongoing, and indissoluble. 
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 In this energy Maximus characterizes the divine as active and the human as passive.  It is 
tempting to juxtapose the Confessor’s description of passive, suffering humanity with an 
impassible, unmoved concept of the divine.  Maximus does not approach human passivity in this 
manner.  By characterizing humanity as passive in this regard, his emphasis is not on refuting 
related issues such as patripassionism nor does it represent a conceptualizing of the divine nature 
in a fundamentally unmoved state.  Reading concerns for the immovability of God would project  
a western approach to theological reflection far more characteristic of thomism.  In the present 
text, the Confessor is not comparing human nature to God’s in any way.  When he discusses 
human passibility, Maximus addresses humanity insofar as it is bodily, suffering, and contains 
within its contingency the possibility of death.36 
The union of the Logos to a human nature grants God the realm of human suffering.  In 
this very suffering that Christ brings humanity together in Himself: “By means of the suffering, 
He makes us His own” and enables humanity to be deified “for we have become that which He 
revealed.”37 The theandric energy of the hypostatic union acts upon the passive humanity, 
affecting the whole of human nature.  Maximus’ formulation of theandric energy does not stop 
with Christological definition but encompasses the deification of all humanity.  We read in Amb 
4: “In doing lordly things in the manner of a slave, that is, the things of God by means of the 
flesh, He intimates His ineffable self-emptying, which through passible flesh divinized all 
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humanity...”38 The theandric reality in Christ is salutary and revelatory.  The Incarnation and 
Passion are the means by which all of humanity can become deified.  
 The path for deification has the hypostatic union as its template.  Humanity only receives 
divinization through the communion of divine and human natures - human nature is unable to 
reach this on its own.39 Humanity’s participation is one that does not leave its own nature behind 
but likewise enters into an active communion, one that is reciprocal and preserves human and 
divine identity.40 Thunberg frames this dynamic within the terminology of movement, as we 
discussed last chapter.  In becoming human, the Logos moves “tropologically toward man.”41 
Thunberg describes humanity as passive, this time not only by nature but due to sinfulness, 
moving in a “false direction.” The mystery of Christ is what enables humanity to turn, to be 
“activated by the divine movement” and due to the hypostatic union in Christ, respond by 
“divinizing [our]self.”42 This does not mean that after the mystery of Christ’s hypostasis is 
established humanity is in no further need of communion with God.  Thunberg clarifies that 
Maximus’ vision of deification enables humanity to move “beyond” what is natural and “beyond 
the existential.”43 The means of this movement is the communal, existential relationship, the 
theandric unity in which humanity can now participate.44  
 This union affects the totality of the human person but does not deprive the human person 
of freedom.  We will return to this point later but for now we should note that reciprocal 
communion leaves an “empty space” between the “uncreated and the created order.”45 Within 
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this space divinized humanity is able to move.  This movement is not fated obedience or natural 
necessity but is movement characterized by Thunberg as “intentional.”46  
 We should remember that the union is no mere “abstract synthesis” but occurs at the 
hypostatic level from which the divine is brought into relationship with human hypostasis.47 The 
goal is participation in the mode of exchange of divinity and humanity.  Redemption, deification, 
moving according to the logoi in a divine mode is primarily a relational reality and secondarily a 
metaphysical one.  This new mode enters into creation first through the person of Christ and then 
through human persons united to Him through their own deification.  Humanity occupies a 
specific place in the dynamic of our own deification and the deification of the cosmos.  As 
created persons, humanity has the capacity for union with the person of Christ as well as the 
capacity to mediate that union to other facets of creation.  Christ remains the foundation upon 
which the redemption of creation rests but inasmuch as humanity participates in the exchange of 
modes that is theandric action, we become participants in the redemption of creation.  Humanity 
in Christ, collectively as Church, and as particular individuals in communion with Christ 
constitute “the hope for salvation of the whole creation, [they are] priest and mediator of 
creation.”48  
 Participation in the mediatorial task of Christ is the promulgation of the new tropos.  The 
remainder of this chapter will chronicle how humanity’s own mode is changed, what that means 
for freedom, the physical creation as manifest in the human body, and ultimately how humanity 
mediates the divinization of the cosmos in reciprocal communion with the divine. 
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B. The Process of Deification as a Change in Tropos 
 Change in tropos, the mode of a being’s activity, is Maximus’ way of preserving both 
human and divine natures in Christ first and second his way of preserving the totality of the 
human person in communion with God. Nichols describes Maximus’ approach to the topic of 
deification following Garrigues: “divinization and Christology form one single mystery.”49 
Maximus’ experience as an ascetic and his reception of the monastic tradition allowed him to 
form a synthetic vision that carried his Christological and anthropological insights into spiritual 
theology.  As such, Maximus’ concept of deification is not only couched in dogmatic 
terminology but includes a spiritual theology that unfolds, a process of deification. 
 Nichols interprets Maximus’ description of deification as a perpetuation of God’s will to 
be embodied: The Word, born of the flesh in the Incarnation also seeks to be “born ceaselessly 
according to the Spirit, in those who desire him.”50 This pneumatic birth of deification happens 
as human nature grows according to the virtues.  Far from a simple confirmation of humanity’s 
natural dynamism, living according to the virtues necessitates deification, “transposing [nature] 
into a new key.”51 This transposition is not one that is reserved exclusively to the afterlife.  
Deification mysteriously takes hold of “the whole ‘natural’ life of human creatures.”52 The 
process is one that embraces the history of human movement as it is transformed and restored by 
grace.53 It is the reception of grace as the participation in the life of God that allows human 
nature to take part in deifying movement not as a defying of its own nature but in accord with 
this new key, moving beyond its own nature.54  
                                                          
49 Nichols, The Byzantine Gospel, 207. citing Juan Miguel Garrigues, Maxime le Confesseur: La charite, avenir 
divin de l’homme (Paris: Beachesne, 1976), 112. 
50 Nichols, The Byzantine Gospel, 207. 
51 Nichols, The Byzantine Gospel, 207. 
52 Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 247. 
53 Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 247. 
54 Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 248. 
 
 157 
 The first step of this transformation can be equated with the colloquial meaning of 
“conversion.” Though we have already explored Maximus’ nuanced understanding of this term 
as a movement according to the logoi, here it can be presented as the beginning of deification.  
Anyone who turns away from sin and sets their life on the path to virtue yields to convertive 
movement.  Maximus writes that such a one can be said “to enter with Christ, our God and high-
priest, into virtue, which is figuratively perceived to be the Church.”55 Growth in virtue grants a 
share in divine charity that Thunberg describes as a participation in God similar to the dynamic 
communicatia idiomatum in Christ.56 Just as both human and divine attributes subsist in the one 
person of Christ so the person undergoing deification is the recipient of “reciprocal attribution, 
that the attributes of those whom it unites pass from one to the other ... and that it makes man act 
and appear as God, through the one and unchangeable decision and motion of will on both 
sides...”57  
 The details of this process, Maximus describes within the framework of his logos-tropos 
distinction.  As these terms were used to describe what was new in Christ so it is used to describe 
how the human logos can act divinely.58 Maximus formulates this interaction and growth toward 
deification in a triad that forms the mode (tropos) in which human nature is expressed in a divine 
manner corresponding to being/well-being /eternal being. 
 The progression is straightforward, moving from being to well-being to eternal being.  
Some confusion may arise since in places Maximus since uses both of his key categories, logoi 
and tropoi, interchangeably to describe these movements.  The centrality of these categories and 
this process requires us to clarify this before examining the Confessor’s texts.  Tollefsen argues 
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that Maximus is right to use both terms since being, well-being, and eternal being all depict a 
phase of participation in God.  Just as we saw earlier with providence and judgment, God guides 
creation by certain principles (logoi).  Here there is a need to speak of how beings are regulated 
or modified so that they may participate in God at the levels of being, well-being, and eternal 
being.59 If beings were not guided by these principles, external to themselves, we would wonder 
why they would “not participate in the fullness of activity all at once.”60 That there is a process 
of deification then necessitates that the participation in the divine be guided by these principles.  
As these principles are participated in, we can speak of the participation in the logos of being, of 
well-being, and of eternal being as modifications made not to the logoi of individuals but to their 
tropos.  Such as they connote principles by which beings participate in God and are deified, these 
phases are logoi.  When naming how creatures participate in God, they are tropoi. 
 Movement toward God is taught by these principles which bestow participatory 
properties on creatures depending on which mode they lie within.61 Maximus lays out these 
phases in a consistent manner throughout his opus.  As with the logoi in general, being, well-
being, and eternal being are discernible to those who have sharpened their spiritual vision.62 
Within the first section of the Chapters on Theology, Maximus presents an illuminative 
illustration of these logoi.  He describes them as activities that correspond to different days 
within creation. 
 Being corresponds to the sixth day of creation.  It is associated with natural genesis.  It 
was on the sixth day that we see the “full accomplishment of natural activities.”63 For Maximus 
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this is not only an image of natural creation in the beginning but for the fulfillment of created 
natures.  Growth in natural virtue belongs to the sixth day, which “reveals the principle of being 
of things.”64 This natural movement, though it moves creatures according to the way they were 
made, including rational creatures and is “a symbol of practical activity”65 are actually the 
accomplishment of God since it was God who wrote this movement into the logoi.66 Movement 
according to being corresponds with movement according to the essence of a created being but is 
characterized by potential, not actualization of this essence.67 Loudovikos understands this as an 
affirmation of the goodness of creation itself as well as God’s goodness.  The creation is 
complete in and of itself but has the potential for spiritual growth.68  
 Well-being is likened to the seventh day which is “the fulfillment and rest of the natural 
activities of those who contemplate the ineffable knowledge.”69 This day begins the cessation of 
natural movement and the beginnings of created beings moving according to a divinized tropos.  
Though this day is not used to denote the final rest of deification in God, the Confessor’s use of 
“rest” calls to mind the seemingly contradictory “ever-moving repose” we discussed previously.  
The day of rest is also the pivotal day of human activity.  It corresponds to the movement of 
conversion.  This is an active day because it includes the choice to enter into the rest of the 
Sabbath.70 It is at this stage which rational beings freely make use of “the potential of nature, 
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either according to nature or against nature.”71 The activity of conversion, choosing well-being, 
movement according to nature that leads beyond itself, is the moment of freedom.72 It is also the 
opportunity for the misuse of this freedom, which would bar the creature from entering into well-
being “the misuse of natural powers” which “necessarily leads to their destruction.”73 This 
intermediate mode is characterized by free action while the two opposite it (being and eternal-
being) are characterized by God’s own action.74 Loudovikos draws a direct correlation between 
this mode and the spiritual state of the baptized who have freely chosen to proleptically place 
themselves in a life beyond natural life, a simultaneous reception of grace and a putting of that 
grace into action.75 The free choice to enter into well-being can be understood as the moment 
when the divine tropos begins to grow within the creature and sets it on the path to eternal-being. 
 The culmination of deification, eternal-being, is a sharing in the eternal eighth day.  This 
is the “ineffable mystery of the eternal well-being of things.”76 The one who has been found 
worthy of this eternal day “becomes himself God by deification.”77 Maximus presents this day in 
all of its eschatological splendor. It is the “perpetual day, ... the unalloyed, all-shining presence 
of God, which comes about after things in motion have come to rest.”78 This state of eternal 
well-being is confirmed by Maximus to be a participation in God, who gives those within it “a 
share in Himself.”79 This sharing, again, is not according to the nature of the created being but is 
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solely the action of God according to grace.80 Loudovikos attributes all that Maximus says about 
deification to this final mode of being: herein is the Resurrection and ever-moving repose that is 
facilitated by participative theandric unity.81  
 The communion between the created and uncreated is brought about due to the change in 
tropoi according to the logoi of being, well-being, and eternal well-being.  The Confessor 
ascribes the being and eternal-being to God (which he calls the “extremes”) while allowing the 
drama of freedom to unfold in the middle term of “well-being.”82 In citing God as the active 
agent of the first and last stages, does the Confessor seek to bracket the second mode affected by 
freedom or as the sole place where created freedom can be exercised?  Tollefsen cautions against 
taking an absolute stance here.   To affirm that the effects of freedom are limited to well-being 
would be problematic since eternal-being would no longer be connected to the free choice of the 
creature.  Instead, the result of free decision carries into the mode of eternal being.  Eternal 
being, be it well-being or ill-being is the result of the decision for or against conversion.  “The 
quality of this eternal existence is open to [humanity’s] own influence.”83 This dynamic is 
consistent with Maximus’ dedication to freedom.  Rather than uncoupling eternal being from the 
results of free choice, deification includes the permanentizing of free decisions.  The final stage 
is the deification of the created being that has already chosen well-being.  To better communicate 
this, Tollefsen encourages a combination of the final two modes, already found in Maximus’ 
reflection, calling the mode of deification “eternal well-being.”84  
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 Bradshaw reflects on how this process as a whole showcases freedom’s involvement in 
the shaping of the tropos of logoi that lasts eternally.  The logoi have an initial mode by which 
they move naturally.  The freedom of the creature gives specificity to the mode by which the 
logoi are actualized.  The creature shapes the mode of the logoi as one responding in the course 
of a dialogue.85 While the logoi themselves remain intact, the trajectory upon which the created 
being travels is forever shaped by this freedom.  Beyond a simple affirmation or denial of well-
being, creaturely response changes the mode in a way that is particular to that response.  The 
mode and path by which the logoi have had their tropos modified by the response of created 
beings determines whether and how those logoi are regathered into eternity.86  
 
C. Deification and Human Freedom 
 Maximus is best known for his formulation and defense of dyotheletism, the proposition 
that there were two wills (thelema) in Christ which correspond to Christ’s two natures.  The 
controversy gripped Christendom, threatening the already fragile unity between East and West.  
It was this issue that led the Byzantine monk to ally himself with the Pope in the hope of winning 
over his countrymen.  Ultimately, dyotheletism would be accepted by the Church, both East and 
West at the Third Council of Constantinople (681) but not before Maximus was banished from 
the debate through exile and the grotesque punishment of having his right hand and tongue cut 
off so that he was incapable of writing and speaking against monothelism.  The conviction that 
this formulation of Christological wills was true earned Maximus the title of Confessor. 
 The development of neo-Chalcedonian dyotheletism is one of the Confessor’s central 
contributions to theology.  Maximus’ definitive formulations of this view were cast in the 
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crucible of the ongoing debate and grew in nuance and clarity over the course of the events that 
led to his persecution.  It would be a mistake, however, to bracket the Confessor’s understanding 
of dyotheletism from the rest of his thought.  As we have seen, Maximus’ theological worldview 
is intricately woven so that each part is consistent with the others.  His thought on the wills of 
Christ is no different.  We can repeat as we have already said in relation to Maximus’ description 
of deification here: what the Confessor writes about the hypostatic union is manifest in the 
ecclesial reality of His Body.  Our reflections on the wills of Christ are relevant to Maximus’ 
anthropological outlook.  We saw this in the previous section, regarding how the process of 
deification has the exercise of human freedom at its center and gives rise to the possibility of 
human free choice setting the eternal tropos of the creation that participates in God.  Prior to the 
point of conversion that is the entrance into “well-being”, Maximus demonstrates that freedom is 
the central characteristic of the human person.  We will explore the place of human freedom in 
Maximus’ anthropology before delving into the far more complex issue of how that freedom is 
manifest in Christ and how theandric activity reflects back upon human freedom. 
 A common exercise in the writings of the Church Fathers was to inquire into the meaning 
of Genesis 1:26 in which God creates humanity in his “own image and likeness.” Speculation on 
the image and likeness include the human capacity for reason, the possibility of good action, or 
the ability to love.  For Maximus, the image of God is made manifest in the expression of 
freedom.  God gives humanity the ability to be like God who has the freedom to self-actualize 
and self-determine.87 For Maximus, the image and the likeness of Genesis 1:26 can be separated 
into two distinct realities.  The image tells us how humanity has been created.  Humanity has the 
power to decide their own fate through the exercise of freedom.  Whether humanity conforms to 
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the “likeness” of God or not is contingent upon the human choice to follow the logoi. Though the 
exercise of human freedom according to the logoi constitutes the culmination of action 
consonant with human nature, we cannot understand even this free movement as independent of 
God.  As we noted in our discussion of deification in the natural phase of “being”, God is 
responsible for the genesis of human nature and the possibility of virtuous action which is 
nothing more or less than the human person’s adherence to that same created nature.  The 
realization of God’s likeness is then both the result of free human action and humanity’s 
participation in the immanent God, written in their nature according to the logoi.88  
 Freedom is pointed toward the same goal of deification.  The nascent potential of 
humanity to participate in God must be affirmed by self-determining activity.  That free choice 
and divine action are needed does not make the process of growing in God’s likeness less 
“natural” for Maximus.  Harper provides an acute summary of this dynamic:  
 
Although the human essence or nature already iconizes God’s essential attributes, it does 
so in potentia and must be activated through self-determination in order to properly exist 
like God, voluntarily receiving from divinity at each stage of the natural maturation 
process what it needs to continue eschatological movement.89  
 
Nichols points out that this should not be understood as a rote obedience to God but as true acts 
of human self-determination.90 Maximus describes how God values the “shining thoughts of the 
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mind” which can be no less than the free contemplation of divine things as precious “pearls.”91 
The free exercise of the human intellect is for Maximus a holy act.92 Recall that God’s own 
contemplation of creation, including humanity, is according to the logoi of providence and 
judgment.  These logoi allow beings to move, even according to their logoi, in a manner that 
respects their God given freedom.  In Maximus’ cosmology, God conceives of and contemplates 
individual beings as moving within contingent possibility.  This is related to freedom.  Though 
the realization of the eschatological state is a unified one, the logoi represent the relationship of 
God to each individual creature.  The exercise of freedom in the response to the logoi introduces 
a tropic variance that is as particular to the creature as the logoi they were created by.  The 
eschatological potential set by God is exercised such that each creature reaches the fulfillment of 
that potential in its own way.93 This uniqueness does not declare the free creature self-sufficient.  
Even in freedom there is an interplay between the creature and God.  Charity, for instance, can 
only be practiced in union with God.  The free human response of charity is then incapable of 
expression without divine action and we see in it the dynamism of human-divine action once 
again.  Garrigues calls this synergy a “co-acting” that both divinizes humanity through 
participation, growing in likeness of God, while “not suppressing distinctively human activity.94  
 To complete the maximian interpretation of Genesis 1:26 would be to affirm that the 
potentiality for free action, the image, is the same in all rational creatures.  The response, the 
formation of the likeness in each creature is in a way so particular that each response is its own 
unique expression of God’s likeness.  
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 Maximus’ understanding of human freedom carries over into his Christological 
reflections on freedom.  The capacity for freedom and self-determination is therein reaffirmed as 
the way humanity carries the image character of God.95 The discussion of freedom thus far has 
not necessitated the tracing of Maximus’ definition of creaturely freedom as such.  The use of 
these terms in a Christological context requires that we delve into the nuances of his definitions.  
For instance, to this point we have spoken of freedom in the overarching sense of autexousia or 
“power over oneself,” self-determination.96 According to McFarland, Maximus’ use of the term 
is meant to communicate “individual ownership of responsibility for action.”97 Despite how 
Maximus’ depiction of deification intertwines human freedom into dialogue with divine 
principles, this overarching concept is consonant of the sort of self-determination necessary for 
moral praise and blame.  Beyond this equivocal sense, Maximus’ usage differentiates between 
specific types of freedom.  
 The key distinction is between natural will (thelema physikon) and gnomic will (thelema 
gnomikon).  Natural will, as the name suggests, corresponds to what is proper to rational beings 
by nature.  Human natural will is intrinsic to human nature.  For Maximus, the natural human 
will is what defines us as human agents.98 This is the autexousia that plays a crucial role in the 
process of deification and it is according to this determination that the tropic response to the 
logoi is made. 
 The gnomic will is often contrasted with the natural will though sometimes in ways that it 
is consonant with the natural will and others where it is juxtaposed as a corruption of the natural 
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will.  In either case, gnomic will is understood as corresponding to a mode of the human will.  It 
is properly speaking a tropos not a logos. 
 The moral character of gnomic will is debatable. In the most ambivalent sense of the 
gnomic will, it can be understood as an “a particular instance of willing, oriented to some real or 
imagined good.99 The natural will then is the inherent ability to choose.  The gnomic will would 
be individual modes of that will as distinct choices are made. 
 Andreopoulos interprets Maximus’ reflection on the gnomic will as a reality that did not 
exist prior to the fall.  Sin has broken the natural will, now in need of restoration, the mode of 
human willing is trapped in the gnomic will.100 The gnomic will consists of humanity acting in 
an indefinite manner via subjective opinions and requires continuous deliberation. Yet even in 
this negative valuation of the gnomic will, the mode of the will becomes the epicenter of 
deification.  It is in this exercise of will that the decision for or against the logoi – for or against 
conversion – takes place.101  
 In both interpretations, gnomic will is the formulation of particular decisions based upon 
human opinion, which is the literal meaning of gnome.102 The formation of this opinion would 
not be enough for an act of gnomic will.  It is accompanied by deliberation and is consummated 
in judgment, the moment of decision.103 The gnomic will has the capacity to either follow the 
divine will or become divergent from it.104 Though Andreopoulos and others emphasize the 
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fallen state of the will, this does not necessarily mean that the fruit of gnomic deliberation always 
produces incorrect decisions. 
 We are finally approaching the level of nuance present in the Christological discussions 
on Christ’s human and divine will.  As a preamble and final word about the human will in an 
anthropological sense, we ask an eschatological question: what happens to the natural human 
will as a result of the process of deification?  Maximus consistently teaches that the hypostatic 
union includes all that is proper to the human nature.  The natural will is an intrinsic part of that 
human nature, united to the second person of the Trinity.  As the human nature is united to the 
divine in the hypostatic union so “we too... will come to be in the world above ... undergoing no 
change whatsoever in nature.”105 Clearly this includes also human natural will, the autexousia, of 
self-determination.  The Confessor confirms as much in Amb 7 when describing deification and 
the subjection of all things to God’s will: “Let not these words disturb you, for I am not implying 
the destruction of our power of self-determination...” but that humanity’s will in mode of 
deification would be moved by desire for God.106 Maximus’ eschatological vision includes free 
human action, self-determination, in the eschaton.  This freedom united to the divine freedom 
and resulting in theandric activity would include human nature but move in a manner that is 
beyond its natural power.  The permanence of this free movement in God, the ever-moving-
repose discussed in the previous chapter, would be an elevated form of freedom, not a limitation 
of freedom.  This freedom would be delineated by God’s will for creation encapsulated in the 
logoi of providence and judgment.107  
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 Deified freedom is exemplified first in Christ.  Only on account of the hypostatic union is 
human nature, inclusive of freedom, compatible with deification.  What then of the gnomic will?  
Maximus’ stance on this issue evolved as his combat with Monotheletism intensified.  Before the 
monothelite controversy Maximus included the gnomic will in Christ.  The inclusion had a 
soteriological purpose, Christ was the only one capable of restoring human deliberation.108 As a 
result of a prevailingly negative evaluation of gnome within the debates, the Confessor made 
what Blowers calls a “great reversal,” which denied that Christ’s will was expressed in a gnomic 
mode.109 He settled on a definition that gnomic will is fallen and ambivalent which was 
incompatible with the hypostatic union. 
 Speculation that this mode of the will was due to the Fall was not the only reason 
Maximus changed his view on gnome.  Couching the problem in his distinctive terminology, 
Maximus understands that the composite hypostasis of the human/divine union would have been 
incapable of the gnomic mode.  This mode of willing, he argues, is not only proper to human 
natural will but to the human hypostasis as a whole.  The whole human person corresponds to the 
human logoi.  Since Christ’s humanity participates in the hypostatic union and cannot be 
summed up as a human hypostasis, the gnomic mode of willing does not apply.110 The 
Confessor’s rejection of gnome in Christ also has a soteriological logic.  The gnomic will, 
vacillating about which decision to make, would not have been capable of bringing about the 
stabilization of the human natural will - it would have lacked the resolve to do so.111 Instead, 
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Maximus holds that Christ has a natural human will that is at once deified and always obedient to 
the Divine will. 
   The Confessor’s stance on this issue has sparked some soteriological concerns among 
maximian scholars.  That Maximus’ mature writings reflect a rejection of gnome in Christ is 
almost universally agreed upon.  The concerns center around Gregory of Nyssa’s adage “what is 
not assumed is not redeemed.”112 Despite the Confessor’s argument that the gnomic will is a 
tropos of the will rather than the nature of the human will, the worry is if Christ did not 
deliberate within himself then the process of human deliberation has not been redeemed.  The 
description of the gnomic tropos as the making of particular decisions compounds the issue since 
that is the only mode in which humanity experiences freedom prior to deification and obedience.   
 Ian McFarland’s interpretation of Maximus’ teaching changes the register in such a way 
that avoids these difficulties.  Instead of focusing on the gnomic will as the making of particular 
choices, McFarland highlights the Confessor’s emphasis on investigation and deliberation as 
actions characteristic of gnome.113 This places the issue firmly in the bounds of knowledge.  If 
gnome is an attempt to form an opinion about the good through investigation and deliberation 
then it would not be fitting for Christ to have it since the hypostatic union would mean that 
Christ always had knowledge of the good and would always act in an obedient manner in 
accordance with the good.  McFarland explains that this would have made Christ’s human 
willing “qualitatively different” than what any other human being would have experienced yet 
without any change in Christ’s human nature.114 The difference here is that all of Christ’s 
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particular decisions are formed in accordance with the good because Christ could see the good 
clearly and had no need to investigate and deliberate. 
 The Agony in the Garden (Lk 22:43-44) is the key biblical text for the Confessor.  The 
way gnome is defined plays a crucial role as to whether Maximus’ use of this passage clarifies 
the redemption of the human will or leads to the bespoke problematic.  Understanding gnome as 
vacillation and deliberation leads Blowers to question whether we could understand Christ’s 
agony in the Garden as redemptive of the human will.115 For Blowers, the appearance of this 
vacillation in Christ makes the event at Gethsemane unique and he questions whether denying 
gnome honors the drama present in the biblical witness.116 McFarland’s analysis allows for there 
to be a real drama, a true struggle of obedience in Christ without the presence of gnome.117 The 
Agony in the Garden demonstrates for McFarland an exercise of the human will in Christ that 
corresponds to the acceptance of his vocation.118 There is in Christ a drama that is based upon his 
true human nature, the fear of death, and not reliant on the darkness of the human intellect 
caused by sin.  This human nature is reconciled to the divine nature in the exercise of the human 
will to become obedient to the divine will.  There must be drama, a certain tension.  As a risposte 
to the monothelite, human will must be conformed to the divine will.  Maximus’ theological 
opponents held that the human will would not have struggled since it had already been overcome 
by the divine will in a way that would have made obedience compulsive.119 The crux of the issue 
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for Maximus is that it is against human nature to will death and therefore could only be chosen as 
a response to the call made by the divine will.120  
 Once more, we see Maximus’ Christology as a means for working out the problems of 
deification.  If we understand gnomic will as the result of imperfect knowledge which would 
require deliberation then we can understand that as the human person is enlightened by God’s 
knowledge and will manifest in the logoi, they are able to more easily choose the good, a 
lessening of this gnomic mode.  Ultimately, deification means that the human will no longer 
relies on fallible judgments but is capable of the same agency that is inherent to its nature.  
Gethsemane as an example for the interplay between divine and human wills writ large brings 
some conclusions to the fore that we can make based upon Christ’s redemptive suffering.  The 
process of deification is not bereft of drama.  The struggle is not one in which the human is 
easily conformed to the divine but includes the divine call and transformation through suffering.  
The present example shows that Christ’s obedient response was not without suffering.  This 
obedience does not deprive Christ’s humanity of autexousia yet the exercise of this freedom to 
act beyond his human nature produced agony.  Freedom is both preserved and surpassed by 
deification. 
 
D. Deification and the Body 
 Lars Thunberg succinctly expresses Maximus’ approach to the human body, the 
Confessor does not condone “a departure from the lower elements in man, but a restoration and 
reintegration of man as a whole.”121 The mission of restoration is an affirmation of the goodness 
of creation, particularly in this case the goodness of the whole human nature and all of which it 
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consists.  Within the context of Ancient Greek thought, this view of the body offers a distinctly 
Christian approach.  Whereas other thinkers in the Hellenic tradition may see the body as dead 
matter, brought to life by the soul, for Maximus the body itself has a participation in the Logos 
and is capable of being deified.122  
 As a general point of his anthropology, Maximus includes the body within his schema of 
deification because it is an inalienable element of the human nature.  Returning to Amb 7, 
Maximus describes deified life as God acting to the whole of the human nature as the soul acts to 
the body.123 This does not cancel out the existing relationship between soul and body, both are 
retained.  Here, Maximus is describing the sort of life, the mode of life, that will be lived by the 
deified.  This relationship is one in which God permeates the human nature in a mysterious way 
so that we can no longer speak of the deified as living life in a natural manner.124 This life is not 
less than a natural one but is beyond it.  The Confessor emphatically includes both the soul and 
the body as participants in this dynamic, the soul receiving “immutability” and the body 
receiving “immortality.”125  
 Christologically, the body plays an important role in fulfilling God’s desire to be 
embodied in all of creation.  Once again, the process of deification and Maximus’ Christological 
teaching are reflexive: Christ in assuming human nature has in his hypostasis a wholly deified 
human body.  This is not accidental but serves a crucial purpose.  The deified body of Christ is 
not an obstacle for apprehending the Logos but is the divinely chosen means by which the Logos 
is definitively revealed.  This character carries over to human corporeality as a whole which 
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becomes “the organ for [the divine glory’s] manifestation and active presence throughout the 
whole cosmos.”126 Deification transforms the whole person, including the body, through 
participation in God and is expressed in the living out of the virtues, primarily charity.  For 
Cooper, Maximus’ description of the presence of God in the body as the incarnation of love 
gives the human body a sacramental character.127 The body becomes a communicative means for 
charity and as deified persons interact with others, they enable the latter to share in deification.128  
 Christ’s body and therefore all human bodies acquire a theophanic character through 
deification. This truth underscores the difference between Maximus and those who downplay or 
reject the body.  Cooper notes that this is all the more extraordinary given the Confessor’s ascetic 
context. The strict discipline of the body leads to the understanding that the body itself was the 
“most contingent and mutable object of creation.”129 The monastic experience of tempering 
bodily desire and the struggle with bodily sins led to the temptation to characterize the body as a 
source of difficulty.  Following the logic of Maximus’ thought on the Incarnation and deification, 
Cooper writes “the human body-when ennobled by deification, has been selected by God in his 
own good counsel as the primary means of his self-demonstration in the cosmos, and thus the 
high point of creation’s access to him.”130 The deified body becomes the crossroads between the 
impermanence of contingent creation and the one who holds all of creation together.131  
 How does Maximus portray the body during the process of deification and what is its 
final fate once that process has been consummated? We should be clear that in his work on 
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deification, the majority of the Confessor’s writings about the body are a proleptic expectation, 
the description of the body’s participation in God within the context of a realized eschatology.  
For Maximus, there is no tension between the reality of life in God lived in the present and the 
age that follows.  The present, proleptic, state of deification always acts as a signpost to that final 
consummation.  It is a fitting share in that final state proper to the present.  When Maximus 
considers the body, he does so in a way that describes deification in a pre-resurrection existence.   
 In his comprehensive study of the subject, Cooper explores Maximus’ portrayal of the 
deified body.  Of particular interest is how Maximus emphasizes the passivity of human 
bodies.132 Recall that in his description of the hypostatic union, human nature allows the Logos a 
share in passivity, particularly the ability to suffer.133 In the same passage the passivity of human 
flesh (δια σαρκὸς φύσει παθητῆς) is emphasized.134 There is here an instrumental use of bodily 
passivity by Christ to affect salvation which makes the flesh passive in the process of deification.  
The body then, participates in deification by becoming passive to the theandric activity affected 
by the graced incorporation of the whole human person in God.135 Based upon this, we echo 
Cooper’s conclusion that the human body is deified and expresses deification by suffering.136 
Granting to the body the role of suffering does not negate the goodness of the human body or 
creation as such.  In suffering, the body has within itself an intrinsic martyrdom, a witness that 
points through its own contingency beyond being.  Deified suffering is not a masochistic practice 
or a resignation to punishment but an active drawing close to the same mystery manifest through 
the crucifixion.  Maximus does not speculate on the aftermath of bodily death, the apex of bodily 
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suffering, except to say that the body continues to have a share in God, no longer subject to 
natural processes and is wholly deified in its action.137  
 
E. Humanity as Microcosm 
 The eschatological trajectory expressed by the body through suffering cannot be 
separated from human nature as a whole.  As a compositional unity of body and soul, humanity 
occupies a distinctive place within the cosmos.  Thus far we have taken these elements of 
humanity, so to speak, in turn focusing on specific aspects of humanity including the change in 
tropos in deification, how that dynamic transforms freedom, and the body’s role in deification.  
Now we turn to the unique reality of human nature as understood by the Confessor: the gathering 
of disparate elements of creation into union.  For Maximus humanity is a microcosm.  This is the 
central locus around which Lars Thunberg bases his reflection on maximian thought.  
Understood as a microcosm, humanity occupies a unique place in God’s plan for creation:  
 
The very fact that the things of the world are reflected in man present him with a vocation 
to gather them together for his and their final goal. He should relate opposite phenomena: 
mortal creatures with immortal creatures, rational beings with non-rational beings, etc. In 
this way man should function as a world in miniature, and for this reason he was created 
as a reflecting image of the whole cosmos.138  
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Christ is the first and paradigmatic realization of this vocation.   Humanity can only strive 
to fulfill this unifying call because of Christ’s recapitulative redemption, granting humanity the 
ability to heal the “natural fissures” in creation.139 The Incarnation inaugurates this unitive action 
by first perfecting humanity in himself through the hypostatic union.  Christ chose to affect this 
unity first because it is the building block upon which the rest of the gathering relies. 
 Maximus elaborates on the image of humanity as microcosm in Mystagogia 7.  For the 
Confessor, the redemption of a single human being is the redemption of the whole of creation in 
miniature.  He analogizes between the whole of creation which includes visible and invisible 
elements with humanity which is also visible and invisible because their nature is the unity of 
soul and body.140 Maximus’ view is that humanity represents the whole universe and perhaps 
more provocatively, describes the universe as a human being.141  
 The cosmos itself is like the unity of the visible and invisible in humanity because the 
whole cannot be teased out of the parts.  The invisible belongs to the universe as much as the 
visible.142 This anthropomorphic analogy should not be taken to mean that creation itself forms 
some sort of hypostasis but that the visible and invisible, the sensible and insensible elements, 
belong to the same reality of the cosmos in the same way that we cannot speak of a human nature 
without considering the soul and body.  This is tied to the cosmos’ eschatological fulfillment: 
“The universe, as a man, will then have perished in that which can be seen, and it will be raised 
again—new from that which has grown old—at the resurrection that we presently await.”143 The 
commonality of composition becomes a commonality in resurrection.  Just as humanity in 
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deification is permeated by God’s action and presence so the whole universe, likened to the same 
reality, will be raised in a manner wherein God’s presence permeates the whole.  This is 
Maximus’ way of expressing the eschatological fulfillment of 1 Cor 15:28, that in the 
Resurrection, God will be all in all.  It is crucial to keep the Confessor’s Neo-Chalcedonianism in 
mind.  In this final consummation he holds that the human along with the whole cosmological 
creation will be penetrated by the Logos without being ontologically assimilated.144 The Logos 
does not seek to deconstruct creation or remove the individuality of the human person instead its 
tropos is changed to a divine one without in any way altering its being.145  
 
F. Consecration of Creation as the Vocation of Humanity 
 Just as the whole of creation can be conceived of as a human being that will be raised and 
share in eschatological fulfillment, the human person can be said to contain all of the elements of 
creation.  Humanity contains the potential to relate with each of the five “divided elements” by 
virtue of the human nature.146 The unity of disparate elements in humanity points toward God’s 
original plan for the human species.  God’s intention was for humanity to serve as a mediator, a 
point of unity, for the communion between God and the cosmos.  Maximus tells us that humanity 
is listed as the final part of God’s creation with this express purpose in mind.147 Humanity is to 
be the natural link (συνδεσμός τις φυσικὸς), the point of unity for all of creation with God.148 
This original difference was not due to sin but, as we reflected upon in the previous chapter, due 
to the natural differentiation of God’s judgment.  Maximus describes this original human 
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vocation as a gathering up of all of creation into one.  This proceeds through a series of natural 
divisions (male and female, paradise and the world, heaven and earth, the sensible and the 
insensible) to the point where the whole of creation is brought together in a unity, “one single 
creation.” 149 Having overcome these divisions, Christ unites creation to Himself through 
uncreated love, overcoming the fifth and final division of created-uncreated.  
 Maximus tells us that this final division is overcome through Christ’s ascension.  Having 
mediated all of the divisions in nature through uniting them to himself in the hypostatic union, 
Christ ascends to heaven and with him all the extremes of creation.150  Maximus calls our 
attention to Christ’s human body “which is of the same nature and consubstantial with ours” in 
which Christ had already united the natures of the cosmos.151 In doing so Christ reveals and 
restores humanity’s original vocation as mediator of creation to the uncreated.  Christ gathers all 
of creation together, “fulfilling as man … all that He Himself as God had preordained should 
take place, having completed the whole plan of God the Father for us…”  which allows all with a 
human nature to participate in that vocation once more.152 
The vocation of mediator is understood to be imprinted on the process of deification.  By 
growing in union with God, humanity first mediates God to the human body.153 From this point, 
the intent was for humanity to bring God to reside in all things in accord with nature.154 The 
lasting result was to be a creation “drawn together into a unity as they converge around the one 
human nature.”155 The hope for deification is not, then, a hope that is limited by the scope of 
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human individuality.  It is not a relationship that finds its boundaries in an exclusive relationship 
between God and the self but by the very vocation of humanity breaks down the border between 
self and creation.  The deification of the human person “constitutes the hope for the salvation of 
the whole creation.”156  
 In every description of humanity’s vocation as mediator, Maximus notes the historical 
reality of sin.  This reality does not annul God’s original intention but impedes it greatly.  
Through the misuse of freedom, humanity has become estranged from God’s original goal and 
intention.157 Sin is movement that is discordant with the original intention of God, a 
contradiction of the logoi.  It is a violation of human nature and vocation.158 Instead of uniting 
creation, sinful humanity introduces new and deeper divisions.  Instead of uniting what was 
divided, humanity “divided what was divided.”159  
 Due to this discordant movement, we see why it is only through the Logos’ own 
Incarnation as a human being that humanity’s role can be once again restored.  This does not 
mean that the Incarnation was not an original part of God’s plan.  In a sense we see that God’s 
desire to be embodied in all of creation already points toward the intention of Incarnation.  The 
matter at hand is that the original vocation of humanity can only be realized as a consequence of 
the Incarnation and redemption.  The incorporation into the one Logos from which humanity 
exercises the power to offer God’s presence to the rest of creation, to consecrate that same 
creation to God, is only possible now by means of the redemption.  For Maximus this redemption 
is intrinsically linked to membership in the Church. 
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G. Mediator Role Expressed Liturgically 
 The Church is a reflection of divine activity, bringing about the “oneness” desired by 
God.160 The entry of the human person into the Church is an entering into union with God.  
Thomas Cattoi describes the Confessor’s mystagogical outlook as a “reverse-kenosis.”161 The 
self-emptying of Christ has as its mirror image the leaving of passions and attachments that is 
necessary to become one of Christ’s faithful to enter into the restored relationship with God 
facilitated by the church. 
 Within a liturgical framework, the Church stands as the Body of Christ and is 
representative of the same cosmic unity that is the goal of deification.  The church does God’s 
unifying work through its collective actions as that body.162 The community in microcosm 
encapsulates the macrocosmic action of the church. The liturgical assembly unifies its individual 
members without confusion, surpassing all of their natural relationships and by the incorporation 
of those individuals acts in a corporate manner for the unification of all creation.163 This does not 
only address the internal elements of humanity.  The church extends its reach to non-human 
elements of creation.  The cosmos is “another Church that is made without hands.” 164 The 
Confessor draws a direct correlation between the church “made with hands” to the cosmic church 
that has for itself a sanctuary and nave.165 Maximus explains that the unity of the church as a 
building derives from the liturgical action which takes place within it: “The nave is identical to 
the sanctuary according to power because it is consecrated by the anaphora at the consummation 
of the mystagogy and, conversely the sanctuary is identical to the nave according to activity 
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because it is the place where the never-ending mystagogy begins.”166 The church derives its 
unitive character from its use as place for the consecratory action and remembrance of the 
mysteries.  As the church, the members are incorporated into a unity that outshines their 
differences.  By gathering up members regardless of their natural differences into an indivisible 
union, the church does the same work that God does and with the same activity.  Maximus tells 
us that God is the only one capable of bringing about such a union and when the church performs 
this action it acts as “an image relates to its archetype.167 
Undoubtedly this same action takes place in the church of the cosmos in which the 
Confessor to identify it as a nave and sanctuary.  In his translation of the text, Armstrong notes 
that this liturgical context grants the word anaphora (ἀναφορᾷ) a meaning beyond the mundane 
“reference” by which it is otherwise translated.  Here the term can mean “offering” and in this 
setting refers to the Eucharistic offering of the liturgy.168 We can conclude that the cosmos 
stands in unity with the church as an edifice in which the offering is made, an offering that brings 
each of these realities into unconfused unity.  Thunberg calls this the Confessor’s “ecclesial 
vision of the world.”169 The cosmos, as a macrocosmic church is the place of sacrifice and 
consecration.   The church cannot be separated from the creation it inhabits as though it were 
some exterior reality.  The church as described here is a “double reality” that interpenetrates and 
draws the cosmos into itself.170 Maximus does not envision a separation between the world and 
the church.  The church acts as a consecratory power from within not the “imposition of an 
omnipotent causality.”171  
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 Incorporating our earlier reflection on the logoi allows us to see that the cosmos as 
church is not simply a backdrop for this mystery but a participant in the liturgy.  The liturgy is 
the working out in time of the right movement of the logoi embedded within creation.  The 
double-movement of procession and conversion, which we reflected upon in an ontological 
context, are similarly present in the liturgical dynamic of consecration.  These movements make 
up, as it were, two points of departure by which the Logos affects transformation.  The cosmos, 
inseparable from the multitudinous logoi, point humanity toward the one Logos.  The church, by 
virtue of the unity present in humanity and participation in the mediation of Christ, draws 
creation into one in the anaphora.  The Logos meets and unites the cosmos and humanity in the 
one deifying liturgical act of consecration allowing for the divine tropos to not only be manifest 
in humanity but to become embodied in the whole of the cosmos.  The church, in both senses of 
the image, takes on the task of its archetype, bringing the whole of creation into the unity made 
possible by Christ’s hypostatic union.172 The result of this convertive and unitive movement is a 
dissolution of difference without confusion.  The whole of creation manifests this liturgical unity 
and sings out in the one voice of the Logos which demonstrates their unity not by dissolving it 
but by gloriously outshining their visible distinctions.173 Von Balthasar credits Maximus with the 
novel insight, absent from both Evagrius and Pseudo-Dionysius, that the whole of creation 
participates in the church’s liturgy.174 The liturgical incorporation in Christ is not done despite 
creation, it consists of creation expressed as “incarnational, ascetic, sacramental” creation.175 The 
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material diversity of creation is the instrument of consecration.176 In this action the whole of 
creation is brought into union with Christ, it is deified.  As Thunberg explains: 
 
When, in the Church, the created multiplicity assembles around Christ, who is the only 
logos of the totality-assembles without confusion, but also without separation between 
the divine and the human, as the Chalcedonian formula states-then the Church expresses 
in a ‘typical’ mode (i.e. as type) one of the same principle and one of the same power of 
unity on the level of creation.177  
 
 The influence of Chalcedon on Maximus forms a critical point for his liturgical 
understanding.  Cattoi observes that the declaration of unity “One is Holy, one is Lord, Jesus 
Christ,” that concludes the holy mysteries and is recorded by Maximus in Mystagogy 21, can 
sound “remarkably isochristic ... a complete erasure of difference between deified individuals” 
and the divinity to which they have been joined.178 We have already noted multiple times that 
participation in the divine, the fruit of the process of deification and the goal of liturgical 
transformation, does not annul the nature or individuality of the creature.  The preservation of 
identity within deification indicates two truths.  First, it is God’s affirmation of the goodness of 
the cosmos as created.  The intimacy brought about by Eucharistic participation and the 
transformation of the natural mode to the divine mode does not constitute the erasure of the 
fundamental structure of reality.179 Secondly, it highlights the uniqueness of every created being. 
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Cattoi points out that even the uniqueness of created beings is a shared trait that draws them to 
communion.180 This particularity is not a static one.  The preservation of unique created beings 
reveals God’s design, the unrepeatable logoi by which each creature in its particularity has an 
unrepeatable role to play within the divine plan.181  
 
H. Eucharistic Reciprocity  
 Approaching individual participation in the cosmic action of offering the logoi back to 
God introduces tension between the one and the many.  Maximus’ whole project is 
unquestioningly pointed toward an eschaton in which all are united, crossing the boundaries set 
by the five levels of division with a shared origin in and consummation with the uncreated 
divinity of God.  Teasing out how distinct individual beings participate within this dynamic may 
seem counter to the whole project.  As we have seen time and again, the preservation of the 
individual in a fashion compatible with Chalcedonian language undergirds the Confessor’s 
theological opus.  Mitralexis affirms that when we speak of the human person’s task as mediator 
that we are speaking on the level of the individual: “... each and every separate otherness that is 
to be restored as a perfect otherness in perfect communion, and note merely to the aggregate-
otherness.”182 If this is the case, we must pay close attention to how Maximus views each and 
every individual person’s developing relationship with the divine and the restorative process that 
happens as the result of that relationship.  The ultimate unifying task is not one that wipes out 
this relationship but affirms it. We should also acknowledge that while Maximus’ use of 
microcosm and speaking of the whole of creation and the church as a human would allow us to 
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increase the scope of this dynamic beyond that of the individual, doing so tempts us to ignore the 
pivotal role that the relationship of individual created beings and God plays within this schema.  
Allowing the one to be absorbed into the many does violence to the whole project.  The tension 
between the one and the many must remain intact. 
  
Logoi and the Person 
 Loudovikos’ work places the relationship between persons, human and divine, at the 
center of his interpretation of Maximus’ theology.183 The reframing of the Confessor’s work is 
comprehensive, touching each aspect of maximian thought.  At its core is the understanding that 
the nature communicated by God through the logoi is not a static reality but is presented to the 
person as their own “ecstatic personal vocation, rather than an immutable ‘given.’184” If the logoi 
had been proposed by Maximus as immutable ideals that have their being apart from God, they 
would have exerted power over God’s freedom as we discussed in chapter two.  Here we will see 
that this would have stripped humanity of freedom as well.  Instead, understood as divine wills, 
which rely on the response of creation for their ultimate fulfillment, the logoi are the person’s 
“eschatological ontology.”185 Far from a permanent ontological character, the logoi form the 
basis of a vocational dialogue between creator and created, an eschatological dialogue.186 
Loudovikos underscores Maximus’ eschatological emphasis.  What makes the Confessor’s 
thought stand out is not so much how he describes the origin of the logoi but the process of their 
eschatological fulfillment.187  
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 The logos/tropos dynamic demonstrates that God creates with the intention of having a 
dialogue with his creation. Creation is not intended to be a monologic procession/return to God 
of an already perfect creation simply offered in return the same way it was received.  The counter 
example of the return of an already perfect creation evokes the biblical image of the fearful 
steward of Mt 25:14-30 who does nothing creative with the gifts entrusted to him by his master.   
Dialogue is a risky notion that places the fate of the logoi in the hands of created beings.  It also 
creates a possibility alien to teleological fatalism: the dialogic view holds that creation interacts 
with the logoi in such a manner that there is reciprocity between creation and its creator.  
Mitralexis calls this dialogue “a primary characteristic of existence, an ontological category.”188  
 This dialogue is radically personal, happening between the individual and God but it is in 
no way conceptually independent.  Maximus’ liturgical outlook understands this dialogue as the 
individual’s participation in the collective liturgical movement.  The dialogue is characterized 
first and foremost as Eucharistic.  The center of the eucharistic mystery is a personal dialogue 
characterized by the “exchange of gifts.”189 This exchange is the raison d’etre for Maximus’ 
insistence on the dissoluble character of personal individuality.   
 In Ad Thalassius, Maximus describes the logos/tropos dynamic as a eucharistic 
reciprocation of gifts given.190 Not only the logoi embedded within human nature but the whole 
of the created logoi discoverable in creation through the exercise of wisdom are received by the 
human person as a gift from God.191 The eucharistic movement is immediately recognizable: the 
inner principles (logoi) of all created things, once they are known become gifts offered back to 
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God and have a transformative effect allowing the human person to reveal “in himself through 
his life all the majesty of the divine wisdom which is invisibly present in existent things.”192 It is 
important here to underscore that Maximus does not create a boundary to this dynamic that ends 
at the person.  What is offered is not only the elements of creation that are manifest and 
participate in the person’s own body, the individual microcosm of humanity.  The individual 
eucharistic mediation is an offering of all created reality in which that person discerns the logoi. 
 Treating creation as a gift that could be offered to God exposes Maximus’ logic to a 
critique that threatens to reduce dialogue to monologue.  The concept of offering creation as a 
gift to God seems to forget that the creation itself has God as its origin.  Would it not be the case 
that ultimately what is happening here is only a nominal “offering,” a return to God of that which 
already belongs to God in a way that only appears to include authentic personal involvement?  
Maximus tells us that God is the only one capable of creating according to the logoi.  Attempting 
to change the logoi leads to the destruction of that entity.  God is ultimately the source and 
destination of all creation that has its origin in and moves according to the logoi.  It would seem 
then, that the only offering creation could make to God would be a sinful innovation of the logoi.  
How then can we speak of creation being offered to God in any sense of the word? 
 The key lies in Maximus’ understanding that God offers creation to us as a free and 
authentic gift.  Created things are not only gifts in appearance.  Maximus’ God gives freely with 
no ontological requirement that the gifts be reciprocated.  The nature of creation and its 
ontological distance from God allows God to bestow creation as a gift to itself.  A gift truly 
distinct from God, authentically other.  As the gift is received, God recognizes the creature’s 
legitimate possession of that gift as its own.  God’s free offering is a relinquishing of these gifts 
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to creatures.  The Confessor tells us that this is a demonstration of God’s goodness and provides 
us with an ability to offer an authentic gift back to God, not out of obligation but out of freedom: 
“[God] accepts His own gifts as offerings from us, reckoning the whole contribution as ours.”193 
The giving of gifts does not happen on the level of appearance.  God gives authentically and 
becomes a participant in the relationship that can now openly receive gifts.  The giver becomes 
the receiver of gifts, recognizing an “indebtedness” for the gifts coming from creation.194 By 
treating what has been given as exclusively belonging to humanity, God can then participate in 
this Eucharistic relationship in a truly dialogical manner.195 Without this element, the 
communion would be one sided, a participation of creation in the creator and not a communal 
exchange.  This dynamic becomes the guarantor of creation’s freedom.  Communion with God, 
received by God as gift, is in no way obligatory or compulsory.  
 The Confessor grounds God’s ability to give and to receive in His complete 
independence from creation.  Since God is totally other, beyond the created world and essentially 
self-sufficient, God has no need of what creation can offer.196 The return offering of the logoi, 
the tropoi changed by their actualization within created beings, are received as gifts.  They do not 
return to God out of a matter of necessity because God by nature has “no need of any of these 
things.”197 Understood as a gift to be received and given, maximian cosmology reveals creation 
itself to be profoundly dialogical.198 Its whole purpose is to facilitate the Eucharistic giving and 
receiving of gifts. 
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 This Eucharistic exchange is inconceivable without the person. The person as God’s 
dialogical partner is the hinge upon which Maximus’ ontological system is built.199 Loudovikos 
develops a specific definition of the person based on maximian thought. “The person is the 
spiritual event in which the inner principles of entities are made into man’s ‘gift’s offered’ to 
God and God’s ‘gifts bestowed’ on man, circulating between created persons, thus fulfilling their 




I. Becoming, Micro-Eschatology, and Micro-Dialogue 
 The broad categories of “person” and “gift” once again tempt a macrocosmic 
understanding of maximian thought.  Contemplating these ideas in such a categorical manner 
may evoke imagery of the whole creation, represented as a composite other, exchanging gifts 
with the divine.  Loudovikos, following Maximus’ writings closely, emphasizes that for this 
system to avoid breaking down into a matter of necessity, it must be built around the individual 
responses of distinct persons.201 The logoi are offered by God as gift and proposition to creation 
writ large, yes, but more importantly as proposals that elicit responses from individual rational 
beings.  Freedom to respond, to self-determine and have an influence over the eternal trajectory 
of the logoi is the key moment of receiving the gift and reciprocity.  Without this, the individual 
exercise of the freedom of persons, we could not understand the logoi as God’s wills.  They 
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would become aligned with the ideals of Greek philosophy, not awaiting a response from 
creatures but by effecting what they represent by their compulsive power.202  
 Responses in freedom are precisely the pivotal moment of deification, as we outlined in 
the journey of being, well-being, eternal well-being above.  Maximus’ ontological vision is not 
one of static being but of a constant progress toward becoming.  Though the person only moves 
toward deification by responding affirmatively to the proposals of the logoi, they do so by the 
mode of free response and not out of necessity. A fated natural teleology would affirm every 
critique of onto-theology and ultimately lead to the pantheistic assimilation of persons Maximus 
guards against.203 Basing the process of deification upon becoming rescues it from a fated 
following of nature.   
 The distinction between being and becoming is a distinction between teleology and 
eschatology.  Maximus’ view is a thoroughly eschatological one wherein creation itself is not a 
finalized perfection.  It does not contain its telos in itself but by virtue of the logoi is placed on 
an eschatological trajectory beyond its nature.  This eschatology becomes manifest to each and 
every individual creature through the logoi.  The proposals of the logoi to individual beings make 
up for that being their own, unique, “micro-eschatology.”204 God’s offer for fulfillment and 
participation with the divine nature is proposed to specific individuals awaiting their free 
response.  These principles set up an eschatological relationship: “each logos is able to represent 
the Logos Himself to the actual being in question.”205 The discernment of the logoi, growth in 
virtue, and the response to the call to deification are all encapsulated in an eschatology for that 
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particular being.  By offering a personal, unique eschatology, Loudovikos writes that God 
presents Himself as a “God for them” whose offering is a free gift of love.206  
 The call and response take the form of a micro-dialogue between God and each unique 
person.207 Dialogic reciprocity entails a reception of gifts and an offering of gifts through the 
logoi by the transposition of their tropoi.  Deification is eternal participation in this dialogue, the 
encounter between the uncreated God and created persons which in turn effects the tropos of 
those created beings that surround that person.  The transposition of the logoi found in creation 
to the new divine mode of life is not an accident of these individual micro-dialogues.  It is 
constitutive of those same micro-dialogues.  The logoi discerned in nature are the currency of 
gift through which the human participation in the divine is made possible.  Without the logoi of 
created things, both within humanity itself and those logoi that have been discerned, there would 
be no recognition of being coming from God.  There would be no free turning of the person 
toward God in well-being and thus no eternal affirmation of that choice in eternal-well-being.  
Creation distinct from the human person is a required element for this micro-dialogic 
relationship.  Without creation there is no gift to be received or given.   
 These micro-dialogues demonstrate how each human person engages the vocational call 
as mediator.  This mediation does not happen in spite of the natural state of the cosmos but in 
fulfillment of those natural logoi that exist within the cosmos.  The cosmos as created is already 
good yet unable to reach eschatological completeness without this task of mediation, one that 
changes the mode from a natural existence to a divine one.  This dynamic would be impossible 
without the freedom of self-determination that constitutes the response to the logoi.  The 
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individual gathering up of the logoi and the offering to God of logoi as a gift from humanity 
shows how the goodness of creation and the task of mediation complement one another.   
 Understood as the same dynamic that is the process of deification, dialogic reciprocity is 
the act of participation in the divine.  Deification is also God’s ultimate ratification of each 
individual person.208 Even at the pinnacle of deification, the human person retains the 
Chalcedonian quality of being distinct from God without separation on the level of nature.  
Eucharistic dialogical reciprocity can continue eternally because the natural logoi of created 
beings are not assimilated into God. 
 The result of each individual dialogue is not a state of isolation of the person with God 
but of communion.  The gifts given through dialogic reciprocity are not given to God as an 
overarching principle but to God in the person of the Logos, Jesus Christ.  The unique exchange 
of gifts, though remaining distinct, are gathered in Christ to the one hypostatic union that allows 
for the created to participate in the uncreated.  Each unique micro-dialogue then leads the 
individuated unity of body and soul that constitutes a particular humanity to union with Christ, 
union with church, union with the cosmos.  The ineffable unity of all things in Christ, the 
eschatological fulfillment of deification, preserves the particularity of the person and their 
freedom yet unites it to every other micro-dialogue, along with the whole of creation in a way 
that is without a change in nature, undivided, inseparable, and unconfused. 
 
  
                                                          




MAXIMUS & THE THEOLOGY OF THE LAITY 
 
 During the summer of 2016, Pope Francis held a celebration honoring the 65th 
anniversary of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI to the priesthood.  At the conclusion of the 
celebration, Benedict XVI gave a short address, which was only the second time he had spoken 
in public since he resigned from the Papacy in 2013. 
 Speaking to Pope Francis, an array of cardinals, and others present he called to mind a 
fellow ordinandi who had the word eucharistomen inscribed on a holy card commemorating the 
ordination.  Benedict emphasized the fulness of this Greek term of thanksgiving: 
 
Eucharistomen harks back to the reality of thanksgiving, to the new dimension that Christ 
imparts to it. The cross, suffering, all that is wrong with the world: he transformed all this 
into “thanks” and therefore into a “blessing”. Hence he fundamentally transubstantiated 
life and the world, and he has given us and gives us each day the bread of true life, which 
transcends this world thanks to the strength of His love.1 
 
In a rhetorical move that resonates equally with Maximus’ thought and Vatican II’s description 
of the laity, Benedict called for the participation of all Christians in Christ’s one act of 
thanksgiving: 
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We wish to insert ourselves into the “thanks” of the Lord, and thus truly receive the 
newness of life and contribute to the “transubstantiation” of the world so that it might not 
be a place of death, but of life: a world in which love has conquered death. 
 
Benedict’s desire for himself and for all to participate in this transubstantiation of the world is an 
apt summation of many of the themes that are present in Maximus and later re-expressed by 
Vatican II in its own ecclesiastic milieu.  His use of priestly language to describe a universal 
human task propels the application of his words beyond the prestigious gathering of clerics to the 
life of all Christians.  The linking of liturgy, participatory action and especially the Eucharist, 
and transubstantiation are touchstones that we will return to at the conclusion of this chapter.   
Our analysis of Maximus’ thought over the previous two chapters has culminated in a 
strikingly similar image of the eucharistic exchange of gifts.  Eucharistic dialogical reciprocity 
draws together the multitudinous radii of the Confessor’s opus to form a dynamic that is 
comprehensive and can be introduced into the ongoing conversation on the laity.  This 
reciprocity aptly describes the call and response dynamic of the irreducibly unique person in the 
myriad of vocational roles manifest in the laity.  Far from a description of an isolated 
relationship between “God and me” this reciprocity is inseparable from the Christic action of 
unifying the whole cosmos in the one Logos.  It is a thoroughly Chalcedonian way of 
understanding each person’s role in the whole Christ. 
 As a recapitulation of maximian theology, dialogic reciprocity relies upon key insights 
form the Confessor’s thought.  First, that God created the cosmos, visible and invisible, as a free 
act of love.  Forming the whole through a free act of will, every part comes to be on account of 
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its participation in God via the logoi.  These logoi serve a twofold function that correspond to 
God’s will to create a diverse creation (the logoi of judgment) and to gather the whole of this 
creation back into Himself (the logoi of providence).  These stamps of the creator are present in 
each creature, from the inanimate natural elements to rational beings.  They are expressions of 
the one Logos, the person of Christ, and act as the means of participating in the Logos by way of 
origin and eschatological return.  This participation moves toward God’s goal of becoming 
embodied in all things everywhere.2  
 As free rational beings united to both the visible and invisible creation, humanity was to  
serve as the natural link between the Creator and creation.  For Maximus, the vocation of 
humanity as mediator is not a result of sin or the depreciation of creation as such but the very 
means by which God holds a dialogue with creation.  The currency of this dialogue is the gift of 
the logoi embedded within creation.  The logoi do not exist apart from creation, making creation 
the necessary dialogic medium between God and rational beings.  God, having freely given, 
allows humanity to freely receive and offer back that same creation to God as humanity’s own 
gift to Him.  In the offering, the divisions of being are broken down and gathered into a whole 
without doing violence to their individuality. 
 Tragically, sin stifled humanity’s ability to make this offering in a natural manner.  The 
unifying of human nature with the divine in the hypostatic union introduces a new theandric 
mode of action.  In Christ, humanity is able to act in a divine manner and can once more fulfill 
this original vocation.  Christ as the Logos Himself, the original end, is revealed as the means of 
this unification.3 Without doing violence to their identity as persons, humanity is able to act in 
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this new divine mode, now capable of fulfilling this original vocation in Christ.  Entry into that 
same theandric activity manifest in Christ’s hypostasis grants ineffable communion between 
human and divine realities.  Deification is the recognition, ratification, and permanency of 
dialogical reciprocity.  
 Recapitulated as Eucharistic dialogic reciprocity, the Confessor’s crucial insights about 
the cosmos, anthropology, and deification can be brought into a fruitful conversation with the 
reflections on laity discussed in the first chapter.  We will take the latest literature on the laity as 
our point of departure and work in a reverse-chronological manner toward the Second Vatican 
Council.  In doing so, we will be able to draw upon the insights and concerns within the post-
conciliar literature when forming our synthesis of Maximus with the council.  The focus of this 
discussion will be the understanding of mediation and creation.  As we approach the conciliar 
text itself, we will analyze the key terms of the conciliar description of the laity, namely “secular 
and “consecrate.” In doing so we will be equipped to understand the points at which Maximus 
and the council find agreement and where further reflection may be necessary. In the final 
section we will attempt to outline a possible theology of the laity based upon a synthesis of 
Maximus and Vatican II. 
 
I. Maximus and the Developmental School of Post-Vatican II Lay Theology 
 We found in chapter one that the post-conciliar literature on the laity could be separated 
into two schools of thought: the magisterial school, in which Lumen Gentium’s description of 
the laity as “secular” is defended and a second, the developmental school, which sees the Second 
Vatican Council as a point of departure for further discussion on the laity.  Since the magisterial 
school is chiefly composed of statements that re-present the conciliar documents we will engage 
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this school when discussing the conciliar texts proper.  Broadly speaking we will introduce 
Maximus’ thought into the conversation between these two schools in a reverse chronological 
order. 
 The nature of the developmental school’s critique requires that it be addressed before any 
meaningful dialogue between Vatican II and Maximus can be attempted.  Development authors 
call into question key concepts used by both Vatican II and Maximus to describe the Christian 
life.  The developmental school names a threefold set of problematic dichotomies: the 
laity/clergy, the secular/sacred, God and the world.  Their reflections causally link the lay/clergy 
distinction to the understanding of a passive laity who must be always receptive to an active 
clergy.  This mirrors the relationship between secular and sacred spheres and ultimately bears 
upon our perception of how God relates to the world.  The underlying concern is one of 
inequality.  These dichotomies, as expressed by the developmental school, bar the laity from 
access to God outside of receiving the sacred from the clergy.  On account of these problematic 
dichotomies, the development school seeks alternative models of ecclesiology that no longer 
make use of the concepts of mediation, the secular, or the sacred. 
 Rooted within the liturgical and monastic traditions of his time, we can candidly ask 
whether or not Maximus would recognize the ecclesial distinction that is at the foundation of the 
developmental critique of lay theology.  If so, would he affirm or deny that it was necessary to 
use the terms “lay” and “clergy” to describe the Church? A reading of Maximus within the 
framework of post-conciliar lay thought might see his proximity to Dionysius the Areopagite, 
who is attributed with enshrining the hierarchy with its privileged place in ecclesiology and 
assume that the Confessor would hold an ecclesiological view consonant with one of his major 
influences.  We would be hard pressed to blame anyone for making such an assumption, 
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especially given Maximus’ own description of his prominent work on the liturgical life of the 
Church, the Mystagogia, as an expansion on Dionysius’ Ecclesial Hierarchy.  Our own reflection 
on Maximus’ theology shows that he leans upon liturgical concepts such as the Eucharist and 
anaphora in which he frames the cosmic and personal drama of eucharistic dialogical reciprocity. 
 Maximus rarely writes directly about the ordained and their activity.  An interpretation of 
the priest and the actions during the anaphora is a notable omission from the Confessor’s 
Mystagogia.  This is underscored by the structure of the work which depicts the liturgy as the 
process of deification.  Maximus’ description of the clergy is not to be found within the liturgical 
reflection of the Mystagogia but in his correspondence.  In a letter to the Bishop of Kydonia, the 
Confessor describes the priest as taking God’s role as mediator among his people, even to the 
extent that God is “physically seen” through the activity of the priesthood.4 In another place, 
Maximus describes the priesthood’s role as mediator in detail.  The work of the priesthood 
consists of drawing every soul to God, granting it a share in “its own knowledge, peace and 
love,” and to “present to God those it has initiated into the holy mysteries”5 The Confessor 
writes that “the goal of the true priesthood it to be deified and to deify” through true knowledge 
and love.6  
 Does this description of the ordained priesthood as mediators and initiators into the 
divine mysteries mean that Maximus is susceptible to the same criticism leveled at Vatican II by 
Doohan, O’Meara, et al?  This criticism has many strata to it and we should deal with them 
individually.  For instance, it is clear that Maximus conceives of a priesthood that acts in a 
ministerial role, at the very least mediating the rites of initiation and presiding over the anaphora.  
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Does this mean that the Confessor conceives of the Church as an “unequal society,” a two-caste 
structure of lay and ordained? To consider this question thoroughly we should look closely at the 
tradition of mediation in the Dionysian literature and how Maximus’ reception of that tradition 
informs his ecclesiological framework.   
 
A. Dionysian Mediation 
 Returning to Dionysius’ influence on Maximus is crucial because it is the place where the 
post-conciliar literature consistently names the birth of the lay/clergy distinction.7 Hahnenberg 
decries the use of a Dionysian hierarchical mediation, the exercise of sacra potestas.8 According 
to O’Meara, the acceptance of Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings at the Parisian school in the Middle 
Ages was an enshrining of Neoplatonic hierarchical structure within ecclesiology and the 
foundation for the passive-lay, active-clergy dynamic.9 He describes the Dionysian influence on 
ecclesiology as the erection of “a fixed, descending, pyramidal structure of a single authority 
possessing all being.”10 O’Meara adds that treating this Neoplatonic structure as a divinely 
willed model for the church is “untenable.”11 
 Aside from a broad understanding that the Dionysian model introduces Neoplatonic 
ideals into Christianity which requires the exercise of a sacra potestas restricted to those who 
receive it through priestly ordination, O’Meara offers scant detail about how Dionysius’ system 
works.  We find in his discussion of Aquinas’ description of the relationship between the 
                                                          
7 Though some such as Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 11., trace the genealogy of the term “laity” to the first 
century letter of Clement, this early distinction does not carry the problematic undertones of the schema attributed to 
Dionysius. See 1 Clem 44. 
8 Hahnenberg, Ministries, 46. 
9 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 178. 
10 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 279 fn46. 
11 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 279 fn46. 
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episcopate and priesthood that O’Meara considers Thomas’ ecclesiological outlook to be 
influenced by Dionysius “for whom diversity flows from unity.”12 From this description we can 
gather that O’Meara and those who criticize Dionysian ecclesial structure, of which mediation 
represents a key component, see this structure as one of Neoplatonic emanation.  The power 
flows out from the one, mediated by succeeding ranks of hierarchy, to the many.13 This model 
describes the lay/clergy dichotomy and is also present in the criticism of ecclesiologies that focus 
too heavily upon a Christological approach, meaning the sacra potestas is held by the few apart 
from the many.  The point of contact with God in this schema is only through the hierarchy and 
without it there is no access to the divine. 
 This is an accurate depiction of Dionysian ecclesiology, to a point.  The hierarchy 
functions as mediators for the faithful inasmuch as they initiate them into the mysteries.  The 
recipients of this mediation do so in a triad of stages that correspond to the sacramental life.  
They are first illuminated in baptism, purified in chrismation, and perfected in their participation 
in the Eucharist.14  
 The Areopagite’s schema differs from a purely Neoplatonic both in what is being 
mediated and how it is mediated.  He is not describing an ontological mediation of something the 
hierarch has that the faithful do not.  It would be a misrepresentation of Dionysius to claim that 
his model is one in which the hierarch, the ordained have as their own the sacra postestas power 
                                                          
12 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 292 fn14. 
13 A short note about terminology: (1) The concept of hierarchy should not be saddled with the cultural baggage that 
the term represents within our early 21st Century usage, something akin to a social rank or pecking order.  Instead, it 
should be understood as combination of Greek hieros “sacred” and arche “source or origin.” (2) I continue to use the 
term “sacra potestas” because it is used within the literature on the laity.  The phrase itself does not appear in 
Dionysius though the concept could be analogous to what he describes as the “power of consecration” the activity 
by which the hierarchy initiates the faithful into the mysteries. Ecclesial Hierarchy, 505D.  A key part of my 
argument is that the objectified version of sacra postestas does not exist in Dionysius and is thus not inherited by 
Maximus. 




of mediation that is theirs to exercise.  This would be an objectification of that power.  While the 
Areopagite describes the hierarchy itself in an ontological manner, the sacred never becomes the 
possession of the clergy.  The divine energy always belongs to God alone.  Instead of the passing 
along of an ontological power that can be possessed, Dionysius describes a mediation based 
upon participation.  Though the hierarchy itself is an ontological ordering, the act of mediation 
does not pass on something of its own ontology, as would be the case in Neoplatonic emanation. 
 The Neoplatonic concept of emanation, as it is found in Procleus and others, includes the 
transmission of being from superior to subordinate beings.  The Proclean model based the 
passing of the sacred upon the ontological order from higher levels to inferior entities.15 What is 
communicated is from the ontologically greater to the ontologically lesser which can have only a 
lesser share due to their nature.  Those receiving from the hierarchy are dependent on those 
above and have no share in the ultimate source of being as such.  They only receive what is 
passed on to them from the higher, those above them in the hierarchy, making them necessarily 
passive and of lesser value.  The proper foil for the arguments and concerns of O’Meara et al is 
the Proclean understanding of hierarchy.  
 Dionysius’ model differs in both what is mediated and how it is mediated.  First, what is 
mediated is not a share in “being” filtered down through hierarchical descent but an 
undifferentiated share in the purifying divine activity (energeia).16 This act of mediation is not 
one that involves an ontological stepping down and a flowing from more to less.  It is not an 
ontologically reduced facsimile.  It is the participation in the whole of irreducible divinity.   The 
                                                          
15 See Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon, eds., Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 445-577. 1089.17-1239.21 See also Elias Tempelis and Christos Terezis, "The 
Presence of Proclus in George Pachymeres’ Paraphrase of Ps.-Dionysius’ De Divinis Nominibus," in Proclus and 
his Legacy, ed. David D. Butorac and Danielle A. Layne (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), 272 fn3.  
16 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 35. 
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divine activity participated in is not the possession of the hierarchy or the faithful which is why 
we cannot speak in any sense of a passive reception but an active participation.  Initiation into 
these mysteries can in no way be a passive process because it is an initialization of that same 
dynamic divine activity in the individual.  This activity, or in Dionysian terms energeia, never 
ceases to be the activity of God alone who operates through the hierarchy that serves as an icon, 
ever pointing through itself to the ultimate source.  This is a distinctly Christian view of 
hierarchy that differs from earlier Neoplatonic views which would consider not only the source 
but each stage in the hierarchy as divine.17  
 A proper understanding of the Dionysian process of consecration/deification then is one 
in which the hierarchy remains distinct from those being initiated as to their functional role as 
consecrators.  This function does not grant them a higher share in the sacred than the recipient.  
As utter mystery and simplicity, God cannot be divided.  Participation in God is likewise not to 
be divided.  The sacred is never portrayed as the possession of the hierarchy.  The result is not a 
dependency upon the hierarchy for access to God but an equal share in relationship to the divine. 
 The notion of participation clearly differentiates the Dionysian hierarchy from the 
Proclean.  There is a tension between the divine activity and the Areopagite’s emphasis on 
ecclesial structure and function.  The latter can tempt us to lose sight of the unity of divine 
activity.  Loudovikos notes that Dionysius’ apophatic approach to divine activity, expressed in 
the charisms which interpenetrate one another, is overshadowed by the clear and distinct 
                                                          
17 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 36. See also Cooper who notes: “In Dionysius the word (draw ‘elkuso’ via Jn 
12:32) comprehends the totality of the function of the Church’s sacerdotal office in which the hierarch - the bishop-
serves as a mediating ray for the assimilation to God of all the orderly ranks under him.  This of course indicates that 
Dionysius, and Maximus following him, understood the notion of hierarchy differently form the way it is popularly 
understood today.” Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 174. and Harper following Louth: “whereas the modern 
understanding of hierarchy stresses separation and exclusion, for Denys it connotes inclusion and union.” Harper, 
The Analogy of Love, 116. 
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functional designations of the hierarchy.18 Decoupled from the apophatic, this structure stands as 
an objectified edifice, ripe for misinterpretation as an ontologically ordered descending 
hierarchy.   
  Does Maximus’ own understanding of mediation and hierarchy draw similar emphases?    
The structural elements and descriptions are suspiciously absent in the Confessor’s own 
ecclesiological reflections.  Constas notes that Maximus does not use the term “hierarchy” once 
within his writings.  Given the ubiquity of the term in the Dionysian corpus and the multiplicity 
of other terms Maximus adopts from the Areopagite, Constas sees this omission as a “tacit 
rejection” of the very structural notion of hierarchy.19 This of course would require a nefarious 
reading of the praise offered by the Confessor of Dionysius’ Ecclesial Hierarchy at the outset of 
his own Mystagogy.20  
 Without interpreting the omission of hierarchy as a rejection of the concept in toto, we 
can at least say that what Dionysius emphasized, Maximus deemphasized.  Loudovikos writes 
that Maximus does not reject Dionysian hierarchy as much as he goes beyond it.21 The central 
point of the Confessor’s position is familiar to us, drawing from the first chapters of the 
Mystagogy: the Church acts as God acts, in a participative manner and does nothing apart from 
this divine activity.22 Where Dionysius is concerned with drawing out the particularity of 
distinction, Maximus draws together consubstantial unity in action.  This does not mean the 
dissolution of difference and the creation of a confused amalgam.  We do well to remember that 
the Confessor’s thought has a Chalcedonian grounding.  The differences of the individuals are 
                                                          
18 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 42. 
19 Maximos Constas, "Maximus the Confessor, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the Transformation of Christian 
Neoplatonism," Analogia 2, no. 1 (2017): 4. 
20 Myst 48 CCSG6. 
21 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 44. 
22 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 45. 
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united in a characteristically Chalcedonian manner into the one body that is the Church.  
Loudovikos proposes an understanding of this that holds in tension the preservation of individual 
members in light of the whole: “The Church, I would therefore say, is the eschatological mode of 
the human person’s unity, whereas the human person is the consubstantial mode of the unity of 
the Church.”23 This concept of consubstantiality is key to Loudovikos’ interpretation of the 
Confessor. This is necessary since Maximus recognizes priests as mediators of deification, does 
not explicitly reject an ecclesial ordering that could be understood in a hierarchical manner, 
while at the same time affirming the participation of each individual in the one divine activity 
that is consonant with deification.  Maximus’ description of the unity of the Church as a human 
being lends itself to being described in a consubstantial way.  While we might point toward a 
hierarchy of functions within a body, the body acts as a single unity.  That is to say, the actions 
of the body are carried out with the same energy, expressions of the same person in a 
consubstantial manner.  These activities, though they can be individually recognized, are actions 
united in substance: “And each of the Church’s energies or charisms is spiritually validated only 
as a manifestation of a complete likeness to the specific divine energy to which it corresponds, 
since it expresses the whole of this energy and it alone.”24 The interpenetrating consubstantiality 
of the actions of the whole Church allows for the expression of unity that Maximus affirms in his 
ecclesiological writings. 
                                                          
23 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 46. 
24 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 47. We should also note that when speaking of the unity of the charisms we 
are not envisioning a body that is the sum of its parts.  The interpenetrative nature of charism is apophatic in itself 
since it is necessary to recognize certain functions but impossible to separate them from one another.  As 
Loudovikos writes: “every charism is the whole of ecclesial being.”  In this analysis, the structures of the Church are 
not conceived of as “being” but “becoming” as such the hierarchical functionality is not a reflection of the eternal 
but the means by which all are to enter into that same unity.  Here the hierarchy exists not to be enshrined over all 
but to constantly fulfill its task of drawing in all to become members of the apophatic unity and participants in the 
divine activity.  See Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 49-50. 
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 At the heart of this consubstantiality is Maximus’ concern for both divine unity and the 
unity of the Church.  Cooper notes that a central feature of Maximus’ thought is the “baptismal 
unity” described by Paul in Galatians 3:28: “there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male 
and female, for you are all one in Christ.” Due to the consubstantiality of the charisms, this unity 
is not impeded by differing ecclesial rank but facilitated by it.25  
 We have come full circle to the concerns for ecclesial unity found within the post-
conciliar literature.  Would Maximus recognize the ecclesial dichotomy of lay/clergy in a manner 
that can be comprehended by the conversation surrounding Vatican II? Our response must be 
both yes and no.  The answer is yes in the affirmation of general categories of hierarchy/clergy 
and lay/faithful.  It must be no if we have in mind an ontological ordering that values the 
charisms bestowed on the hierarchy in a way that would put it over and above the charisms 
received by the faithful.  The unity of the charisms forbids this.  Yet the Confessor can still see 
the hierarchy as a means for consecration and initiation.  The recognition of each of the charisms 
containing all charisms within them in an apophatic unity guards against an idealistic dichotomy 
in favor of a consubstantial unity. 
 
B. Ecclesial Distinction and Structure 
 We must be cautious here to delineate between definitions of ecclesial structure and lay 
activity.  There is scant reflection upon lay activity in the development school.  When it is 
mentioned, the whole maximian idea of humanity acting as a mediator is rejected for reasons we 
have discussed at length.  Concerning ecclesiological structure, Maximus and the developmental 
school (specifically Hahnenberg and Gaillardetz) hold much in common. 
                                                          
25 Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 178. 
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Maximus’ thought is generally compatible with Hahnenberg.  The two thinkers share the 
view that the activity of the clergy and the laity are of profound value.  A major difficulty in 
reconciling Maximus with Hahnenberg is that the Confessor would still draw a solid line of 
demarcation between the types of activity undertaken by the hierarchy and those of the laity.  
The difference is that Maximus would not see this as a lessening of the dignity of lay activity but 
as a proper expression of the one charism manifest in the particularity of their activity.  Maximus 
may agree with Hahnenberg that the clergy are only so in light of their relationship to the 
community but would argue that this relationship is characterized by a distinct activity, an 
expression of the one charism.  The “dividing line model” looks different from the Confessor’s 
theological framework.  In Hahnenberg this distinction is seen as the root for separation, in 
Maximus it is an expression of unity in diversity. 
 Maximus’ pneumatological emphasis is similarly inseparable from his Christological 
theology of the Logos.  The charismatic activity of the Church is the result of the response to the 
logoi.  The pneumatological frame of reference is interchangeable with the Christological mode.  
The dynamic of charism and logoi are one in the same due to the perichoretic nature of 
Trinitarian activity.  This theological reflection demonstrates the point on the unity of the 
charisms.  Just as the logoi participate in the one Logos, so the charisms as they are lived share in 
the one anointing of the Spirit open to all the baptized.  In Maximus’ thought one can in no way 
deemphasize the Christological in favor of the pneumatological. 
 The post-conciliar trajectory discerned by Gaillardetz seems compatible with Maximus’ 
thought. By Gaillardetz’s evaluation, the council’s thought was moving “strongly in the direction 
of simply identifying laicus as the normal situation of the practicing Christian who seeks in their 
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daily life to bring all of history to its fulfillment in Christ.”26 We would find particular agreement 
in the description of the micro-eschatological eucharistic exchange as portrayed by Maximus and 
the common activity of daily life expressed in Gaillardetz.  The clergy/hierarchy would share in 
this role but would also carry out those extra responsibilities that are particular to their state.  
What is at issue in Gaillardetz is not the special mission of the clergy, which he affirms to an 
extent but the existence of a special mission of the laity.   
 
C. The Secular and the Sacred 
 In a radical departure from preceding expressions of ecclesiological structure, Doohan 
declares the term laity “theologically dead.”27 Doohan precedes Gaillardetz and shares the basic 
concept of the lay now occupying the position of common membership within the Church.  As 
Doohan puts it “the laity are Church.”28 We could expect that Maximus may agree with this 
thought which is directed by a general thrust of equality among ecclesial members due to the 
dignity of baptism.   Doohan’s rejection of “laity” as a category is also based upon the 
observation that it leaves the vast majority as passive recipients of clerical ministry.   Maximus’ 
view does not approximate the caricature of hierarchy that sets up the clergy as an ontologically 
superior class to the laity.  The Confessor would equally take issue with the description of any 
participant in the Christian life as “passive.” As we have seen, every member the Church in 
Maximus’ outlook is in communion with and participates in the same deifying life of God.  As 
we have outlined in our last chapter, every Christian, clergy and laity alike, are active 
participants in the Eucharistic reciprocity that is the individual’s dialogue with God as well as the 
                                                          
26 Gaillardetz, "Lay-Clergy Distinction," 18. 
27 Doohan, "The Lay-Centered Church," 23. 
28 Doohan, "The Lay-Centered Church," 23. 
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core of ecclesial identity.  The participative communion that forms the basis of this reciprocity, 
culminated in liturgical action, is always an active participation.  Maximus describes the 
eschaton as a continuation of this activity.  The liturgical offering of creation to God does not 
come to a final resolution but is transposed into the eternal communion with God: ever-moving-
repose.    
 Doohan had considered a view similar to Maximus’ in the overview of lay theology at the 
outset of The Lay Centered Church.  While he lauded attempts to reframe the life of the laity as 
an engagement with the world founded on the value of creation, he thought that the position 
would be incomprehensible to the vast majority of the faithful:  
A basic problem in this theology of laity is that it demands a radical conversion in the 
way one understands the essential contribution of earthly life to salvation.  Many people 
find it difficult even to admit the need for such conversion, for “that the earthly and 
heavenly city penetrate each other is a fact accessible to faith alone.”29 
 
Though Doohan does not reject this mode of thinking outright, he leaves it undeveloped in favor 
of the ecclesiocentric “laity as Church” model he pursues throughout the rest of the work. 
 The difficulty noted by Doohan contains within it a kernel of argument that finds its 
realization in the secular/sacred dichotomy.30 Recall that the line of argument expands the 
lay/clergy distinction to their relevant spheres of secular/sacred which imply that there must be a 
similar line of demarcation between the world and God.  The parallels between these 
dichotomies are clear but we must ask whether affirming one necessarily brings about the others.  
This is important because over the course of the fifty years that followed the council the 
literature on the laity attempted to undo these contrastive pairs.  The argument tends to flow both 
ways: recognizing God’s presence in the world does away with the conceptual notion of separate 
                                                          
29 Doohan, The Lay-Centered Church, 15. 
30 Doohan himself names this a superficial distinction between ‘priest/sacred’ and ‘lay/temporal’.” Doohan, The 
Lay-Centered Church, 212. 
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sacred and secular realities which makes the distinction between laity and clergy moot.  This 
would include exercise of sacra potestas which is always referred to in a divisive manner.  The 
development of the argument in ecclesiological spheres often follows an inverse order: all of the 
baptized are equal meaning that there should be no distinction between laity and clergy, there can 
be then no demarcation between sacred and secular activity which means that one cannot 
distinguish between God’s presence and the world.  The result is always a doing away of 
distinction in order to avoid separation. 
 For Doohan this means moving beyond the notion of laity as a distinct set of the faithful 
since the laity act as Church.   Gaillardetz’s point of departure is not the work of the clergy but 
the so-called secular character of the laity, writing that the identification of lay action with action 
in the world creates disparity with the clergy who are concerned with the sacred.31 Claiming the 
laity work in the world implies that they do not work in the sacred which demeans their 
baptismal dignity.  The same dynamic leads O’Meara to rid his ecclesiological view of sacral, 
priestly language and replace it with the non-dichotic vocabulary of mission, service, and 
relationship.  This lens is placed in juxtaposition with mediation: “Ministry approaches the reign 
of God not as high priest or banker but as servant.”32 The dichotomy of world/God is directly 
related to this.  The efficacy of individual sacraments, the work of the clergy/hierarchy, are 
overshadowed now by the sacramental nature of the world qua Rahner’s circles of grace.33  The 
clergy are not proprietors of graced reality because reality — the Church as sacrament in 
particular and the world as creation — is already graced.  
                                                          
31 Gaillardetz, "Lay-Clergy Distinction," 10. 
32 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 227. 
33 O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 2. 
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 Lakeland plays these arguments out to their logical conclusion.  In The Liberation of the 
Laity, Lakeland assumes this post-conciliar theological shift, that nature is already graced, as his 
point of departure.34 This radically reconfigures the mission of the Church and his conception of 
ecclesiology: the means and goal are already embedded within creation and God’s mission for 
humanity consists in “the humanization of the world.”35 Lakeland’s view is simultaneously a 
playing out of and a reaction to the authors that came before him.  If the post-Vatican II literature 
solves the dichotomy of the secular/sacred by overemphasizing intra-ecclesial activity, making 
everything ecclesial-sacred activity, Lakeland solves it by highlighting the secular, making every 
action a secular one. 
 This begets a self-contained vision of creation which would be violated by mediatory 
activity.  Indeed, Lakeland’s view of priesthood and mediation is one in which the priest (in all 
senses of the term) “ferries back and forth between God and the world.”36 A world that is self-
contained, “self-sufficient,” is in no need of mediation since there is nothing to be added. “The 
secularity of the world is the divine plan.”37 To admit such a mediation would be to denigrate the 
status of the self-sufficient secular into one of dependency.  Lakeland admits that the world is 
dependent on God as its cause and architect but reminds us that God abides in the world in a 
graced way.  The graced status of the world is constitutive of its self-sufficiency and allows it, 
for Lakeland, to be self-referential.  To fulfill human nature is then not a seeking of something 
that is outside of the world, for in this there would be a regression to the sacred/secular, 
world/God dichotomy.  Instead, the mission is one of free action and human promotion.  This 
action is good in and of itself as part of the secular, graced world.  Lakeland asserts that these 
                                                          
34 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 151. 
35 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 151.   
36 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 91. 
37 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 173. 
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actions should be self-referential only.  Any reasoning or reduction of these actions to an exterior 
referent would do violence to them, it would “compromise its graced character in the name of 
something supposedly more fundamental.”38  
 In seeking a solution to the secular/sacred dichotomy, Lakeland has traced a cosmology 
that shares many characteristics with the maximian view.  First, both affirm God’s presence is 
within all of creation in a way that allows it to fulfill its very nature.  God’s presence is 
embedded within creation, for Maximus as the logoi and for Lakeland as the grounding of 
graced-created reality.  Both champion freedom of human action.  Freedom is an extraordinary 
good intended by God in the order of creation, it should be valued and fostered.  Lakeland’s 
liberation of the secular world is an affirmation of this freedom while Maximus sees in this 
freedom the very image of God.  The world, creation (in Lakeland’s terms, the “secular”) is good 
in its own right.  In Maximus, it is a gift from God that should become the subject of freedom. 
 This point of convergence is where their cosmologies part ways.  Lakeland’s view holds 
that there is no reason “behind” the secular, that secular reality is the reason.  For Maximus the 
Logos is always present within creation as the logoi.  God is not simply “behind” creation, for 
the Confessor God stands before creation as its eschatological goal. 
 Lakeland’s description of the secular would be virtually the same as Maximus’ if we strip 
the Confessor’s view of dialogic reciprocity.  God creates the cosmos as good and humanity with 
the good nature, logoi, embedded in them to be acted upon freely.  In this portrait there is no 
continued relationship.  God simply abides.  This is not a cold deism, but a lukewarm affirmation 
of humanity’s affairs deprived of further aspiration. 
                                                          
38 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 154. 
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 Eschatological vision is driven from Lakeland’s cosmology because it makes the world 
about something other than the world.  This is done to protect the world from being cut up into 
two distinct spheres: the secular and the sacred.  To say that the world has a further goal is to 
admit this separation from God which is, for Lakeland, the root of hatred for the world.39  
 maximian thought provides us with an alternative to this view.  The Confessor dealt with 
the world/God dichotomy by transcending it.  As we have seen, the doctrine of the logoi allows 
Maximus to affirm the goodness of creation in a radical way while setting it firmly on the path of 
eschatological fulfillment.  The Confessor’s cosmology was forged as a response to Origenism.  
It is a protection against a negative view of the world seen as a punishment or a corruption of 
God’s plan while at the same time maintaining a clear distinction between God and the world.  In 
Maximus’ view, the world participates in God by its very creation in the logoi.  This logic trends 
toward a unity-in-distinction that requires us to constantly hold in tension the distinction between 
God and the world while affirming God’s presence to each individual being and the whole of 
created being through the logoi.  This distinction is the apophatic foundation of Maximus’ 
thought: the distinction between God and the world becomes the guarantee that all of creation 
can participate in a dialogue between God and the world. 
 Mediation takes on a different meaning in this context.  It is not needed to uphold the 
goodness of creation.  The ontological divide between God and the world is not a chasm of 
goodness but of finite versus infinite being.  The contingent nature of the world, which is an 
affirmation of God’s creation of the world in freedom, does not devalue creation but allows God 
to perpetually uphold its goodness through participation in the divine.  The task of mediation is 
                                                          
39 Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 154. 
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not a bestowal of goodness onto creation but a crossing of this ontological divide via relationship 
in a manner that does not cancel out the autonomy of the world or any of its inhabitants. 
 Dialogic reciprocity encapsulates the maximian alternative.  The eucharistic exchange of 
gifts in charity does no violence to nature or claim that the world need be hated or done away 
with.  On the contrary, the dynamic of exchange and mediation in Maximus takes the form of a 
constant relationship that uplifts creation toward its eschatological fulfillment which is eternal 
well-being with God.  Conversion in the maximian schema does not leave the world behind in 
favor of God nor does it insinuate that the world is lacking something that is proper to it.  
maximian deification does not make mediation as a means to an end but recognizes this active 
exchange as constitutive of communion with God.  Mediation does not bring something into 
creation that is not already there.  It allows creation to be creation in all of its goodness.  What is 
changed in Maximus’ schema is the mode, the way of being creation.  The introduction of the 
divine tropos into creation allows creatures to act freely not in isolation or as passive recipients 
but in participative eucharistic communion that is the very act of deification. 
 
II. Vatican II’s Description of the Lay Vocation and Maximus 
 Up to this point we have reflected on the post-conciliar developments of the role of the 
laity, specifically the possibility that Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity leads to a series of 
harmful dichotomies.  Maximus’ theological vision provides a way to transcend these 
dichotomies with his characteristic Chalcedonian logic.  This logic emphasizes unity based upon 
distinction based in relationship.  At its center is the vision of Eucharistic reciprocity. 
 We turn now to the conciliar texts and the subsequent interpretations of them by the 
magisterium.  Our aim will be a dialogue between the maximian system and these sources.  
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Maximus’ nuanced system of theology helps to clarify the vision of the council and stands as a 
solid foundation from which it can be interpreted. 
 In the first chapter of this work, I outlined the council’s teaching on the Church as a 
unified structure of three distinct groups of members: the clergy, religious, and the laity.  All 
together these make up the collective faithful of the Church or in the phrase most used by the 
document to describe the Church “the People of God.”40 The document is intentionally 
structured in a way that emphasizes this unity.  There is not a diversity of missions but all 
participate in the one mission of the Church.  The mission is one of unity through the Spirit that 
works in every member of the People of God.41 This view is groundbreaking in its recognition of 
the laity as sharers in this mission and not mere instruments of the hierarchy. 
 Lumen Gentium, later affirmed by both Apostolicum Actualisitatem and Gaudium et Spes, 
describes the laity by their activity within the world as the norm of their identity and mission.  
The special task of the laity is “to order and to throw light upon these affairs in such a way that 
they may come into being and then continually increase according to Christ to the praise of the 
Creator and the Redeemer.”42 Constitutive of this task are the daily lives of the laity and their 
participation in temporal affairs.  Though the document describes this work as being done in a 
spirit of witness, it has a value in and of itself as an ordering of the world to God.43 This work is 
an expression of the laity’s share in the office of priesthood.  The secular activity of the laity is 
united to the one offering of the Church which culminates in the celebration of the Eucharist.44 
In this very act the laity are said to “consecrate the world itself to God.”45  
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 Two of the most often critiqued aspects on the council’s description of the laity are 
present here.  First, though the conciliar fathers made an explicit effort to avoid a stratification of 
roles within the Church, as we described in chapter one, this is exactly how some received the 
description of the three states.  Similarly, the description of lay activity as secular with the 
purpose of consecrating the world to God led to the prevailing critique that the council was 
making an attempt at delineating clear and separate spheres of activity for the clergy and laity.  
This interpretation took hold despite the conciliar text explicitly rejecting the separation of these 
spheres.46 The post-conciliar literature is proof enough that the documents leave themselves open 
to such an interpretation even if the source of this interpretation is the lived experience of Church 
members during the post-conciliar period and not the documents themselves. 
 We explored the response of the magisterial school to these developments in John Paul 
II’s Christifideles Laici.  This post-synodal exhortation did not grant the theological grounding 
asked for by the fathers of the synod but was a reiteration of the teachings of LG along with 
correctives and further clarifications about the proper roles belonging to the laity within the 
Church.  There is a distinct focus on complementarity within the document, underscoring the 
unity of action described in LG.  John Paul II cautions against confusing these roles since doing 
so would break down this complementarity.47 Following this line of thought, the Pope draws a 
sharper distinction between the work of lay persons in the Church and the ordained, noting that 
their priesthood differs “not simply in degree but in essence.”48 Though John Paul II explains 
that this is ultimately for the sake of unity and complementarity among the Body, it is not 
difficult to see how it could be received as a further distinction between secular and sacred 
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spheres of activity. Though complementarity is the theme, the focus is a reiteration of the proper 
ordering of offices and roles within the Church. 
 It could be argued that the refrain of complementarity agrees with the maximian portrayal 
of the apophatic expression of the one charism in the many activities of the Church even though 
the topic of the Church’s one charism is not clearly treated within the text.  To further facilitate 
the application of Maximus’ thought we can draw a parallel between CL and Dionysius’ 
Ecclesial Hierarchy: both are primarily concerned with the right organization of the Church.  
Due to the centrality of this issue, each work lends itself to the interpretation that their goal is to 
uphold separations.  In turn, they could both be accused of drawing sharp dichotomies where 
there should be only be distinction.  In the case of CL, the desire for a definitive theological 
definition is neglected by a pressing concern for order in response to specific situations.  Any 
deeper grounding based upon complementarity and a vision of the Church acting as a whole is 
eclipsed by the attention paid to basic questions about ecclesiological roles and functions. 
 This parallel lends itself to an application of Maximus’ wider ecclesiological vision 
similar to how the Confessor deemphasized the structural imagery found in Dionysius.  Because 
Maximus does not share this structural concern, I propose that viewing the conciliar descriptions 
of the laity through the maximian lens developed in chapters two and three provides the deep 
theological grounding desired by the bishops who attended the synod on the laity.  Here we are 
less concerned with a detailed mapping of ecclesial roles and more interested in providing a 
theological context for lay activity.  
We should be clear here that there are no direct references to Maximus in the Vatican II 
documents nor that we would be able to derive the conciliar description of the laity from the 
works of the sixth century monk and mystic.  It goes without saying, then, that this is not an 
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argument for the proper interpretation of the council as though the thought of Maximus were 
linked to it as a source or stands as the ultimate authority behind its validity.  Neither should this 
be taken as a reproof of the conciliar texts.  The scope of these documents, even on such specific 
topics as the laity or the mission of the Church are far too wide to contain all of the detail 
necessary to provide a thorough account of the underlying theologies.  We should expect that the 
documents are themselves embedded within the larger tradition of the Church. 
With this in mind, the task we mean to accomplish is a contextualizing of this description 
of the laity in a way that grounds it in the Confessor’s profound vision of the cosmos.  As we 
have seen, the maximian vision resists the temptation to dichotomize distinctions into 
differences.  The post-conciliar literature was prudent in pointing out the possibilities and 
eventualities involved in a dichotomous interpretation.  Reinterpreting the conciliar text within 
the framework of cosmos and mediation outlined in the previous chapters helps us to navigate 
beyond the dichotomies that threaten the underlying message of ecclesial unity found in the 
conciliar documents.  The maximian lens will bring into sharper relief the task of the laity and 
expand upon it so that it is not susceptible to accusations that it is too vague an enterprise to 
carry out.49  
 In the first chapter, we noted that the documents outlining lay activity in the world often 
viewed the world in a variety of ways.  These spanned a gamut of definitions from one of 
alienation wherein the world was seen as opposed to the Church’s mission to the neutral setting 
in which the affairs of human life transpire in the secular as the subject of God’s plan.  Each of 
these plays a part within the maximian framework of God’s presence in the world through the 
logoi.  Though we can say with surety that the creation of the world in and through the Logos 
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and the abiding presence of the logoi make the whole of creation enduringly good we can see 
room for where the negative description of the world could be used in a maximian context.  The 
world as opposed to God’s plan only exists where it has cast off its underlying identity and 
trajectory.   The world as created is always good but if, through the free choice of seeking to 
subvert the abiding logoi in resisting its nature, even this good creation can reject God’s plan.  
The rejection of the embedded logos of a particular being threatens it with non-being.  
Attempting to replace the logos destroys that being.50 This means that the ecclesial mission to the 
world is not one that is against creation but is ever for creation.  If ever Maximus were to speak 
of creation opposed to the plan of God it is only in the context of inviting creation to return to 
natural action according to the logoi. 
 The same participation in the logoi plays out as a rejection of the world as a so-called 
neutral sphere of activity.  Yes, choices can be made in which the logoi are lived out or resisted 
but ultimately the nature of the world points toward its source in the one Logos.  Maximus’ 
theological vision is the concrete affirmation of the third view of the world listed here: it stands 
as the ultimate subject of God’s plan.  This view is consummately expressed in the now familiar 
description of the divine desire: “the Logos of God (who is God) wills always and in all things to 
accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.”51 The mission of the Church is soteriological but 
also eschatological, transcending the very notion of bringing about healing to a prior state of 
goodness.  The work of redemption is inseparable from the work of deification.  The affirmation 
of the good world is not negated in the activity of the Church or its members but is ultimately the 
proper end of the indwelling logoi.  Thus, we can only admit an understanding of the “secular” 
within Maximus that is inscribed with this ultimate eschatological end.  This is not limited to 
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actions, situations, or spheres that have an express ecclesiological or sacral meaning.  It would be 
fitting to stress the presence of the logoi in the particularized obscurity of mundane situations 
and activities.  Here we find tremendous overlap of Maximus’ thought and what is described as 
secular: the “ordinary married and family life, their daily occupations, their physical and mental 
relaxation ... and even the hardships of life...”52 Every facet of creation and activity is an 
encounter and potential moment in this process of deification. 
 A crucial point for correctly representing the maximian dynamic is to hold in tension the 
ontological difference between God and the world without setting up a God/world dichotomy.  
We discussed above how this ontological distance is rooted in the Confessor’s mystical theology.  
This in no way sets up a competition between God and the world such that where God is the 
world is not or vice-versa.  On the contrary, the ontological distance allows for God to both 
transcend of all creation and be intimately present to all of creation in the logoi.  Ontological 
distance in Maximus’ schema facilitates the communion between God and the world.  Creatures 
always remain ontologically creature but through communion with God act in a new mode.  The 
distinction between logos and tropos enables Maximus to describe how created realities are 
transformed in their mode of activity while retaining their own logoi/nature.  The preservation of 
their nature allows created beings to enjoy participative communion with God.  A theology that 
admitted the breakdown of the distinction between God and the world would be one in which the 
communion would last for a finite interval.  Alternative models of divinization would see the 
absorption or annihilation of creation as part of this process.  Not so for Maximus.  The 
definition of communion and divinization for the Confessor is a thoroughly Chalcedonian one 
that it is without confusion, without separation, without change, and without division.  Modeled 
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after the hypostatic union, the eternal exchange between persons does not allow the dialogue of 
God and creation to break down into a divine monologue. 
 Ontological distance as facilitator of communion means that tasks and beings in the 
world are distinct but not separate from God.  The logic of the tasks and actions remain the same 
when transformed into divine activity through their change in tropos.  The world and the actions 
that take place within it never cease being secular in the sense that their subject and practical 
activity appear the same as actions that are non-deified.  The baker, the businessperson, the truck 
driver, the artist, and parent all perform the same activity but in a new mode.  Maximus’ 
theological vision of the logoi acknowledges God’s presence already in these tasks in a non-
competitive manner.  Yet the eschatological invitation to deification allows this activity to 
become divine activity.  The important point for us at this juncture is that the world and the tasks 
within it, though transformed in tropos, still function and retain the identity as created.  The 
ontological distinction and distance do not create a stumbling block for this communion.  
Distinction is the guarantor of communion. 
 The maximian theology of the cosmos offers us an important interpretive lens for our 
engagement with the Vatican II text.  It singles out a definitive description of the world as the 
subject of God’s plan which in its deepest identity can in no way play the part of an antagonist in 
a drama that pits God against the world.  Neither is the world a mere blank slate, a neutral 
ground for action.  Even so, the world is ever distinct from God.  Encompassing all of creation, it 
remains distinct and avoids dialectic absorption or annihilation by the divine in favor of 
remaining a dialogic partner with God.  We have seen Maximus express this on a macro-level.  
He uses the image of a single human person in worship to describe the whole world.  He uses the 
cosmos in a way that it is interchangeable with the Church in its role in eucharistic dialogic 
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reciprocity.  This does not mean that the individual is forgotten.  In characteristic maximian 
fashion, the Confessor retains the individuality of every distinct person, forbidding us to lose 
sight of them in light of the vastness of creation.  As we have seen the macro-dynamic of 
dialogue is based upon the micro-dialogues between God and individuals. 
 Grounding the interpretation of Vatican II in maximian thought also assists us in a 
descriptive manner.  The understanding that it is the tropos of activity that changes and not the 
type of activity affirms the wide scope of human action present within the laity.  Maximus 
describes this diversity in his ecclesiological reflection:  
 
For numerous and almost infinite number are the men, women and children who are 
distinct from one another and vastly different by birth appearance, by nationality and 
language, by customs and age, by opinions and skills, by manners and habits by pursuits 
and studies and still again by reputation, fortune, characteristics and connections. All are 
born into the Church and through her are reborn and recreated in the Spirit. To all in 
equal measure she gives and bestows one divine form and designation, to be Christ’s and 
to carry his name.53  
 
The many members who bear the divine name share in the same divinized tropos but through 
their own logoi.  The diversity in action does not negate a share in the one divine activity.  
Maximus is not scandalized that these differences perdure in the midst of the deifying Church 
but rather relishes the variety of expressions in the Spirit. 
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Within this diversity, the council recognizes distinction.  How does the lay/clergy 
distinction appear through our maximian lens? The relationship between laity and clergy is 
spelled out in LG 32.  This passage identifies the clergy in a way that is consonant with 
maximian thought: they are “dispensers of mysteries on behalf of others.”54 A performative 
example of this can be found in the Mystagogy.  Beginning with the reading of the Gospel, 
Maximus identifies the priest with “the spiritual Word of contemplation.”55 The procession of 
the priest toward the people with the Gospel is an image of the Incarnation the Word “coming 
from heaven to dwell with his people.” The Confessor so closely identifies the priest with the 
Word that the text no longer makes mention of the priest as an individual but recounts all of the 
ritual actions undertaken by the priest as actions of the Word.  This continues throughout the 
most profound moments of the Divine Liturgy, the revelation of the mysteries, the chanting of 
the Trisagion, through the conclusion of the Liturgy in the singing of “One is Holy.” In all these 
things, the priest acts as the Word, undifferentiated by Maximus as the agent who leads the 
faithful to deification through participation.  As with the discussion of Dionysian mediation 
above, understanding the role of the clergy as primarily initiators into the mystery of Christ does 
not place them in a persistent power dynamic.  Even in their mediatory role, the clergy’s share in 
Christ is a participative share that can be relinquished, as we shall explore below. 
 In this same passage of LG, the clergy are given the task of “teaching ... sanctifying ... 
ruling.” This final task has no maximian parallel, making it difficult to understand the concept of 
“ruling with the authority of Christ” within the maximian framework.  In the context of LG, 
ruling is always connected to the visible structure of the Church which requires some form of 
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practical governance.56 Governance is understood as the facilitating of growth in Christ in a way 
that is consistent with the role of clergy, especially bishops, named by Hahnenberg.  They are the 
sign of unity for Christian community and foster the growth and exercise of the charisms.  LG 
likens the role of governance to that of a father and shepherd who is always prepared to lay down 
his life for those under his care.57  
 In their role as the visible rulers of the Church, the clergy are not the source or ultimate 
authority.  As with Maximus’ understanding of mediation being a participative union in Christ so 
LG describes the mode of governance exercised by the clergy.  Though they are “ruled by human 
shepherds; are nevertheless continuously led and nourished by Christ Himself.”58 Drawing a 
parallel between the maximian understanding of mediation allows us to frame governance as 
something other than a claim to power or the establishment of ruling clerics who oppress the 
majority of the faithful.  Governance that is understood as a theandric task that is only properly 
exercised legitimately if it has a share in the participative union with Christ would deprive the 
clergy of an objective claim to authority.  Maximus’ relationship with eastern and western 
ecclesial authority is a narrative example of this dynamic in action.  
During his final years, the height of the monothelite controversy, Maximus proffered his 
obedience to Pope Martin I and his predecessor Theodore I over the eastern patriarchate not as a 
statement about papal primacy but based upon Christological orthodoxy.  The account of the 
Confessor’s trial demonstrates that ecclesial communion and authority was one of his 
prosecutors’ primary concerns.  They asked Maximus to accept their Christological definitions 
not out of a concern for right-belief but due to concerns over ecclesial communion, berating the 
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Confessor as a stumbling block to that unity.59 The prosecutors’ plea with Maximus continues 
until it reaches a crescendo: “Why do you love the Romans and hate the Greeks?” They ask, to 
which Maximus responds: “We have a precept which says not to hate anyone.  I love the Romans 
as those who share the same faith, and the Greeks as sharing the same language.”60 With this 
final rejection of communion with the east, Maximus sealed his ecclesiological allegiance as well 
as his fate as a confessor. 
Maximus did not tacitly accept the doctrinal authority of the eastern clergy, he recognized 
their error.  Christological orthodoxy was the rule by which he judged ecclesial communion.  In 
turn we could conclude that this communion affects his view of ecclesial authority.  The eastern 
patriarchs and clergy did not possess this authority ex officio but due to their communion with 
the reality from which that authority flowed. 
Just as the laity have so long been deemed “sharers” in the mission and work of the 
apostolic Church which had been previously seen as the proper role of the hierarchy, here the 
hierarchy itself becomes a “sharer” in the governance of Christ insofar as they themselves have 
been drawn into divine life.  We could illuminate this concept further by offering the negation of 
LG 6: If Christ is no longer the one who is continuously nourishing and leading the laity in the 
actions of the clergy, the human shepherds have no claim to authority.61  
 The document concludes the description of the lay/clergy relationship by quoting St. 
Augustine of Hippo: “What I am for you terrifies me; what I am with you consoles me. For you I 
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impossible.  See Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 55. 
 
 226 
am a bishop; with you I am a Christian.62 This indicates not only what is the cause of 
Augustine’s trepidation - the role of the Bishop - but what he and all clergy share in common 
with the laity, their role as Christians.  As the following section 33 unfolds we are ready to affirm 
something that is implicit within Maximus’ schema.  In their participation in Christian life, the 
laity do not so much share a task that is exclusive to their state as much as they carry out the task 
of the one Church in a distinctive place and manner.  This constitutes the laity’s proper role in 
the apostolate.  Their own work is a participation in Christ since they “expend all their energy for 
the growth of the Church and its continuous sanctification, since this very energy is a gift of the 
Creator and a blessing of the Redeemer.63 This mission is specifically to “make the Church 
present and operative in those places and circumstances where only through them can it become 
the salt the earth.”64 Once again, the task itself is not a separate one, it is rather the individuated 
expression and the location in this time, in this place that make up the laity’s irreplaceable 
contribution.  A multiplication of the clergy would not be fit to execute the task of the laity. The 
laity do not simply make up for what is lacking in clerical number, effort, or ability. Following 
the doctrine of the logoi, each member of the faithful has at the center of their life an exclusive 
micro-dialogue that they alone can carry out in the unique milieu they occupy. 
 Maximus’ theology can serve as an interpretive key for understanding the laity’s place in 
LG 34’s consummate image of the lay priesthood: consecrating the world itself to God.   
For all their works, prayers and apostolic endeavors, their ordinary married and family 
life, their daily occupations, their physical and mental relaxation, if carried out in the 
Spirit, and even the hardships of life, if patiently borne—all these become ‘spiritual 
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sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ’. Together with the offering of the 
Lord's body, they are most fittingly offered in the celebration of the Eucharist. Thus, as 
those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity consecrate the world itself to 
God.65  
 
The following points represent a maximian re-imaging of Vatican II’s theology of the laity. 
  
A. The World Constitutes a Eucharistic Gift 
 First, our discussion of world consecration must happen with the understanding that the 
act implies in no way that mediation somehow devalues the world.  Consecration in maximian 
terms does not mean introducing a commodity into the world that it was somehow previously 
lacking.  We find in both the Vatican II documents and Maximus’ cosmology an emphasis on 
gathering creation as an offering to be united to the action of the Church. 
 This text evokes the dynamic of eucharistic reciprocity.  We can link the text thematically 
to Maximus’ thought in the shared concept of gathering up all of human activity throughout 
creation, uniting it to the cosmic liturgy as a eucharistic consecration.  The eucharistic nature of 
this consecration further distinguishes it from a view of mediation that acts as a sort of 
commerce, a trade, or a ferrying of some commodity of grace or ontological being between God 
and created beings.  Eucharistic action as a rule stems from the free act of thanksgiving and self-
offering to the other.  The unitive aspect of Maximus’ approach undergirds this: the one 
consecrating in a eucharistic manner gathers up all the various aspects of life as constitutive of 
themselves as an offering.  For the Confessor, the human vocation of mediation is not a task that 
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happens exterior to the person and the deifying communion with God as though it were clear and 
distinct offerings of separated realities.  Far from a task that casts aside the material for the 
spiritual, the action of eucharistic offering takes place in a thoroughly incarnated, embodied 
reality.  The personal gift offered by humanity cannot be decontextualized from the particularity 
of an individual person.  Apart from the variety of mundane phenomena that sample human 
experience in LG 34 there would be nothing for humanity to offer. 
 To further clarify this in a maximian framework, the gifts that are gathered, united to the 
human person, and offered to God do not happen with the world as a so-called neutral backdrop.  
The gifts gathered and eucharistically offered are the embedded logoi which are inseparable from 
the particular beings that they abide within.  Dialogue as a eucharistic exchange of gifts is 
constituted by the offering of logoi presented from the creature to God now with a tropos of gift.  
Therefore, the dialogic reciprocity can be in no way extracted from creation in an ideal, 
uncreated manner.  To be within this reciprocal dynamic means conversing in the key of logoi 
which necessarily includes the consecration of created realities to God.  To sum up this point, 
dialogic reciprocity of the laity does not happen in the midst of the world as some backdrop, it 
happens in the world because it is the world itself as constitutive of experiences, relationship and 
reality that is offered back to God.  It is with this world that humanity acts eucharistically and by 
means of the world as created reality that thanksgiving is offered. 
 
B. “Secular Character” As Descriptive of Micro-Dialogue 
 In this context we are describing in dialogic reciprocity is the underlying action of all 
Christians.  Maximus tends toward describing Christian action as a unity.  Acknowledging a 
“secular character” for the laity that uniquely differentiates this activity from that of the clergy 
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may not be consistent with his thought.  As we have seen, the hierarchical priesthood occupies a 
specific place in Maximus’ thought but even the basis of their activity is described within this 
eucharistic framework.  In fact, it provides the model for the rest of human activity.  We can 
return to a point made in the analysis of LG’s claims about lay activity: The emphasis of the 
document does not set up different spheres but grants individuals with a specific orientation of 
mission.  The activity of eucharistic offering is held in common by the whole of the Church.  
Maximus’ vision for the Christian life as an individuated participation in the cosmic liturgy 
reflects this dynamic. 
In Maximus we find no affirmation of a task that belongs to the laity alone. There is, 
however, the remains of a definition of the laity in a “negative” manner of those who are not 
ordained.  Yet this is not the return to a dynamic in which the lay life is somehow lessened or 
devalued by the lack of an exclusive task.  The action of the hierarchy serves the Christian 
mission, the lay mission to embody God through the logoi.  While the hierarchy participates in 
the totality of the shared mission, their activity as mystagogues or the exercise of sacra potestas 
is not done for its own sake but as an integrated part of the greater work of God’s embodiment.  
This is an important change in ecclesiological perspective since it is not an inclusion in some 
alien mission being offered by the hierarchy. 
 The “secular character” would not connote a specifically lay set of actions but is used to 
describe the expansive, extra-ecclesial location of that activity in lay life. Secular character still 
communicates something special about the lay faithful: theirs is to execute the mission of God’s 
embodiment in themselves and the particular facet of the cosmos that they alone can address.  
The deemphasis of secular action in favor of a concentration on interior ecclesial works can lead 
to a state in which the reality which the secular character describes is left unaccomplished and 
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the vast majority of human activity seen as irrelevant to the mission of the Church.  As a 
maximian adaption, we can see mundane human activity as individual instances of micro-
dialogue.  Though the range of human activity is diverse they participate in a common end often 
obscured in particularity.  Taking time to map out a role or theology for the graphic artist, the 
accountant, the philologist, or the botanist would both grant us too wide a set of experiences and 
one that is too narrow.  The dialogue happens embedded within the world and as between the 
human and the divine on both an individual and collective level.  We cannot here discount the 
cognitive dissonance noted by Doohan.  Tasks in the world tend to be dissociated with ecclesial 
activity.  A description of the laity should not seek to deepen this perceived rift but show how 
this is an unnecessary exclusion.  The secular character, then, can be interpreted as a shorthand 
for individual micro-dialogues as a reminder that these are constitutive of an individual vocation, 
a mission to the world.  
 
C. Humanity’s Gift Expressed in Freedom 
 An invaluable facet of Maximus’ thought is the championing and description of freedom.  
We have seen that for Maximus, the world is created from nothing and given by God out of 
freedom.  Human response, a mirroring of divine freedom, can reach its divine potential by 
offering those same freely created realities back to God in conversion.  A maximian 
understanding of the consecration of the world to God removes any temptation to view this 
return as a fated reditus caused and guaranteed by forces of necessity.  The notion of a necessary 
return to God is a violation of freedom and threatens to depersonalize humanity into cogs in a 
divinely arranged machina.  A formulation based on necessity would destroy dialogue and break 
down the communion between persons. 
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 Such a remission of freedom is impossible for Maximus who sees free will as a primary 
way in which humanity images God.  The Confessor guards this freedom in his eschatological 
formulation of the dynamic.  God does not impose forces of necessity upon creation but invites it 
to free response.  The converse of this would be a graced-forcing of creation to unfold in a 
certain manner bereft of freedom. 
 Applied to the life of the laity, the preservation of human freedom is invaluable to a 
description of the diversity of lay action.  If God’s plan is a free dialogue and not one of 
monolithic necessity, the variety of human responses can be understood positively.  As we 
discussed in chapter two, the logoi as expressions of God’s wills create a space for a multitude of 
free human responses.  This has two direct consequences: first, it reframes our understanding of 
vocation and second it underscores our inability to evaluate how those around us respond to their 
own micro-dialogue with God. 
 Within the maximian model, contemplating one’s vocation contains something of the 
“interior dimension” of pre-Vatican II vocational theologies described by Hahnenberg.66 
Maximus affirms a fundamental nature and ordering of the life of the individual as a plan by God 
by acknowledging the logoi.  The revelatory elements do not take the character of an ossified 
“will of God” in one’s life but form that basis of the dialogic relationship.  Recall that for 
Maximus the logoi that could be interpreted as God’s plan for the individual and the cosmos is 
contemplated by God as containing each possibility of one’s response to that logoi.  Within this 
milieu of change, the stream of dialogue, the manifestation of individual logoi may contain 
differing possibilities over the course of one’s life, these logoi penetrate “both our present and 
future life, as if they were different generations…”67 While holding in tension the human 
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person’s constant ability to live in a manner that rejects the logoi, we affirm that living one’s 
vocation is not within this model a simple discovering of what one ought to do and sticking with 
it. Living out one’s vocation is a continued dynamic of relationship, the living of that 
relationship within the same participative communion of deification. 
Even in cases where we have developed discernment in our own manifestation of 
dialogic reciprocity, we would expect that the result of the micro-dialogue between God and our 
neighbor would be different. These differences would not immediately ascribe moral value to 
one response over the other since they are responses to different individuations of the logoi. 
 Here we are reminded of the apophatic nature of dialogic reciprocity: inasmuch as the 
dialogue is between God and the individual, it is an exclusive dialogue. As such, it requires that 
the response come from the individual involved in that specific dialogue.  Acknowledging this 
necessitates a space of freedom for that dialogue to take place.  There can be no sense in which 
responses could be constructed by someone outside of that dialogue or foisted upon the dialogic 
participant by an outside authority.   
 This emphasis on freedom proffers an ecclesiological model that is radically different 
from the pre-Vatican II caricature of a laity whose task is but to "pray, pay, and obey."  The 
clergy should never seek to short-circuit this dialogue but to ever form, invite and exhort 
Christians to participative communion in God.  The shared state of all Christians as participants 
in their own logoic dialogue with God should create a foundational empathy.  In no way can the 
role of the laity, or any Christian, be subsumed into mere obedience or passivity.  The action of 
every Christian must attain to the maturity Gerard Philips uses to describe well-equipped laity: 
they must have "accurate judgment, inventive spirit and creative imagination."68  
                                                          
68 Philips, The Role of the Laity, 144. 
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 This bespeaks an individual genius of particularity.  Without being able to draw 
conclusions as to the correct response in all possible instantiations of the logoi we must affirm 
that the one who is capable of giving that correct response is always the dialogic participant and 
none other.  As such their freedom must be respected. In no way does the allowance for this 
freedom connote an inability to name immoral action or responses that are contrary to the logoi 
writ large.  What we are concerned with here is the myriad of creative responses made possible 
within the relationship of whom the only proper executor is the individual participant in 
dialogue. 
 The value of freedom also yields an eternal meaning to individual human action.  This is 
similarly rooted in the nature of creation as freely created by God.  God hands over creation in a 
way that relinquishes claims on ownership.  The dynamic Maximus describes for the return of 
creation to God is incumbent upon free action that changes not the nature, the logoi, of creation 
but the mode of creation in free human response.  God then receives the gift back in the manner 
it has been offered by the created agent. 
During the dialogic exchange the logoi constitutive of the gift remain intact but the 
trajectory changes due to the novel tropos applied to it by the creative response of the creature.  
The particularity of the response is characterized by two radical elements of individuation: the 
particularity of the logoi and the particularity of the response to those unique logoi.  That this 
dynamic has at its core the return of the logoi embedded within every facet of the cosmos has 
inestimable consequences for lay or “secular” activity.  The ubiquitous nature of the logoi 
forbids us from dismissing any authentically human act of freedom as irrelevant to the church’s 
life and mission.  The decision for or against converting the logoi in a manner that returns them 
to God is a decision with eternal ramifications in every circumstance.  As they return to God, the 
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logoi carry with them the inventive effects of human freedom. In a sense, God allows humanity 
to have a share in the ultimate direction and meaning of creation.  While never losing sight of the 
communal unity in eschatological fulfillment we acknowledge that the most minute or interior 
movements of human freedom carry an eternal relevance.  God’s reception of tropologically 
deified creation is an eternal acknowledgement of human action.   
 
D. World Consecration as Participative Communion 
 Contextualizing the consecration of the world within the maximian eucharistic 
framework rejects the exercise of dialectic for the sake of an outcome in favor of dialogue.  A 
dialectic approach may follow a logic of God being combined with what is not God resulting in 
some new synthesis.  Reviewing Maximus’ comments on theandric activity we can see that this 
is not his aim.  Maximus is interested in a new activity that does not mix natures but preserves 
them in participative communion.  We recall here the image of the fire and the sword the 
Confessor used in Amb 5.  Each takes on the characteristics of the other without a change in 
nature.  So too with the hypostatic union and by Maximus’ extension of that same logic, 
communion between the human and divine. 
 Participative communion describes an action that does not end.  There is no cessation of 
this dynamic once a desired outcome is met.  The consecration of the world cannot, therefore, be 
seen as some appropriation of the world by the Church or God.  The result is not a completed 
action but an establishing of the communal dynamic.  To admit an end to world consecration 
would be akin to seeing an end to the eucharistic exchange of gifts. 
 While Maximus describes deification in a three-step process of being, well-being, and 
eternal well-being, we should note that what is established at the end of the process is not a new 
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being but a permanence of the relationship of the original being with God.  The transformation 
that results has to do with the mode of being, affirmed by the free choice in conversion of that 
being’s original logoi to return to God in an eschatological manner.  At no point does a new 
being emerge from this process.  So too, the offering back to God of all creation does not result 
in a different creation but a deified one.  Even the use of the word “result” is misleading here 
since we are speaking about an establishing of a relationship in eschatological permanency.  
Even as God is embodied in the deified world, ontological distance is never done away with.  In 
each person and in each created reality, consecration establishes participative communion that 
has yet to be eschatologically ratified. 
 That this dialogue perdures as a permanent dynamic within the eschaton is supported by 
Maximus’ temporal theology of ever-moving-repose.  This concept allows us to see deified 
creation as coming into the repose that connotes the impossibility of regressing from the final 
union with God while acknowledging the continual dynamism of this “ever-moving” 
relationship.  The deified receive this quality of ever-moving-repose as a reflection of God’s 
activity.  We are reminded here, of the Confessor’s use of the Gregorian idea of perpetual 
progress.  The never-ending communion bespeaks a further deepening of the relationship.  
Though this relationship is eschatologically permanentized it is one that is not susceptible to 
Origenistic satiety. 
 The above intermingles with a fine point of eschatology due to the nature of this dynamic 
as a participative and not a productive one.  In offering creation to God through consecration 
humanity never acts in a way bereft of divine activity.  Eschatological consecration is always 
then a result of divine activity and never human action alone.  Though humanity is invited into 
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the role of consecrator, eschatological realization can never be said to be contingent upon 
anything but divine action. 
 
Conclusion: Consecrators of the World to God 
At the outset of this chapter, we mentioned Benedict XVI’s hope that we might all be 
gathered in Christ’s activity of transubstantiating the world.  The Pope Emeritus was not 
referencing a fully developed theological concept but making a striking parallel between the 
liturgical action of consecration and the offering of the world to God.  Transubstantiation of the 
world is similar enough to conversion of the logoi that it can be used here because it addresses 
the same eucharistic realities that make up maximian dialogic reciprocity. 
Maximus would not have been familiar with the concept of transubstantiation since it was 
not coined until the 12th century.69 The concept is characteristically western, drawing upon the 
Aristotelean framework of substance and accidents.  Without belaboring an explanation of the 
philosophical categories at work we can understand the concept of transubstantiation as an 
acknowledgement that while the outward appearance of a thing remains the same, God is capable 
of changing the reality behind it.   
An aspect of transubstantiation that is particularly well suited for our purpose is that from 
a position removed from the reality, especially without the perspective offered by faith, one does 
not notice any change in the reality which is being addressed.  To draw a direct comparison: in 
the same way as one who observes the eucharistic species from an outside perspective sees only 
bread and wine, the lives of Christians who have turned the tropoi of their lives to God would 
consist of the same matter of joy, suffering, love, and death that makes up every human life.  The 
                                                          
69 James T. O’Connor The Hidden Manna: A Theology of the Eucharist (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 183. 
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daily bread offered and consecrated to God is of the same good creation which every human 
person experiences from their own unique perspective. 
Here I propose a change in tropos is accompanied by a subjective element, a change in 
meaning.  This is in keeping with our application of transubstantiation.  In sacramental theology 
it could be said that the eucharistic action is accompanied by but not limited to a tran-
signification that indicates to the believer that this bread and wine now mean something different 
without exhausting the mystery of the sacrament.70 In the same, I submit that the change in 
tropos is signaled by a change in subjective meaning for the one making the offering.  Once 
again, this is not meant to equate a change in tropos with a change of meaning but names a 
change in meaning as one of the traits of a reality which has been handed over as an offering, a 
logoi recognized, affirmed by human freedom that is on a trajectory back to God. 
This proposition touches directly the practical daily living of the faithful and begs 
specific application.  First, we should note that each of these examples are participative instances 
of the divine-human activity that Maximus names theandric, the language I am using to express 
these examples may tempt us to see them as taking place as an exclusively human action but, if 
we are to be at all faithful to the maximian perspective, we must always remember that God 
remains ever involved in this activity.  Second, there is a need to make a chalcedonian distinction 
that does not imply separation between actions that are explicitly undertaken as an offering to 
God and those that acquire their status as an offering because they are the natural actions of 
human persons on the path to deification.  The first I call explicit offerings since even if they are 
                                                          
70 For discussions on transignification vs transubstantiation see Rock A Kerevesty Wedding Feast of the Lamb: 
Eucharistic Theology from a Historical Biblical and Systematic Perspective (Chicago: Hillebrand, 2004), 211.  For 
an in-depth discussion on symbolism and signification as one aspect of one aspect of a sacrament that does not 




not undertaken for the sole purpose of being an offering to God the recognition of the activity as 
offering grants it an explicit change in meaning intended by the offeror.  The second I call 
participative offerings since they take on the character of offering not as a direct result of being 
recognized as such but because they make up the daily matter of life of one in participative 
communion with God. 
Explicit offerings include any of those actions in which the meaning is understood to be 
directly connected to God.  As the most explicit offering, times of prayer and liturgical action are 
the means by which other realities in our lives are offered and consecrated.  This includes the 
handing over of one’s life, struggles, joys, and hopes in the course of the Church’s liturgical 
action as well as personal prayer.  Actions taken in the name of charity and justice also fall under 
this category: the reordering of society taken up as a vocational call of the laity represents an 
explicit offering to God of practical circumstances.  Similar to this are actions taken for the sake 
of creation in the name of preserving the ecological gift that God has given.  These actions, 
inasmuch as they share an intentionality that is done for the sake of or on behalf of God’s plan, 
are explicit offerings of creation to God. 
Participative offerings, due to their indirect nature, may be recognized by the offeror as 
acts of consecration during moments of reflective introspection but do not owe their status of 
offering to this recognition.  They are performative in nature and consist of those daily life 
decisions that unceasingly demand the attention of the faithful.  These offerings are the living out 
of the married life, daily occupations, physical and mental relaxation, and hardships cited in LG 
34.  Many of these realities are difficult to extract from the complicated circumstances that make 
up daily life and in naming these actions and situations I in no way intend to present them as a 
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comprehensive list nor do they represent clear and distinct sacrifices that could be isolated from 
one another but in concert make up the life and creation offered. 
One common scene from family life can serve as an intersection for many of the complex 
realities characteristic of a participative offering: a mother’s loving care for her child. It would be 
difficult to find an act of love that is more natural or ordinary, yet it is the nature of this love that 
we see the logoi of selfless care and dedication manifest.  Images of this are iconically written 
into the human psyche.  From the point in which the child relies on the mother for existence en 
utero, to first years of feeding, teething, soothing, playing, crying … Regardless of life 
circumstances mothers give something of their very lives to their children. Such self-gift 
demonstrates participative offering to the point that it would be bold not to recognize the 
presence of the logoi even in the actions of non-believers. 
The biological roots of maternal charity are not a stumbling block for us here, as though 
the act of self-giving in motherhood would be better if it were a matter of sheer will.  That 
maternal love arises partly out of a mother’s natural desire and disposition toward loving is itself 
a proof that the logoi tend toward dialogic character of self-gift.  Maximus’ creation affirming 
thought prepares us to recognize that the logoi are not opposed to corporeal reality but written 
into it.  The realization that such love draws the mother out of herself, toward charity, and is best 
realized in other-centered-self-gift may be a natural path through which many recognize and 
pursue conversion of the logoi. 
 Similarly ubiquitous to human living is the tragedy of suffering.  In LG 34 this reality is 
coupled with a qualification: it must be “borne patiently.” This is due to the ambivalent character 
of suffering, which may engender spiritual growth or death equally based upon free response.  
There are, of course, voluntary sufferings which fall under the above heading of explicit 
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offerings: fasting, mortification, trials and challenges offered up.  More common are the 
innumerable trials, difficulties, hardships, and tragedies that beset humanity no matter our station 
in life.  These become participative offerings whether they have been acknowledged as such or 
not. The bearing of hardships and not the flight from them is itself a sacrifice.  
The culmination of involuntary human suffering, death, has a unique place in Maximus’ 
theology of deification.  In his study of the human body within the maximian corpus, Cooper 
observes how Maximus’ thought connects bodily death to the realization of deification.71 
Deification puts death to active use as a means of detachment, purification, and witness.  In this 
sense, the long suffering of a terminally ill patient may be seen not as the defeat of medicine or a 
meaningless event but as a witness to life beyond the physical.  Without foregoing the 
accompanying emotional experiences of sadness and grief we can see in death a participative 
offering of the dying who point beyond the contingent creation in which the final manifestation 
of deification is impossible. 
 In contrast to emotionally evocative events such as suffering, death, and motherhood is 
the quintessentially mundane example of the day-to-day work of the faithful.  As with suffering, 
there are instances of this daily work that manifest themselves as explicit offerings.  Those daily 
tasked with a mission at the service of their moral or religious conscience can clearly draw the 
tropological meaning shift we have proposed.  Health and mental care workers, advocates for the 
disenfranchised, and public servants, to name a few, may see their work to and for others as a 
sacrificial offering.  Connecting professions that are not commonly associated with service or 
mission proves far more difficult. 
                                                          
71 Cooper, 245-6. 
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 What do trash collection, fast-food service, or balancing a corporate budget have to do 
with consecrating the world to God?  Within these contexts we have individual opportunities for 
explicit and participative offering.  Explicitly those employed in occupations could see their own 
activity as an explicit call to live out the logoi in their particular place of work.  Justice remains 
justice whether it is the collective bargaining for worker’s rights or if it is the manager’s decision 
to ensure that a single parent has ample time off.  An explicit offering might be made of 
particular relationships based upon their employment and there are many who find their 
Christian identity as a workplace evangelist. 
 Concurrent with these explicit opportunities is the participative offering that takes place 
within the workplace by the simple virtue of the faithful living and working within it.  These 
manifestations of offering tend to be hidden and are often unacknowledged.  They are made by 
the simple living out of the logoi in the context of the world.  As with the example of 
transubstantiation, these lives are only noticeably different if analyzed at the level of meaning.  
For instance, the person formed by the logoi of faithfulness and honesty may carry out their task 
in the same manner as anyone else, their unexplored motivations inseparable from their life with 
God.  Similarly hidden is the resistance of temptation which from the perspective developed by 
the Confessor is the free affirmation of the logoi which converts them back to God. 
Manifestations of these virtues for Maximus point toward God in and of themselves.  As 
self-contained milieus in their own right, workplaces share many of the same raw experiences 
represented in our other examples.  Certainly, places of employment have proven to be a source 
of stress and suffering for many.  As such these spaces become stages for our life’s drama and 
for the faithful this life is a manifestation of God’s presence.   
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As participative offerings, the change in meaning does not require a conceptualization of 
God’s presence or action but a uniting of that reality to our deepest selves.  Though the change in 
action is taken in relation to and for the sake of the Logos and logoi, the effectiveness of our 
consecration of the world is not contingent upon the ability to draw conceptual connections from 
the realities of life to God.  If this were the case, the consecration of the world to God would be 
indistinguishable from the pietistic habit of explicitly referencing every experience we have to 
God.  The reality we are attempting to recognize tends to be just as hidden as the lives that 
undertake it daily.  By acknowledging a change in meaning as a change in tropos I mean to say 
that this change resonates to the very core of who we are as persons even if the presence of the 
logoi can only be acknowledged in these situations during periods of introspection and prayer. 
 
Proleptic Participation 
 From the maximian standpoint, the exercise of the common priesthood puts the laity 
within a proleptic participation of the eschatological dynamic.  Living in a manner that offers the 
sum of human experience, in the Spirit, to God as a eucharistic offering constitutes a proleptic 
participation in the deified life.  Though ever mindful of a future eschatological consummation, 
Maximus does not draw a sharp line of distinction between deified human activity in the present 
and future eschatological fulfillment.  Thus, the Confessor holds in tension an ever-accessible 
realized eschatology with the promise that the foretaste will be perpetuated and fulfilled when it 
enters the eternal dynamic of ever-moving-repose. 
 Upheld by the preservation of persons and God’s affirmation of human freedom, the 
proleptic experience of deified life is itself the union of God and humanity through consecration 
of the world.  That this reality is present as a foretaste does not lead to the alleviation of any part 
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of the human life or condition.  As Lumen Gentium indicates in its list of human activity, this 
does not inaugurate a cessation of human suffering, human work, human leisure, or human 
creativity.  Human freedom to undertake tasks, to hope, to dream, and to act is not stifled but 
granted a new divine mode.  This means that there is no quantifiable goal to deified human 
action.  Participation in eucharistic dialogic reciprocity means that at no point can we identify the 
boarder or goal of the activity of mediation.   
 There is a tension here of eschatological hope.  Proleptic participation in the eschaton 
through the consecration of the world is not a discursive movement of progress from one point to 
the next.  At no time can a claim be made that God has fully been embodied in one created 
reality or another.  The task is an unquantifiable one.  There is no territory to be definitively 
conquered, no filling of vessels with a commodity of grace, no perfect society to establish.  
There is only the perpetual communal offering.  This understanding of world consecration avoids 
two extremes contradictory to eschatological hope: triumphalism and futility.   It avoids 
triumphalism because neither can one say that the work has been completed in this or that sphere 
nor can one claim that having completed a task, or that the final work of divine dialogue is 
fulfilled.  It avoids futility because the very point of the work is communion and not some 
preconceived product.  Deified life is not out to overtake, conquer, compete with, or cancel 
human experience but to come into intimate communion with it. “The Logos of God (who is 
God) wills always and in all things to accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.”72 
Eschatological hope is not for an accomplishing of this consecration once and for all but the 
participation in the eternal communion that is the embodiment of the Logos.
                                                          






The goal of this dissertation was to develop a theological lens that is faithful to the 
thought of Maximus the Confessor and to bring that lens to bear upon the continuing 
conversation on the theology of the laity.  As a result, I have addressed two major issues that 
dominate the discussion of the laity since the Second Vatican Council.  The first of these is the 
perceived contradiction of terms in the conciliar language, that the task of the laity is to 
“consecrate the world to God.” The second is ambiguity and non-specificity in the conciliar 
teaching about lay life outside of explicitly ecclesial activities. 
 Maximus’ rich thought pressed our study beyond these questions and invited us to 
consider the lay life as an individualized instance of the dialogic reciprocity between humanity 
and God.  Drawn from the Confessor’s vision of cosmological unity in Christ, this dynamic 
reveals that the life of the laity is a performative participation in God’s desire to realize the 
mystery of His embodiment in the cosmos.  This understanding moves the task of the laity from 
the periphery to the center.  God’s plan to unite all things in Christ is made manifest by the daily 
offerings made in every lay life, no matter how obscure. 
 To address the primary concerns of the post-conciliar literature, I had to first trace the 
scholarly literature on the laity.  In Chapter 1 I mapped out the formulations of lay theology 
present in the documents of the Second Vatican council and the two schools of thought that 
characterized the reception of the Council’s teachings.  The Magisterial school reaffirmed the 
conciliar teaching and continued to apply it to emerging situations within the Church without 
addition.  Pope St. John Paul II’s Christifideles Laici re-explored the conciliar teaching with an 
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emphasis on complementarity between the laity and clergy but retained the themes and language 
of the council. 
 A second voice that emerged from the post-conciliar discussion were those theologians 
who saw the theology of the laity as it was expressed in the conciliar documents as a terminus a 
quo from which further theological discussion was not only invited but necessary if the 
theological identity of the laity was ever to be defined.  These theologians make up what I call 
the developmental school.  A combination of identifying the documents of the Second Vatican 
Council as a point of departure and the theological developments of the 20th century led these 
thinkers to a number of shared conclusions and concerns.  One crucial issue raised by the 
development school addressed three corresponding dichotic pairs: the laity-clergy, secular-
sacred, world-God.  They viewed the conciliar language as implying a set of distinct spheres 
which, at best, implied that the laity had been relegated to a passive role and, at worst, 
envisioned the laity and the secular as being completely cut off from God.  This vision of the 
laity was not only in contradiction with the claim that the Second Vatican Council recognized the 
laity as equal sharers in the Church’s life and mission, the development school understood the 
dichotic pairs as implying that creation itself is not good due to its need to be consecrated. 
 What is the purpose of a laity whose mission is the consecration of an already good world 
to God?  How can we understand the ecclesiological categories of laity and clergy in a manner 
that does not relegate the laity to an exclusively passive role?  Maximus’ cosmological vision is 
uniquely suited for addressing these aporia.  In Chapter 2 I provided a detailed description of the 
Confessor’s cosmology.  At the root of Maximus’ thought are the Chalcedonian adverbs used to 
describe the hypostatic union.  This union is distinct without separation, without change, without 
division and without confusion.  These enable the Confessor to make important distinctions 
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without implying a breakdown in unity or a shared identity that would result in assimilation.  I 
explained how this is key to his cosmological system since it allows Maximus to describe a 
cosmos that is characterized by an ontological difference that is a necessary prerequisite for 
communion with God. 
 This understanding framed my introduction of Maximus’ key cosmological term: the 
logoi.  As wills of God, the logoi are creation’s participation in God.  All of creation was made 
according to the logoi and has the logoi embedded within it.  The logoi are God’s abiding 
presence within creation understood in a Chalcedonian manner: God is united to creation as its 
source and destiny.  Creation is in itself good but is not to be confused with God.  The good 
character of creation can never be lost since it can never be separated from the logoi which 
informs its nature.  There is embedded within the logoi an eschatological invitation to return to 
God.  This may be fulfilled or resisted by the free action of created beings and is manifest in the 
mode, tropos, through which they express their logoi.  This mode may be in line with the logoi or 
it may be opposed to the logoi as is the case with the corruption of sin.  The movement of the 
logoi on a trajectory back to God, conversion results in the eschatological consummation of 
creation, the fulfillment of God’s desire to become embodied in creation through the logoi.  
Maximus’ cosmological vision gives us some of the tools necessary to solve the problem of a 
good creation offered back to God: participation in God through the logoi gives creation an 
undeniably good character yet there is an invitation to return so that God’s intentions for creation 
might come to consummation. 
 Building upon the cosmological vision laid out in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I reflected upon 
Maximus’ description of deification.  Deification provides the details of how the Confessor’s 
cosmology unfolds in time as well as revealing humanity’s unique role in God’s plan.  Maximus 
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describes the change affected by deification as a communion with God through a change in 
tropos.  Deified humanity has Christ, the Logos himself, as its prototype.  The Confessor 
presents the hypostatic union as the key to reclaiming the original vocation for humankind: the 
mediation of all creation to God.  Humanity follows the Logos according to their particularized 
logoi.  Maximus explains that Christ united all of creation despite their apparent divisions in his 
person, exercising activity that is the unified action of God and humanity, otherwise known as 
theandric activity.  By living their lives in union with God, humanity lives in accord with a new, 
divine tropos and becomes individual manifestations of theandric activity.  This activity is 
expressed in the exercise of human freedom within the creation both in an individual way and 
corporately as Church.  Maximus’ formulation of this dynamic and the presence of the logoi in 
all of creation make the whole world a participant in the cosmic liturgy.  I outlined how this 
liturgy is expressed on an individual level as a dialogue between God and the individual as a free 
exchange of gifts, as Loudovikos has coined it, a eucharistic dialogic reciprocity.  This 
summation of Maximus is particularly well suited for theological reflection on the life of the 
laity since it deals with mediation as individual micro-dialogues with God present within 
particularized human experience. 
 In chapter 4, I applied Maximus’ theological framework to the problems raised by 
contemporary theologies of the laity.  Addressing the issues at the center of the developmental 
school’s critique was central to this task, particularly whether or not Maximus would agree with 
a view that the laity were passive receptacles of grace acted upon by the clergy.  As I have 
outlined above, this is connected to a host of issues including the goodness of creation and the 
fittingness of using language of mediation and consecration.  The solution I presented was 
unique to Maximus’ adaption of Dionysius and Chalcedon. 
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First, I distinguished between the sort of mediation the Confessor would have received 
from the Dionysian tradition which recognizes only God, not the clergy, as the one from who the 
whole Church receives the charisms.  As mediators of this divine activity, the clergy are not set 
over, above, or against the laity.  Both participate in the charisms that belong only to God.  I 
contrasted this with the thought of Proclus whose ontological understanding of mediation 
requires that members of the hierarchy retain a share of the power they communicate to those 
below them and to whom they only impart a lesser share.  From this I concluded that Maximus’ 
understanding of mediation, even as it would pertain to an ecclesial hierarchy, acknowledges an 
equal share among all.  Joined to the Confessor’s reception of Chalcedon, I highlighted the 
participative nature of the communal share in the charisms.  This allows for the clergy and laity 
to express the charisms in their own manner, in their own situations without claiming that they 
are in competition with one another. 
Turning to how Maximus could develop and deepen the theology of the laity present in 
the conciliar texts, I viewed the description of the laity found in Lumen Gentium 34 through the 
lens of maximian dialogic reciprocity and explored a number of key insights.  Among these were 
the acknowledgement of the whole of creation as a eucharistic gift that could be offered to God.  
The return of this gift is the act of consecration enacted through human freedom.  I explored the 
innumerable expressions of human freedom made possible by Maximus’ understanding of the 
logoi of providence and judgement.  As long as they are in accord with the proper nature gifted 
to creation by God, the logoi, these acts of human freedom are received by God, as such they 
become a human contribution to theandric activity that enter into eternity. 
My attempt to create synergy between maximian thought and conciliar theologies of the 
laity lead me to consider the life of the laity as it is manifest in different sorts of offerings as 
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consecration: explicit and participative.  The latter is an act of consecration by the living of 
deified life in any circumstance.  Though it may not be acknowledged it is not a lesser sacrifice 
but consists of an offering due to the theandric activity that pervades the life of the faithful.  
These particular acts of consecration, no matter how hidden or obscure, are themselves proleptic 
foretaste of the definitive eschatological consecration – the unity of the logoi in the Logos. 
 
A. Omitted Topics Related to this Study 
There are many lines of inquiry related to the topic of this dissertation that may have 
proven fruitful to discuss but I have omitted for the sake of focus on the interplay between 
Vatican II, contemporary theologies of the laity, and the thought of Maximus.  Some of these 
topics are tangentially related to the topic of laity others run parallel to the argument. 
 Perhaps the most glaring omission is a detailed study of Karl Rahner’s theology of 
grace.1 As I noted several times in the text, no other theologian influenced the development 
school as much as Rahner.  Rahner is often cited by development school authors as the guarantor 
of their formulation of the God-world relationship and by extension their concern regarding the 
aforementioned dichotomies.2  
 I believe a study of Rahner in relation to this topic would make a fitting dissertation on its 
own and could be approached by various lines of inquiry: to what extent did Rahner’s theology 
of grace influence the development school?  Do the conclusions reached by the development 
school accurately represent Rahnerian thought?  A comparison of Rahnerian and maximian 
                                                          
1 See Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. William V. 
Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1978)., Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William V. Dych (New York: 
Continuum, 1994)., helpful introductions to this and other aspects of Rahner’s thought include William V. Dych, 
Rahner (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992). and Leo O’Donovan, ed., A World of Grace: An Introduction to the 
Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner’s Theology (New York: Seabury, 1980). 
2 This is particularly the case for O’Meara who has written extensively on Rahner’s thought see Thomas O’Meara, 
God in the World: A Guide to Karl Rahner’s Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2007). 
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thought would also be fruitful:  At what points do the thought of Rahner and Maximus intersect 
and on what issues would they have differed?  Human freedom and goodness of creation stand 
out as fertile points of departure for a conversation that places these theological giants in 
dialogue.3 
 The voluminous nature of Rahner’s work on grace, along with the plethora of interpretive 
literature proved prohibitive to incorporating it in the current project.  Rahner’s substantial 
writings on the lay vocation were pre-conciliar and were not representative of his mature 
theology of grace.  Any exploration of his thought on the laity would have had to include a study 
of his theological development throughout the 20th century.4  The discussion would have also 
distracted from the nature of the project which was to view theologies of the laity through a 
maximian lens. 
 Rahner’s contribution is evocative of the nature-grace conversation that dominated the 
theological discourse of the 20th century and continues today.5 The outstanding issue is the 
possibility of a nature completely separate and bereft of grace.  The debate has impacted almost 
every facet of theological inquiry: theological anthropology, moral theology, and sacramental 
theology to name a few.6 The application of Maximus’ thought to the theology of the laity is, in a 
                                                          
3 For Rahner’s view of the interaction between grace and human freedom see Karl Rahner, "Questions on Theology 
of History," in Theological Investigations 5: Later Writings (Herder & Herder, 1970).  Rahner espouses a view of 
charisms as individual manifestations in one whole charism similar to Maximus’ in Karl Rahner, "Observations on 
the Factor of the Charismatic in the Church," in Theological Investications 12: Confrontations (New York: Seabury, 
1974).  For Rahner’s thought on the act of consecrating as it relates to clergy and laity see Karl Rahner, 
"Consecration in the Life and Reflection of the Church," in Theological Investigations (Herder & Herder, 1983). 
4 Examples of Rahner’s explicit thought on the lay vocation leading up the council include Rahner, Christian in the 
Market Place. and Karl Rahner, "The Sacramental Basis for the Role of the Layman in the Church," in Theological 
Investications VIII: Further Theology of the Spiritual Life 2 (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971). 
5 The work of Henri de Lubac was precipitous to this conversation, one cannot approach it without being familiar 
with the issues he raised: see Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: 
Crossroad, 1998). and Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Arnandez (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984). 
6 For how a view of this debate nested within the greater development of theological anthropology see Stephen J. 
Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectgives in Theological Anthropology (Collegeville: Litrugical Press, 1993). 
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sense, an engagement of this problem in microcosm with an ecclesiological focus.  Loudovikos, 
Tollefsen, and von Balthasar have demonstrated that Maximus does not separate nature from 
grace.7 Due to his place in history and the theological method of the east, the Confessor stands 
outside of the issue.  An analysis of the nature-grace conversation through a maximian lens could 
adopt a method akin to the present one which does not read Maximus into a debate but presents 
him as an alternative that could speak into the conversation. 
 A third major thread that I have not broached within this dissertation is the sexual abuse 
scandals and coverups that have called many aspects of the laity-clergy relationship into 
question. A thorough study of Maximus on the subject would be fruitful.  As a lay monk who 
spoke out in opposition to a position adopted by a majority of the hierarchy, the Confessor stands 
as an example of one who confronted the clergy from within the church.  The witness of his life 
underscores his understanding of charism and the church’s ability to preserve the fulness of the 
one charism despite failures within the clergy.  In his work on ecclesiology, Loudovikos 
formulates Maximus’ position on charism as a consubstantial participation in a singular reality.8 
The understanding of a charism in which clergy participate but may render themselves unsuitable 
to exercise may help the church grapple with grievous offenses and lead to further reflection. 
 
B. Further Developing Maximian Lay Theology 
In closing, I would like to highlight three avenues down with the conclusions of this 
dissertation could be applied and further developed.  These areas of study emerge within vastly 
                                                          
For an understanding of how this debate influences the development of virtues and the proper end of humanity, 
specifically as formulated by Aquinas see Jean Porter, The recovery of virtue : the relevance of Aquinas for 
Christian ethics (Louisville: John Know Press, 1990). Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on virtue : the legacy of the 
splendid vices / Jennifer A. Herdt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
7 See Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology, 10., Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 122., Balthasar, Cosmic 
Litrugy, 190. 
8 Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 55. 
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different frames of reference: philosophical, ecclesiological, and the self-contained milieu of 
particularity.   
 Applying Maximus’ thought to the contemporary actions of the laity has, I believe, 
indirectly addressed some of the core issues of post-modern philosophy.  The deconstruction of 
metaphysics fueled by the thought of Nietzsche and culminating in thinkers like Derrida and 
Foucault are essentially based upon the great scandal that all human values, as expressed in 
ideas, language, and culture, are subjective and correlative.  The world we perceive, they 
observe, is so greatly dependent on our linguistic categories and self-formed viewpoint that we 
have no hope of attaining to an objective, absolute truth.  We can summarize this post-modern 
tenet as disillusionment at the realization that all meaning consists of subjective linguistic 
constructions, or more colloquially, that it is all “made up.” 
 Common responses to this assertion are the direct denial of radical subjectivity in the 
hope of coming upon some bed-rock objectivity.  This is often sought by means of rational proof, 
logic, or grounding philosophy in belief in God.9 All of this is undertaken in order to grant some 
form of objective meaning. 
 The dialogic reciprocity of divine communion found in Maximus does not go down such 
a route.   Maximus’ formulation of God’s embodiment as an accomplishment of theandric 
activity shows a radical comfort with the human, the subjective, the relational.  The logoi are not 
principles that drop to the earth as granite monoliths.  The will of God has at its center the 
relationship it maintains and promises to fulfill.  God’s openness to possibility, the respect for 
freedom allows the logoi to be received and offered as the result of human meaning-making.  
                                                          
9 I believe that this accounts for the resurging popularity of thomism, embraced by some conservative leaning 
groups as the exclusive orthodox form of philosophical and theological thought.  For an exposition on different 
strains of thomistic thought and their relation to the wider theological horizon see Tracey Rowland, Catholic 
Theology (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017). 
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The dialogue between God and humanity is not about coming to an objective view of the cosmos 
but the participative communion of the cosmos with the divine.  This process does not take the 
subjective viewpoint as a chrysalis which will be discarded in favor of an objective realization in 
the eschaton but is in fact the eternal ratification and affirmation of this subjectivity by 
deification. 
 The most sacred realities of Catholicism reflect this worldview.  The biblical corpus and 
Tradition in general, are theandric works, God-inspired human words, couched as it is in cultural 
and linguistic limitedness now rightfully received as the canon.  Liturgically, the offering of 
human words and actions that have ever-evolved over the past two-thousand years is the 
theandric presence of God among humanity: sensible, corporate, corporeal, and real. 
 The nature of humanity and God’s relationship as a theandric dialogue and the 
apophaticism that underpins the Confessor’s theology allows the dynamic as we have described 
it to coexist alongside the post-modern critique of ontology.  The mystical/apophatic rejection of 
concepts and ideas evidences the maximian acknowledgement of the humanly conceivable as 
contingent.  Maximus’ taxonomy of the cosmos would certainly be rejected as a subjective 
explication of phenomenon but the dialogic dynamic that emerges from his analysis would 
remain.  Theandric relationship, not human knowledge of objective reality, bears the weight of 
maintaining humanity’s communion with God. 
While I believe that the above represents a new dialogue between Maximus and 
contemporary philosophy,  it is not the first time the Confessor’s thought has been brought into a 
conversation with post-modernism.  Two notable authors who have applied the Confessor’s work 
to contemporary philosophical issues are John Zizioulas and Jean-Luc Marion.  On the topic of 
otherness, personal communion, and desire, John Zizioulas compares the thought of Maximus 
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and Pseudo-Dionysius to Emmanuel Levinas in order to show that the “other” of post-modern 
philosophy and Patristic thought are not consonant with one another.  Zizioulas notes a 
fundamental difference between Levinas and Patristic thought.  For Levinas, the human desire 
for God only leads to desire itself, which is ultimately unfulfilled since God as Other does not 
have any desire for humanity or anything at all.  For Patristic thought, which for Zizioulas is best 
represented by Maximus, God not only desires communion with humanity but provokes 
humanity’s desire and is its ultimate destination, resulting in unending communion between 
humanity and God.10  As mentioned above in chapter 2 note 77, Jean-Luc Marion folds concepts 
from Maximus’ mystical theology into his phenomenological explorations.  Marion applies these 
concepts as a substitute for traditional ontology which he rejects as a mere idol.  He attempts to 
forge a new path to theology in place of ontology, based upon the saturated phenomenon of gift 
that leads to love and the affirmation of God as the giver of that love.11 
 
C. Descriptive Ecclesiology 
 A practical advantage of this theology of the laity is that it does not necessitate a radical 
reconfiguration of ecclesiological structures.  In many ways the actions that are done in every 
facet of ecclesial life remain the same when viewed through the maximian lens.  The refocusing 
of the Church’s activity toward the consecration of the world does not require clergy, lay 
minister, religious, or laity to cease what they are doing and take up some novel activity. 
 The maximian tempered lay theology, with the embodiment of God realized in communal 
theandric activity as its hallmark, acts as a descriptive lens for what has already been the action 
                                                          
10 See John D. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 48-51. 
11 See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012). and Jean-Luc Marion, 




of the Church not only in the past sixty years but throughout the sum of her history.  While 
promoting the equality of all members of the body, the maximian schema places strong emphasis 
on the participation of the whole with the dynamic of eucharistic offering.  The goal of a 
constantly renewed theandric communion, that is not manifest once and for all outside of the 
eschaton, shifts the focus from intra-ecclesial life and work to the practice of this theandric 
communion among those who may conceive of themselves as tangentially related to the 
Church’s life and mission. 
 The activity necessary to fulfill each individual’s mission, their sharing in the mission of 
the Church does not look like an ever-increasing devotion modeled after the lives of clergy and 
religious.  Transformed, deified human activity still looks like human activity.  The 
consummating liturgical action of transubstantiation may be a useful register for this point: the 
bread and wine remain the same in outward appearance while now encompassing a new divine 
reality.  Likewise, the daily tasks of humanity in their banality can be lived in a theandric manner 
without changing their constitutive tasks or appearance.  The goal is the realization of divine 
communion in every time and place. 
 
D. Theandric Response in Radical Particularity 
 Our previous point about ecclesiology -- that the maximian lens does not offer a new way 
of being church that requires a reconfiguration but is a descriptive lens that further assists us in 
seeing a lay-lived theandric communion as a sign that the dynamic is being properly understood 
and lived -- leads us to acknowledge the relevance of radical particularity.  Grasping this point is 
a matter of understanding the inestimable relevance of the peculiarities and eccentricities of 
particular human milieus to the divine plan. 
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 Often the stage upon which the church’s life and mission are conceived are extracted far 
beyond the mundane: what is important are the events of Calvary, the shifting of life and culture 
of society, the influence of the Church upon the res publica or some other compounding of 
human activity such that it is often difficult to see how individual relationships contribute to their 
outcome. 
 In contrast, the stage of the dialogic exchange is the obscurity of individual communities 
and lives.  Dialogic reciprocity embraces the radically particular and elevates it to the stage upon 
which the salvation of the world takes place.  Perhaps it would be illustrative to reformulate the 
return of the logoi in these contexts not as the salvation of the world but the salvation of worlds.  
Changing the frame of reference here is not meant to deny the final unity of the cosmos but to 
draw attention to the phenomenological experiences of humanity and our creation of our own 
worlds which we inhabit.  One has only to drive down a city street to become overwhelmed by 
the innumerability of these worlds: the discount tire center, the fast-food restaurant, the corporate 
office, the family of four huddled in a small apartment.  Every instance comes with their own set 
of self-centric concerns: how to solve this supply problem, will there be enough customers 
tonight to pay the employees, how to resolve an ongoing interpersonal conflict, does this 
diagnosis mean my daughter will never be happy… 
 To its inhabitants, every one of these worlds is of inestimable importance.  They can 
contain the hopes, fears, sufferings, and longings of generations.  Each of these have nested 
within them an infinitude of experiences, all of which may be brought to bear to the theandric 
relationship of dialogic reciprocity.  Inasmuch as these expressions of human particularity and 
freedom do not run contrary to the logoi, they are the fertile ground for the fulfillment of God’s 
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